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Note 
This work has been submitted as the author’s PhD-thesis in 2004. Since then, the text has been 
revised to take into account suggestions made by the two dissertation advisers, Professor Rudolf 
Wagner and Ulrich Lau, for which I am grateful to both of them. Other revisions have been made 
to take into account the author’s continuing work, together with Ulrich Lau, on the Zhangjiashan 
legal texts, which resulted in Lau and Lüdke 2012. Differences to Lau and Lüdke 2012 result 
either from insights gained after the latter work went to print, or, in rare cases, from different 
approaches of the two co-authors to specific issues. Primary sources and secondary literature 
published since 2004 have been added where these are necessary to document updates in the text. 
In a very selective way, secondary literature has also been introduced to position the original 
arguments in relation to more recent discussions. A comprehensive account of the vast literature 
on the Zhangjiashan legal texts published after 2004 would have resulted in a completely different 
kind of work, which would have been neither appropriate nor desirable. This thesis dates to a 
period when the Zhangjiashan texts just started to receive scholarly attention. Since then, the 
amount of publications dealing with them and related aspects has multiplied (Barbieri-Low and 
Yates 2016, in their bibliography of secondary sources in Asian languages, list an estimated 1500 
works on 98 pages). Nonetheless, the author hopes that his work remains a valid contribution to 
the field. 
Erlangen, October 2016 
Preface 
While writing this study, a number of debts have accumulated. I probably owe most to Ulrich Lau, 
who first introduced me to the study of early Chinese law and showed me the riches to be derived 
from this still unexploited mine. I probably would never have stumbled by myself on this field, 
 5 
which so far has not been in the mainstream of Sinology due to a lack of sources and attention. 
When Ulrich Lau, after a seminar in Heidelberg on the Zouyanshu, suggested working together on 
a translation of this source, this became the beginning of a project that has since taken on a life of 
its own. We soon realised that an accessible translation of the Zouyanshu not only required 
extensive annotation, but also a detailed analysis of the legal institutions that form its background. 
At some stage, we decided to present this work in the form of a dictionary of the legal terminology 
used in the Zouyanshu. Over the years, this has developed into a detailed reconstruction of many 
of the core concepts of Qin and Han law on the basis of the presently available received and 
palaeographic sources. This work has been greatly furthered (and also greatly prolonged due to 
the necessary revisions) by the publication of the Ernian lüling collection of statutes, dating to 
186 BC and unearthed from the same tomb in Zhangjiashan as the Zouyanshu. The results of this 
co-operative project will be published as a separate volume under the envisaged title The Craft 
and Terminology of Early Chinese Law – A study of the Zouyanshu and the Ernian lüling. While 
the present study has grown out of this larger project, it affords me the opportunity to look at some 
of the wider issues concerning the evolving professional field of legal practice in early China. 
Throughout the pages to follow, I have included only few cross-references to the larger 
forthcoming work, to which the reader is directed for a detailed annotation of all the Zouyanshu 
passages quoted and for translations of most of the Ernian lüling stipulations mentioned, as well 
as for a detailed discussion of the legal terms and concepts which for the most part are only very 
briefly explained in the following chapters. 
Our co-operation on the Zouyanshu project has been a fortunate one for me, as I have learned 
much from Ulrich Lau which also has benefited the present work, not least from his keen interest 
in social institutions as a foundation of society and culture, his wide knowledge of early Chinese 
legal and non-legal sources, and his subtle understanding of the Chinese language, which is 
informed by an expertise in historical phonology – both a rarity among sinologists and an absolute 
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prerequisite for the work with palaeographic material. At the same time, I also need to apologise 
for the many disruptions in our work, caused by the exigencies of life and my youthful optimism 
which again and again caused me to gravely underestimate the effort involved. 
The support of a number of other people has been essential for my work. I am grateful to all of 
them: 
Peng Hao 彭浩, of the Jingzhou museum 荊州地區博物館 which has excavated the 
Zhangjiashan material, has given indispensable help in spending much time discussing the 
originals of this find at a time when the reproductions were not yet published. 
Ziva Ben Porat extended a generous invitation to a conference on “Mediated Testimonies” held 
by the Tel Aviv University’s Porter Institute in April 2002. Without this, the second chapter of 
this study probably would never have been written. 
Enno Giele not only furnished me with his as yet unpublished dissertation, but also provided 
stimulating insights into a number of relevant questions. 
Laura Skosey generously sent me a copy of her exciting dissertation. 
Catherine Yeh again and again brought a warmth and brightness that was good to have during 
long lonely hours among books and in front of computers. 
Most important has been the unwavering support given to me by my parents, Antonia and Karl 
Josef Lüdke, throughout the many years of my study of this unusual choice of a subject. 
Throughout the last ten years, it has been a very special privilege for me to study and work with 
Professor Rudolf Wagner at the Institute of Chinese Studies at Heidelberg University – not only 
because of the ideal conditions and the creative atmosphere he has established, his irresistible 
intellectual presence, and the continuous challenge to his students to realise their potential to the 
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fullest. Without Professor Wagner, this work would neither have begun, as the enthusiasm for 
China he has helped to kindle kept me into Chinese studies, nor would it have been finished. I am 
particularly grateful for the rare combination of complete intellectual freedom afforded to me on 
the one hand, and a very keen and critical interest in my work on the other. His suggestions on a 
number of minor and major matters have been indispensable. For all remaining mistakes and 
shortcomings, I alone carry full responsibility. 
Heidelberg, December 2003 
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Introduction: Law in China 
This study is concerned with law in early China. It thus touches on a very fundamental issue: Can 
we speak at all of law in the context of China? 
The one end of the spectrum of possible answers is marked by authors like Thomas B. Stephens, 
who, in a study of the Shanghai Mixed Court (1911-27), concludes that China up to and including 
the period of the Mixed Court, has been characterised by a “disciplinary system” that is 
fundamentally opposed to the “adjudicative system” of the West. In the adjudicative system, 
dispute resolution and the maintenance of order turn on the “balancing of the rights and duties of 
each party in relation to the other according to the predetermined codes”, so that “[r]ules of 
obligation are the heart and centre of this system”.1 In contrast, the disciplinary system hinges on 
“the enforcement of duties without rights”, so that “[o]bedience to superiors in a hierarchy of 
authority is at the heart and centre of this system”.2 As a consequence, “the realities of dispute 
resolution and the maintenance of social order in traditional China do not fit, and cannot be made 
to fit, into the categories, constructs, and relationships of Western jurisprudence”.3 In short: The 
situation in China can be characterised as “order without law”.4 Vandermeersch, whose view is 
quoted in the third chapter of this study, proves to be another proponent of the lack-of-law school 
when he opposes the “juridical order” characteristic of the West with the “ritual order” which 
distinguishes China.5 
Laura Skosey is an example of the opposite approach. Referring to work done by Golding,
6
 she 
                                                     
1
 Stephens 1992, 4-5. 
2
 Stephens 1992, 5. 
3
 Stephens 1992, 3. 
4
 This is the title of Stephens’ first chapter, Stephens 1992, 3-15. 
5
 Vandermeersch 1985, 13-14. 
6
 Martin P. Golding: Philosophy of Law. Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1975. Quoted in Skosey 
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defines a group of criteria for a full-fledged legal system, namely the existence of (1) laws and (2) 
agencies for (a) changing and making laws; (b) determining infractions of laws; (c) enforcing 
laws; (d) settling disputes between individuals. Applying these criteria, she finds that even the 
Western Zhou already “did in fact meet the standards of a full-fledged legal system”.7 An early 
precursor of this approach can be seen, for example, in W. A. P. Martin, who found that the 
relationships between the Zhou period states were governed by a well-established system of 
international law, akin to its modern equivalent.
8
 
There are a number of intermediate positions. Among them are those of Yates and Lewis, also 
quoted in the third chapter of this study, which acknowledge the existence of law in China, but 
subordinate it to ritual and religion.
9
 Maybe closer to Skosey’s position are those who argue for 
the existence of rule of law ideas in early China, but concede that these very much remained a 
pipe-dream, because not much of it can be discerned in actual legal practice.
10
 
The question of law in China assumes added urgency due to its relevance to the current state of 
Chinese affairs.
11
 It is often assumed that the availability of autochthonous models of law and for 
the rule of law determines, or at least influences, the chances and direction of legal reforms in 
present-day China. For example, the editor of a volume on “The Limits of the Rule of Law in 
China” summarises the studies in that volume as highlighting “the great importance that Chinese 
leaders and intellectuals attach to scrutinising their legal heritage and its relation to current 
problems”.12 Chinese scholars and administrators recognise that for economic reforms and the 
integration into the world economy to be successful, China needs legal reforms that are capable of 
                                                                                                                                                         
1996, 249. 
7
 Skosey 1996, 249-254. 
8
 Martin 1894. 
9
 Yates 1995, 333-357 and Lewis 1999, 1-23. 
10
 E. g. Turner 2000, 8; Chang 2000, vii-xi. 
11
 Compare Turner 2000, 8. 
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regulating complex economic relationships and, most importantly, provide a high degree of 
certainty and predictability to both foreign and local economic actors. The absence of any 
autochthonous models would mean that for law reform, China would have to rely entirely on 
foreign models of law and of the administration of law. Should, on the other hand, autochthonous 
models indeed be available, they might not be directly applicable to the present-day economy and 
society and thus probably would in most instances not offer concrete solutions for modern 
problems. But they might provide a framework in which new or imported legal rules, institutions 
and procedures can be understood and become plausible. 
Arguments that either deny the existence of ‘law’ in the proper sense in China or are sceptical 
about its importance and its independence from realms such as ritual are often formulated in a 
way that is problematic on at least two important questions of method. 
First of all, the proponents of such arguments tend to be confident that broad generalisations can 
be made across an enormous range of time and space. The difficulties with such an approach are 
even more obvious for the West than for China, as it overlooks the huge historical and cultural 
differences between, say, mediaeval and modern legal systems, or Anglo-Saxon law and 
Continental Law, or even between the law of the European socialist states in the 20
th
 century and 
Western European law at the same time. On the Chinese side, the problems with this approach can 
be observed, for example, in Stephens’ study mentioned above.13 His focus on the Shanghai 
Mixed Court is an innovative and ingenious choice for contrasting Western and Chinese law, as in 
the Mixed Court practitioners of both traditions met on the same bench. However, this particular 
experience is evaluated entirely in terms of Western, or rather, Anglo-Saxon law, and the findings 
are then re-superimposed on all of the Chinese legal tradition, notwithstanding the fact that the 
Chinese on the Mixed Court were the very last representatives of imperial Chinese law. 
                                                                                                                                                         
12
 Turner 2000, 17. 
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A second problematic aspect of many of the arguments sceptical about the existence or 
importance of law in China is their tendency to (over-)emphasise the theoretical concepts 
underpinning legal institutions, that is, the way in and the degree to which legal institutions are 
reflected in philosophical, political or even legal writing. Stephens, for example, feels that at the 
heart of the lack of law in China lie “fundamental divergencies in the theoretical and 
philosophical concepts of the nature and purposes of the processes of dispute resolution and the 
maintenance of order in society”.14 Discussions about legal theory in China mainly refer to the 
so-called legalist writings, primarily the Shangjun shu 商君書 and the Hanfeizi 韓非子. These 
are seen as advocating a “rule by law” (instead of a rule of law), an interpretation that tends to be 
influenced by the Confucian and Daoist criticism of these writings, as well as by the bad 
reputation that the “legalist” system of Qin had since the Han period.15 However, such views 
themselves are influenced by the strong focus on theoretical concepts and their explicit reflection 
inherited from the Greek tradition, which might overlook a focus on practice and application 
based on concepts which are implicitly understood, rather than explicitly spelled out, but 
nonetheless equally valid and differentiated. 
To avoid the problems of premature generalisations and of undue reliance on theoretical 
statements, this study, and the related larger project of reconstructing and analysing the role of 
early Chinese law, on the one hand, deliberately focus on a relatively small time frame, but 
attempt to paint as accurate and detailed a picture as possible of law and the administration of law 
during this time; on the other hand, they reflect a commitment to study actual legal practice in 
addition to the theories underpinning it. 
The temporal angle of this study is the late Qin and early Han, the time which, in terms of legal 
                                                                                                                                                         
13
 Stephens 1992. 
14
 Stephens 1992, 4. 
15
 E. g. Vandermeersch 1985, 14. 
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sources, is reflected in the Shuihudi and Zhangjiashan material; the core of that time span are the 
eight decades between the accession of King Zheng 政 of Qin (the later Qin Shihuangdi) in 246 
BC and the penal reforms under the Wendi emperor in 167 BC. Within this period, the transition 
from Qin to Han is an important hiatus. The focus on a relatively small period of time is helpful 
because it offers the chance to discover important details that a broader inquiry might miss. The 
attention to detail, in turn, makes it possible to reconstruct both the inner logic of legal 
arrangements and the interrelationship of these legal arrangements with particular social and 
political conditions. In this way, a particular legal arrangement can be understood both in the 
context of the particular legal institutions and in the broader context of historical conditions of the 
time. It also offers the chance to study the extent to which law changed in that short period of 80 
years, and in particular across the Qin-Han transition, and thereby to arrive at a measure of change 
and persistence in Chinese legal history. A study of Qin and early Han is also helpful because that 
particular point in time is a crucial period in legal history: In Qin and early Han, the legal system 
had just fully evolved from its Warring States precursors and acquired the form in which it 
became formative for more than 2000 years of imperial history. The Qing code, in force until 
1911, is, in principle, a direct descendant of the Qin and Han codes. A detailed reconstruction of 
Qin and Han law also provides a meaningful point of reference for comparison with the law of 
later periods. Chinese legal institutions and legal practice, when confronted with modern Western 
law, might appear mere facets of a “disciplinary system”. But they might become better 
understandable when viewed in the light of their much earlier origin. 
This study attempts not only to be specific, but also to pay attention to legal practice and the 
interplay between theory and practice. The importance of cultural practice in history, as opposed 
to an emphasis on either ideas or socio-economic realities, has long been recognised in the 
humanities: Studies on the French Revolution, for example, have supplemented knowledge of 
enlightenment thought and of the economic conditions in 17
th
 and 18
th
 century France with a 
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concern for social practices such as book printing and distribution and the thriving of literary 
salons and journals.
16
 Likewise, I will argue that in China an analysis of questions such as how 
trials were actually conducted, how people made statements during trial, why people chose law as 
a profession, and what ethos guided them as legal specialists will have to supplement knowledge 
of the legalist literature and of the socio-economic conditions in the late Warring States and early 
imperial periods. Indeed, new insights will be available from a re-evaluation of legalist literature 
in the light of legal practice. That is, rather than viewing harsh laws as a direct result of a legalist 
thought advocating stern measures, it might be possible to see the same concern with 
predictability and equity that is visible in legal practice also reflected in the legalist writings.
17
 
This study therefore is characterised both by its focus on Qin and early Han law and by an effort to 
evaluate legal practice with the same effort as legal theory. Both these approaches have been 
made possible only by recent archaeological discoveries of legal texts. For the first time, these 
give a more complete picture of early Chinese law and its practice than has been available through 
the sketchy evidence extractable from the dynastic histories and other received sources. 
Particularly important are the discoveries at Zhangjiashan, which have yielded the Ernian lüling, 
a collection of laws in force in 186 BC, as well as the Zouyanshu, a collection of case records. 
Even though as sources they stand at the centre of the inquiries that will follow, a full evaluation 
of the finds from Zhangjiashan and of related texts discovered elsewhere is beyond the scope of 
this study. In this regard, the translation of the Zouyanshu18 by Ulrich Lau and myself, as well as 
our forthcoming dictionary of legal terminology
19
 are important complements of the present 
study. 
                                                     
16
 See, for example, Baker 1990 and Chartier 1991. 
17
 For some of the theoretical underpinnings of an emphasis on the analysis of practice see e. g. Reckwitz 
2002 and 2003. 
18
 Lau and Lüdke 2012. An English version is in preparation. 
19
 Lau and Lüdke forthcoming. An English version is in preparation. 
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My theme is law as a professional field and its specialist practitioners in Qin and Han China. I will 
argue, against views like those mentioned above, that in order to understand early China, it is 
indispensable to understand its legal institutions and legal practice, as these made an independent 
contribution to shaping society and the body politic. I approach this theme from three different 
angles, corresponding to the three chapters of this study, highlighting three mutually related 
aspects of early Chinese law: 
The first chapter deals with the Zouyanshu as a case collection that mirrors the increasingly 
standardised and professional character of legal practice. The Zouyanshu is not only a source of 
early Chinese legal practice. The collection and the cases it contains also played an important role 
as a part of that legal practice: The case records formed the basis for, and thus prefigured, the 
judicial decisions; the collection as a whole was authoritative as a guide for judicial officials and 
pursued a certain agenda. The chapter therefore explores the nature and role of both the individual 
cases and the case collection as a whole. It deals with the questions of dating that are fundamental 
for an evaluation of all information which this source presents. Lastly, it evaluates the way the 
Zouyanshu records proceedings. The model it uses for this can be understood as a form that needs 
to be filled in by the judicial officials; an analysis of this form demonstrates not only the 
importance of standardised procedure in early China, but also allows to distinguish different types 
of proceedings, reflecting the differentiation and sophistication of early Chinese practice, and also 
its development. 
The second chapter deals with maybe the paramount element in early Chinese judicial practice, 
namely testimony, and the way in which it was elicited and recorded by legal specialists. The role 
of testimony is an important determinant for any legal system, because it leads to questions like: 
How does a legal system deal with people who do not confess? What are its assumptions about 
guilt and innocence? In early China, the confession requirement – no conviction without a 
confession of the accused – was a direct result of the importance accorded to testimony. I will 
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attempt to analyse why the legal system maintained the confession requirement even in the face of 
the quandaries that it posed, and why it resorted to torture to resolve this quandary, only to arrive 
at new dilemmas: Can a confession extracted under torture be trusted? – The question of 
testimony in turn leads to the question of how testimony was recorded (“mediated”), as testimony 
in its recorded form is both the only way in which it is now, more than two thousand years later, 
accessible to us, and also the only form in which it played a role in judicial decisions at the time it 
was rendered. Therefore, it is important to know the mechanisms at work in the recording of 
testimony, as these will at least indirectly influence the outcome of the proceedings. These 
mechanisms, in turn, can be understood as a result of the professionalisation of legal practice. 
The first two chapters focus on the Zouyanshu as one particular example of a legal source, and the 
eliciting and recording of testimony as one particular aspect of legal practice. The third chapter 
attempts to highlight the broader context of these specific themes by asking the more general 
questions of what role law played in early China, and to what extent it can be understood as an 
independent professional field of historical significance. This chapter explicitly takes up notions 
that ritual and religion were the dominant paradigms in early China, and that law, if at all, only 
had a derived function. I will show that, quite to the contrary, law was a distinct and important 
sphere, with legal specialists who derived a body of legal knowledge from legal literature, 
discussing their knowledge in a distinct terminology. Equally important is the observation that, as 
a consequence of this increasing professionalism, law made its distinct contribution to the body 
politic, not only for facilitating the exercise of authority, but also for the legitimisation of 
authority. I will argue that legal practice in early China reflects a realisation that, for political 
authority to be perceived as legitimate, it was necessary that the law was perceived as equitable 
and predictable. A precondition for this was a relatively high degree of specialisation and 
professionalism. 
These remain only small contributions to the analysis and (re-)evaluation of early Chinese law 
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which have been made possible, and are demanded, by the new, and constantly growing, body of 
palaeographic legal sources. Many tasks for further research remain which go beyond the limited 
scope of the present study: 
The starting point for any study of early Chinese law is a fuller translation and analysis of the 
palaeographic sources. While translations of the Zhangjiashan texts have become recently 
available,
20
 the new finds also require a fresh and more systematic look at and re-translation of at 
least parts of the Shuihudi legal material. There is neither a systematic study nor attempt at 
translation of those fragments of the Juyan, Longgang, Xuanquan and Dunhuang finds that are 
relevant for the history of law. It is already clear that fragments that previously have been hard to 
interpret have become understandable by the new sources, and it is to be expected that even more 
could be learned from a systematic look at all those fragments that deal with law. 
Similar work could be undertaken in regard to the received sources. The Shiji and, in particular, 
the Hanshu are rich mines for legal history that have not nearly been exploited. While Shen 
Jiaben
21
 in late Qing and Cheng Shude
22
 in the Republican period have laid the groundwork by 
exhaustively compiling all relevant passages, their understanding of the systematic context has 
been hampered by incomplete sources, a situation that has dramatically changed with discoveries 
such as those at Zhangjiashan. 
A natural second step would be to study specific problems within early Chinese law. Questions 
like the treatment of intent would be of interest far beyond the circle of China specialists, 
especially if undertaken from a comparative perspective. Studies on subject matter such as the 
legal status of women and their claims to property (complementing studies such as the one by 
                                                     
20
 Lau and Lüdke 2012; Barbieri-Low and Yates 2016. 
21
 Shen Jiaben 1985. 
22
 Cheng Shude 1963. 
 17 
Bernhardt),
23
 the punishment of sexual offences, or the role of gender within law would not only 
be interesting to legal historians, but also to sociologists and social historians. 
From a more traditional perspective on history, the contribution of law to the functioning of the 
Chinese body politic and to the formation of the empire would need to be evaluated. While the 
third chapter touches on the role of law for the legitimisation of political authority, much more 
would need to be said about the concrete ways in which law was important for the maintenance of 
the body politic, for example as a tool to order society and the relationships within society; as a 
means for social and political control; as the rationale according to which the bureaucracy 
functioned; and as the universal standard that guaranteed a measure of unity throughout the 
empire. 
A large gap of knowledge remains in regard to civil law. So far, this has been largely absent even 
from the newly discovered sources. However, it is exactly this conspicuous absence which 
requires an investigation. The most likely hypothesis is that civil law was based on contracts and 
custom, in contrast to the highly codified penal law, but still adjudicated by the state according to 
set procedures; alternative hypotheses would be that civil law conflicts were either settled by 
means of the penal law, or that the state did not interfere in civil law matters at all, leaving these to 
informal mediation. Any study of this subject faces the obstacle of extremely scarce source 
material. From a methodological point of view, I would therefore suggest the following approach: 
Start with the earliest sources that provide a substantial amount of information on civil law (which 
might be rather late in imperial China),
24
 then compare the evolution of penal and administrative 
law from Qin/Han up to the time of these sources in order to gain an idea of the amount of change 
in the legal system over such a time horizon, and with this background go back to the scant 
                                                     
23
 Bernhardt 1999. 
24
 Studies such as Kroker 1965, Bernhardt and Huang 1994, Huang 1996 and 2001, for example, provide 
rather extensive information about civil law and civil adjudication in Qing China. 
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references of civil litigation within the early sources, the most important of which are found in the 
bronze inscriptions,
25
 the Zuozhuan, the Baoshan Chu strips, scattered within the dynastic 
histories, and among the Juyan material, which contains the important and relatively detailed 
record of an early Eastern Han civil law suit.
26
 
In the field of legal history, an obvious subject for new research is the question of how the highly 
sophisticated law of the Qin and Han periods, which became formative for imperial law right up 
to 1911, evolved. Most available works, many of them from China, have mainly confined 
themselves to listing the positive knowledge to be gained about early law from the received 
sources. However, Qin and Han law is visibly different both from earlier legal arrangements (such 
as evidenced in the bronze inscriptions
27
) and from those in other parts of the Chinese realm (such 
as reflected in the limited material available from Warring States Chu
28
). It remains an intriguing, 
but unanswered question to what extent and how Qin and Han law, despite the appearance of 
difference, is related to earlier models of law and to those practiced in other early Chinese states. 
But this is not enough: Chinese legal history needs to broaden its perspective to include much 
farther places. Some art historians have recently suggested that late Qin sculpture, architecture, 
and silverware might have been influenced by Hellenistic, specifically Greco-Bactrian, as well as 
Persian models,
29
 arguing, as a result, that that “[t]he First Empire of the East can only be fully 
assessed if discussed in a pan-Eurasian context.”30 Such influences might be more readily 
discernible in material objects, where similarities are not obscured by linguistic barriers (and 
divisions of scholarly fields according to languages and modern nation states). But if a 
                                                     
25
 Civil litigation in the bronze inscriptions is dealt with in Lau 1999 and Skosey 1996. 
26
 I. e. the relatively well-known Kou En case, Juyan xinjian E.P.F22:1-36, discussed by number of scholars, 
e. g. Hulsewé 1979, Lian Shaoming 1986, and Zhang Jianguo 1999, 315-345. 
27
 See Lau 1999 and Skosey 1996. 
28
 See Weld 2003, who describes the legal arrangements reflected in the Baoshan slips as very different 
from the uniform and centralised Qin system. 
29
 Barnard 2004, Nickel 2009, Nickel 2012, Nickel 2013. 
30
 Nickel 2013, 443. 
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transmission of patterns and knowledge can be shown in material culture, it will be of at least 
equal importance to trace possible connections in administration and law. Could it be that the vast 
Persian Achaemenid Empire, with its multi-layered administration, universal legal system, 
unified bi-metallic currency, imperial highways and public projection of imperial power e. g. by 
use of stone inscriptions provided some of the models that proved important for Qin’s ascendancy 
and eventual unification of China? While some of the art historians suggesting Western 
influences in late Qin have assumed that Alexander the Great’s push to the East was a crucial 
intermediary step in facilitating contact with China, the Achaemenid Empire, in the two centuries 
preceeding Alexander, reached far enough into Central Asia to raise the question whether 
transmissions could have already taken place earlier. 
Irrespective of whether legal innovations in Qin and Han were autochthonous or related to 
developments in other Chinese states or even distant empires, it is important to better understand 
which preconditions made their realisation possible. Questions such as the following would need 
to be answered: Did law derive its legitimacy and authority from the same sources in Zhou as well 
as in Qin/Han? Was there an evolution from religion and ritual to law, or was law very early on 
already a separate sphere? What are the reasons for, and effects of trends to publish law since the 
late Chunqiu period? What role is played by customary, and what by written law? Such a study 
would go back to evidence available about Zhou law from the bronze inscriptions and received 
sources such as the Zuozhuan and would then have to grapple with the difficult Baoshan texts 
which provide a window into the crucial Warring states transition period at the end of which stand 
the Shuihudi texts. Such a study would need to do more than just compile the relatively 
well-known passages on legal institutions, and take into account, in particular, the role of jurists 
and of law in life and its role in society. 
This kind of analytical study of the history of law would need to be developed into the other 
direction as well: Prior to the archaeological discoveries, the Tang code, as the earliest received 
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law code, seemed to mark the beginning of the legal tradition that found its end with the Ming and 
Qing codes, with the Han precursors only as distant ancestors. The new sources have made clear 
that Qin and Han law had a much more direct influence on the Tang code, and through it on all 
later legal arrangements, than previously thought. Beyond the more factual problem of which 
specific Tang legal arrangements are derived to what extent from Qin and Han precursors, the 
question remains to be answered what exactly enabled the extraordinary stability of the legal 
structures over the entire imperial period, a stability which warrants the claim that law in China is 
an element of the longue durée. 
Finally, a note on translation terminology: Stephens severely criticises as an indefensible case of 
“backward translation” the tendency of sinologists, by using Western legal concepts and 
terminology when talking about China, to “smuggle” in foreign institutions, thereby distorting 
and concealing “Asian reality”.31 However, it will already have become apparent that I have no 
qualms about using terms like “law” and generally English legal terminology in the context of 
China. This does not imply that I think Chinese and Western law and legal institutions are 
“essentially” alike; but neither do I want, by choosing entirely different terms, make the statement 
that Chinese and Western law are “essentially” different. I start with the assumption that different 
societies have similar problems, but use different solutions and mechanisms to deal with them. 
Even though the specific institutions and concepts might differ, they can be called “law” as long 
as they deal with similar problems. Similarly, I use English legal terms in the translation if they 
suggest, in broad way, the function of the institution for which the Chinese term stands. By this 
usage, I intend to at least temporarily relieve the terms from their philosophical and conceptual 
baggage; the reader is trusted to remember that this study deals with Chinese law and that, by 
definition, translated terms will be never be matches for the English terms which describe 
institutions in a different setting. Still, a surprising number of functional parallels will be observed, 
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 Stephens 1992, 10-11. 
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which indicates that similar problems sometimes also suggest similar solutions, even across wide 
gaps of culture and time. 
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Precedents and procedures: The Zouyanshu 
and its cases1 
The role of the Zouyanshu within the administration of 
law 
When it was found, the Zouyanshu was an absolutely unique text: While some of its technical 
terminology and procedures were known (though not necessarily well understood) from the legal 
manuals and excerpts of Qin law excavated in 1975 from tomb no. 11 at Shuihuidi as well as from 
the fragments of administrative documents that had been discarded at remote desert outposts of 
the Han empire at Dunhuang and in the Juyan area, no equivalent text, no text that readily would 
fall into the same category, had ever been seen. The nature, function and purpose of the 
Zouyanshu therefore are of primary interest for any discussion of its contents. 
Documents or fiction? – The individual cases 
As the Zouyanshu clearly is a collection of individual cases, the answer to this question will, to a 
great extent, depend on an assessment of these cases: Is the Zouyanshu a collection of legal fiction, 
of stories in a judicial setting that might have been just made up? Or a collection of actual case 
records which document real-world legal proceedings that had been conducted at a specifiable 
point in history? 
                                                     
1
 This chapter evolved from a draft originally written by the author for Exemplarische Rechtsfälle vom 
Beginn der Han-Dynastie: Eine kommentierte Übersetzung des Zouyanshu aus Zhangjiashan/Hubei 
co-authored with Ulrich Lau (Lau und Lüdke 2012) and for the forthcoming English-language The Craft 
and Terminology of Early Chinese Law: A study of the Zouyanshu and the Ernian lüling. 
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I will argue that the Zouyanshu cases fall into three categories:
2
 
1) Cases 1-18, which clearly are based on authentic documents, the basic structure of which has 
been kept intact even if they could have been edited or abbreviated; 
2) Cases 19 and 20, which are in essence literary productions for which it is nearly impossible to 
decide to what extent they draw on actual legal and historical material; 
3) Cases 21 and 22, in which the narration seems, to some extent, to have been arranged in a 
literary way, but which most probably also present historical material and which, at least in 
some portions, draw on actual documents. 
Cases 1-18: authentic legal documents 
In the following discussion it is assumed that cases 1-18 date to Qin and Han, for the reasons 
discussed below. They must be considered copies of authentic legal documents on the following 
grounds: 
Zouyanshu cases 1-18 have, first of all, a clear and explicit purpose within the administration of 
justice. Cases 1-5 are submitted by a prefecture (xian 縣)-level authority to the higher authorities, 
                                                     
2
 The cases are not numbered on the original bamboo manuscript. The numbers used here to refer to the 
individual cases within the Zouyanshu correspond to the numbers and sequence given in Jiangling 
Zhangjiashan Hanjian zhengli xiaozu 1993 and 1995 as well as in Peng Hao et al. 2007. No numbers are 
given in Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Han mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 2001 and 2006, but the cases are presented 
in the same sequence. The sequence given in the above mentioned editions clearly is an attempt to 
reconstruct the original order of the cases in the Zouyanshu manuscript, based on the position of the 
bamboo slips at the time of excavation, which is depicted by the chart published as appendix 2 in 
Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Han mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 2001, 322. An analysis of this chart, in combination 
with the list associating the slip numbers assigned at excavation with the slip numbers assigned in the 
finished transcription (appendix 1 in Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Han mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 2001, 309-320) 
reveals (a) that original sequence of the first five cases in the manuscript most likely was 1-4-2-3-5 (using 
the numbering given/implied in the above listed editions), (b) that the sequence of cases 6-13 can only be 
reconstructed with some degree of uncertainty; and (c) that case 20 probably came before case 19, i. e. that 
the original sequence of the last nine cases most likely was 14-15-16-17-18-20-19-21-22. The sequence of 
the cases will be discussed in more detail below. However, for the ease of reference, the zhengli xiaozu’s 
numbering of the cases will be used throughout. 
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each with the request to decide a case in which serious legal (as opposed to factual) doubts have 
been raised about the culpability of the accused person or persons; specifically, the question 
posed to the higher authorities is whether certain actions or laws which are brought up by the 
defendant in order to exonerate himself are indeed valid defences. Cases 6-13 are similar requests 
for a judicial decision submitted by a commandery (jun 郡) authority in cases where it is clearly 
recognised that the accused is punishable, but where uncertainty exists which of a number of laws 
or possible punishments is applicable. Cases 14-16 and case 18 are case records probably 
submitted by the commandery government to the imperial court (ting 廷) for approval of what 
amounts to a proposed judgement (dang 當). Case 17 is the record of a judicial review of an 
earlier conviction which the convict claims to have been wrongly made. 
All of these types of legal communication are known from received sources and recently 
discovered manuscripts. The procedure for submitting doubtful cases to the higher authorities for 
decision – yan 讞 – is detailed in an edict enacted by the Gaozu 高祖 emperor in 200 BC.3 All the 
yan-cases 1-13 are from the years immediately following 200 BC, implying that the Zouyanshu 
yan-cases were almost certainly directly based on that edict.4 Other edicts stipulated that 
sentences of a certain severity for certain groups of people had to be submitted for imperial 
approval (qing 請);5 the submission of cases 14-16 and 18 probably resulted from such rules. 
Cases 16 and 18 might have been also submitted for other reasons: According to Ernian lüling, 
the collection of statutes and edicts in force in 186 BC which was found in the same tomb as the 
                                                     
3
 Hanshu 23, 1106; text and translation see below. Since the retrieval of the Qin bamboo slips now held at 
the Yuelu Academy, it is clear that the Gaozu emperor’s edict of 200 BC does not reflect Han procedural 
innovation, but rather a re-institution and maybe streamlining of procedures that had existed in Qin for 
submitting doubtful cases to the higher authorities for decision. See Zhu Hanmin and Chen Songchang 
2013; Lau and Staack 2016. Previously to the discovery of the Yuelu strips, yan 讞 was known from Qin 
manuscripts in administrative (i. e. non-judicial) contexts in the sense “to submit a request for permission to 
the higher authority” (e. g. to demolish or make structural alterations to government buildings), see Qinlü 
shiba zhong 121-123=RCL A 64. 
4
 For dating issues see below. 
5
 Hanshu 1B, 63. 
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Zouyanshu, all death sentences had to be submitted to the higher authorities for review,
6
 a rule 
obviously applicable for case 16 if already in force at that time. Shiji and Hanshu contain 
examples where the central authorities, after having been informed of alleged illegal conduct by 
local dignitaries, ordered the commandery authorities to conduct an investigation and report the 
results
7
 – a situation resembling that of case 18. Finally, the right of a convict to “petition for a 
new finding of facts” (qi ju 乞鞫)8 if he maintained that he was innocent of the offence for which 
he had been convicted, the procedure documented in case 17, is mentioned in several sources,
9
 
among them the Shuihudi finds,
10
 and detailed in the collection of Han law from Zhangjiashan.
11
 
The procedure and terminology used, the legal rules applied as well as the form of recording all 
closely resemble other documents. A few examples shall suffice: 
In regard to procedure, the formal interrogation (xun 訊) of the accused corresponds to the 
guidelines contained in the Shuihudi Fengzhen shi.12 The fact that each fully documented case 
starts with a criminal complaint (gao 告) or ex-officio charge (he 劾) corresponds to the 
                                                     
6
 Ernian lüling 396-397. 
7
 E. g. Shiji 118, 3097=Hanshu 44, 2156. 
8
 Ju 鞫 refers to the finding of facts which concluded the formal criminal investigation. The ju resulted from 
the statements of the defendant(s) and witnesses as well as other evidence (Zouyanshu 5-6, 14-15, 22-23, 32, 
45-46, 64-65, 71-72, 90, 91, 120-121, 155-157). The ju was strictly limited to matters of fact. It preceded 
and was the indispensable requirement for the legal evaluation of the facts, which in turn resulted in the lun 
論 “judgement” (or, in some cases, in a submission of the case to higher authority). The procedure triggered 
by qi ju 乞鞫 “petitioning for a new finding of facts” thus involved a re-evaluation of all matters of fact. 
There is no source evidence that qi ju could be used to merely contest a conclusion of law if the facts were 
not under dispute. The closest equivalent to qi ju in current US law would be a motion for a new trial, which, 
if granted, results in a re-examination of the evidence, in contrast to an appeal, which allows contesting 
conclusions of law, but not of fact. In current procedural law for England and Wales, both findings of fact 
and law can be subject to appeal, but if appellate proceedings result in a “retrial”, this also generally 
involves a re-examination of the evidence, resulting in a new finding of facts. See e. g. Chalmers and 
Leverick 2011. 
9
 E. g. commentary to Shiji 95, 2664. 
10
 Falü dawen 115=RCL D 95. 
11
 Ernian lüling 114-117. 
12
 Fengzhen shi 2-5=RCL E 2. 
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stipulation in the Ernian lüling that all investigation be based upon such a criminal complaint or 
ex-officio charge.
13
 
The legal rules applied in cases 1-18 do correspond to a high degree to those known from the legal 
texts found at Shuihudi and Longgang, and most importantly, from the Ernian lüling. 
The form of recording matches examples from Juyan, Longgang (for the last part of case 17) and 
the Shuihudi Fengzhen shi. 
Most of these cases have not only a content that is consistent with actual documents. They also 
show all the linguistic vestiges of actual official communication. They use, for example, the 
formal expressions gan yan 敢讞14 “we venture to submit for decision”, gan yan 敢言15 “we 
venture to submit”, ye 謁 “we request”16 and qing 請 “we request approval”.17 These are polite 
formulae, used by an inferior agency in addressing its superiors, with a clear place in inter-agency 
communication routines. Cases 6-13 are, in this respect, an exception as they are lacking similar 
polite formulae. However, while they must be considered heavily abbreviated records, the full 
document on which the abbreviation is based is still visible behind them. 
Case 18 has an original title which explicitly labels the text following the title as “records” (bu 簿), 
specifically “records concerning the review of a criminal case” (fu yu bu 復獄簿).18 
A number of the cases even contain specific information about the communication channels along 
which the documents travelled. For example, three cases (no. 1, 2, and 5) include variants of the 
                                                     
13
 Ernian lüling 113. 
14
 Zouyanshu 1, 6, 8, 15, 17, 23, 28, 33, 36, 47. 
15
 Zouyanshu 68, 92, 98, 227. 
16
 Zouyanshu 7, 15, 47, 68, 98, 99, 227. 
17
 Zouyanshu 98. 
18
 Zouyanshu 124. 
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formula ye bao shu yushi mou fa 謁報，署獄史某發19 “we request a reply; [on your reply] affix 
the notation ‘to be opened by Judicial Secretary X’”.20 In this way, the sender of the document (a 
prefecture head or deputy head) in effect indicated to the addressee the return address (i. e. the 
responsible subordinate prefecture official) to be used for the requested decision. This ensured 
that the multitude of documents arriving from other government authorities at the prefecture 
directly reached the responsible department, and within the department the responsible official, 
rather than piling up in the prefect’s offices. This formula not only completely corresponds to the 
same type of note found on many of the Liye bamboo slips, which contain actual Qin-period 
administrative records from Qianling 遷陵 prefecture.21 Similarly, at the end of case 17 we find 
the formula teng shu Yong 謄書雍22 “forward a copy of this document to [the prefecture 
authorities of] Yong”. Other cases contain information about the length of the documents in terms 
of the number of bamboo slips.
23
 All this information would make no sense if these Zouyanshu 
cases were fictional and would not be based on actual documents, possible abbreviations 
notwithstanding. 
Further, cases 1-18 all contain external references to dates, localities or persons that can, to a large 
extent, be independently verified. Almost all dating information is consistent with independent 
reconstructions of the Qin and Han calendar.24 Most of the prefectures (xian 縣) and 
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 Zouyanshu 7, 15, 47. 
20
 There has been a long-standing debate among scholars about the correct interpretation of this formula in 
the Zouyanshu. However, the Liye slips have now provided solid evidence for the solution given above. For 
detailed arguments and a discussion of the evidence provided by the sources see Lau and Lüdke 2012, 
103-105, notes 613 and 614. 
21
 Chen Wei et al. 2012, 2. 
22
 Zouyanshu 123. See Lau and Lüdke 2012, 238 note 1184 for a detailed explanation of the phrase. 
23
 Zouyanshu 68, 98, 228. 
24
 This includes not only reconstructions such as Zhang Peiyu 1997 and Xu Xiqi 1997, but also more recent 
ones which take into account the latest archaeological discoveries, e. g. Zhang Peiyu 2007, 72; Li Zhonglin 
2012, 65; or Xu Mingqiang 2013. For a detailed discussion of dating issues see below. 
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commanderies (jun 郡) mentioned in the Zouyanshu are known from other Qin and Han sources.25 
At least one person mentioned in cases 1-18, can be identified as a high official in the dynastic 
histories.
26
 Even one of the personal names in the Zouyanshu can be identified as an official 
mentioned in the dynastic histories, even though the Zouyanshu mostly gives the names of local 
officials who are not preserved in the received sources. 
The formal organisation of these texts provides further evidence as to the character of these texts: 
In contrast to cases 19 and 20, the structure of texts 1-18 is the purely sequential one typical for 
administrative documents: A criminal complaint or ex-officio charge is brought against 
somebody; the suspect and the witnesses are questioned; the suspect is confronted with 
inconsistencies and points of law which might establish criminal liability; a finding of fact is 
made; and either a judgement is passed or the case is submitted to a higher authority for decision 
or approval. If the case is submitted in this manner, first legal arguments (which often are 
extremely concise) are made, and then the decision is pronounced. The argument never follows 
after the decision. This basic structure remains visible even when a highly abbreviated form is 
used, as in cases 6 to 13. Even though the exterior goal of (most of) the documents is to obtain a 
decision in a doubtful case, the the content and structure of the documents are still coherent even 
if the ultimate decision is not recorded, such as in case 2. The absence of a final decision does not 
make the text itself seem incomplete (even though the reader would be interested in the result): 
Case 2 looks more like a document that has not yet been dealt with at the highest level than like an 
unfinished story. The legal arguments that are made are short on wisdom and strong on legal 
                                                     
25
 In particular, see the list of place names in the Hanshu’s “Dili zhi 地理志” (Hanshu 8A, 1523ff.). For an 
overview see also Zhongguo lishi dituji, which has been compiled prior to the publication of the 
Zhangjiashan material. 
26
 A minister of the stables (taipu 太僕) called Buhai 不害 is mentioned in a Zouyanshu case dating to 197 
BC (Zouyanshu 26, for the dating see below). This official is to be identified with Gongshang Buhai 公上
不害, who was appointed taipu in 201 BC and enfeoffed as Hou 侯 of Jishao 汲紹侯 in 196 BC by the 
Gaozu emperor as a reward for his service in the campaign against Chen Xi 陳狶 (Hanshu 16, 605; 19B, 
747; Shiji 18, 690). See Loewe 2000, 123. 
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positivism. The applicable laws and legal precedents occupy centre stage, not the particular 
abilities of a judge. The arguments are of an entirely technical nature. If a decision is reached, it is 
never commented on, as there is no need for it: The proper authority has reached a decision, and 
that is it. Also, the judges remain anonymous. Where a lower authority needs to identify itself as 
in the case of submissions, the officials concerned do so;
27
 this is also true for the judges in the 
original trial of case 17
28
 who are identified as their judgement comes under scrutiny, and for the 
reviewers in case 18
29
 as they are responsible to the central government and its yùshǐ dàfū 御史大
夫 “chief prosecutor”30 who had initiated the review. But this identification is always from below 
to above: The lower authority’s officials are responsible to the higher authority, but for the lower 
officials it is enough to know that the higher authority by virtue of being the higher authority has 
made a decision. The officials who made that decision are not responsible to the lower level ones; 
therefore, they remain anonymous.
31
 Even where the emperor personally has decided, this is 
mentioned only in indirect terms: the case “was brought to attention” (yi wen 以聞).32 Again, in 
contrast to cases 19 and 20, not the personal ability of a famed judge is decisive, but a difference 
in authority. The reason for this is that these cases are based on actual documents of actual cases. 
In theory, it would be conceivable that someone with exact knowledge of legal procedures, 
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 Zouyanshu 1, 8, 17, 28, 36, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58, 60, 61, 67-68, 74, 97. 
28
 Zouyanshu 106, 120. 
29
 Zouyanshu 124, 126. 
30
 The traditional rendering “censor” for this office suggests a Roman censor’s powers to impose sanctions 
outside of the standard judicial avenues, while the role of the Chinese yùshǐ dàfū was, as evidenced in 
Zouyanshu case 18, to enforce the law, especially in regard to the officialdom, by means of standard 
procedures and punishments. 
31
 This also holds for Zouyanshu case 3, which notes that the imperial decision was conveyed to the local 
authorities by the taipu 太僕 (“minister of the stables”) [Gongshang] Buhai 公上不害. The taipu appears 
here only as the transmitter of the emperor’s decision, not in his role as participant in the decision-making 
process. While no other of the Zouyanshu cases 1-18 mentions court officials by name, this might have been 
necessary in this case because the office of taipu normally did not play any role in the administration of 
justice. Explicitly noting that, at the time of the case, he stood in for the tingwei 廷尉 might have been 
required to avoid any doubt on the part of the recipients as to his authority to convey the decision. 
32
 Zouyanshu 26, 47, 68. 
 30 
terminology, and documentary format could draw up fictional case records. However, this is 
unlikely, for several reasons. Not least, the context of the Zhangjiashan find militates against this: 
The person buried in the tomb almost certainly served as an official in his lifetime, therefore he 
would have had access to actual legal material, which he would have perused in during his active 
time. None of the other texts found in the tomb are fictional or can be primarily understood as 
literature: the Maishu 脈書, a medical treatise; the Suanshushu 算數書, a mathematical primer; 
the Helü 蓋廬, a treatise on military and political strategy in the form of a dialogue between king 
Helü 闔閭 of Wu 吳 (r. 514 – 496 BC) and his advisor Wu Zixu 伍子胥; and the Yinshu 引書, a 
manual of therapeutic exercises and dietary practices. All of these texts have a practical 
application, none is literature. The Ernian lüling clearly is collection of laws in force at the time of 
the burial. It would be very surprising if the legal text found in immediate vicinity to the Ernian 
lüling would be of an entirely different character, i. e. not also a pragmatic text with an immediate 
application in the administration of law. Finally, there is simply no other example of elaborate 
“legal fiction” (or any other fiction which would disguise itself as documentary or pragmatic texts) 
until much later than Qin and Han.
33
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 Barbieri-Low and Yates (2016, 98ff.) argue for a widely diverging view as to the origin and nature of the 
Zouyanshu: They contend that the Zouyanshu 
“was compiled from the bottom up, or more accurately, across the bottom by a network of legal 
scribes from different places who circulated, edited, and compiled legal cases that they came across in 
their own jurisdiction and in government-issued compilations”, 
and that the Zouyanshu 
“was not just a practical legal case-book, as most have argued, but also the earliest extant example of 
‘court-case literature’ (gōng’àn xiǎoshuō 公案小說), more familiar from Yuan, Miang, and Qing 
times. The authors (and the intended audience) of this literature were the highly literate Judiciary 
Scribes, who helped manage court cases. Through this edited compilation, they could be entertained 
in life and death by the triumphs and follies of the men of their status and occupation while educating 
themselves through legal precedents.” (Barbieri-Low and Yates 2016, 99). 
Barbieri-Low and Yates claim that these conclusions can be derived from a “detailed textual criticism of the 
book itself” (98), in particular from “certain structural and stylistic anomalies” of the cases (p. 99). For 
example, case 22 of the Zouyanshu for them is a “curious hybrid”, which “in places […] reads like a dry 
legal transcript, but in others […] presents an exciting narrative, full of suspense and folly, that culminates 
in a satisfying resolution” (p. 100). Case 21, in the authors’ view, “had been edited and embellished, and a 
 31 
                                                                                                                                                         
new section appended at some point in time, so that it had the dramatic effect and rhetorical flourish 
necessary to make Shen [i. e. the judicial official making the successful argument in case 21; M. L.] a 
scribal hero like Julü [the successful investigator recommended for promotion in case 22; M. L.].” 
While this is a steep and intriguing hypothesis, the available evidence does not offer sufficient support for 
its two main elements, i. e. (a) that the Zouyanshu was compiled by a network of legal scribes from different 
places (rather than at the imperial court); (b) that a main, or maybe the primary, function of the Zouyanshu 
was to serve as literary entertainment (rather than as technical texts in the administration of justice). As for 
(a), to explain the presence in the Zouyanshu of cases from all regions of the empire and from both late 
Warring States Qin and early Han, such an “across-bottom” network of local scribes would have to 
surmount enormous geographical distances and would have had to remain intact throughout a period 
characterized by civil war and tumultuous change. Barbieri-Low and Yates do not offer any evidence for 
this, or indeed for any type of horizontal communication. In contrast, we have very rich evidence in both 
normative texts such as the Ernian lüling and in actual archival records such as those from Liye of a vast 
and constant stream of vertical communication from local governments to the imperial court and vice versa. 
Also, Shiji and Hanshu not only make it clear that Qin and Han, from the beginning of the dynasty, kept vast 
central government archives, and that the Han had access to the central Qin archives after Xiao He secured 
these following the Han army’s entry to Xianyang; the histories also recount that later in Han, enormous 
numbers of precedents had accumulated in the archives, which were to be taken into account for the 
dispensation of justice; it is more than likely, that this process already started in Qin and early Han. No such 
evidence is available for local archives. The Liye find makes clear that local governments kept records of 
the documents concerning them, but there is no evidence for records concerning matters in other 
jurisdictions or in earlier periods. The presence of both Qin and Han cases in the Zouyanshu is much easier 
to explain if the text was compiled by officials who had access to to the central archives at the imperial court, 
rather than by local officials for whom access to the geographically and historically wide range of cases is 
difficult to explain. As for (b), the earliest gongan xiaoshuo are much later; there is no evidence from the 
time in between the Zouyanshu and the earliest gongan xiaoshuo literature that would allow us to 
understand the Zouyanshu as an early precursor. Also, there is no other example of early Chinese literature 
which would strive to resemble official documents. The literary features and supposed “structural and 
stylistic anomalies” of some of the cases can be better explained as attempts to increase their argumentative 
efficiency and didactic value, rather than as an effort to entertain. For example, the particular stylistic 
features of case 22 are best explained with the stated purpose of the document, i. e. to present an efficient 
recommendation for promotion. Wei yu deng zhuang 142-170 shows that such recommendation letters 
followed a well-established standard format and thus shared the same stylistic features. The features of case 
21, but also of cases 19 and 20 are best understood as enhancing their didactic value concerning efficient 
investigation and legal argumentation. The rhetorical features of the “masters”-literature of the Warring 
States period (to which there are clear allusions in cases 19 and 20) would seem a much apter point of 
reference than the later gongan xiaoshuo literature. Barbieri-Low and Yates point out that officials, in 
particular judicial officials, appear in a relatively high number of Zouyanshu cases. However, rather than 
seeing this as an effort on part of “scribes” to entertain themselves with the successes and follies of their 
(literary) peers, this is much better explained as an effort on the part of the central government to encourage 
compliance among local officials by selecting cases for the collection which present both role models of 
exemplary conduct and warnings against official misconduct. 
Probably the most original argument made by Barbieri-Low and Yates is that some of the personal names in 
the Zouyanshu “appear ironic or curiously apt, much like the humorous or punning names seen in later 
Chinese drama”, as “copyists or editors tampered with these names for literary effect, for the delight of their 
like-minded audience” (Barbieri-Low and Yates 2016, 103). If this could be demonstrated, it would indeed 
require a different accentuation of our view of the Zouyanshu. However, the selection of which names are 
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considered punning seems highly arbitrary and subjective. Why should the eight names highlighted by the 
authors be considered puns, the many others not? The authors themselves admit that even of these eight 
names, some “may be merely coincidental” (Barbieri-Low and Yates 2016, 103). There is no clear principle 
visible according to which the names are considered puns: Some names are said to contain a literal 
description of the deeds of the offenders, e. g. in case 3 Lan 闌 is understood as “border jumper”, while 
others are said to ironically imply the exact opposite of their literal meaning, e. g. Xin 信 “trustworthy” for 
the “murderous Magistrate” in case 16; others still are considered phonetic puns based on homophony, e. g. 
the woman’s name Nan 南 is seen as “an obvious pun on the word nán 男 (male)” because the woman is 
dressed up as a man in case 3 (p. 103). All of these interpretations seem highly subjective and to rely more 
on the authors’ impressions rather than a rigorous semantic analysis. Even more importantly, this argument 
would need to be backed up by a much broader investigation of Qin and Han given names, both in received 
and manuscript sources. Without this, it is impossible to understand which names where considered within 
the range of “normal”, and which would have been unusual enough to be understood as puns. This starts 
with the question for which names the character used to write them can be understood as indicating their 
literal meaning, as opposed to names for which their character is chosen purely on phonetic grounds, e. g. to 
phonetically transcribe a foreign language or local dialect name. For example, the authors (plausibly) point 
out that in case 1 concerning the “non-Chinese tribesman Wuyou 毋憂 […] it is more than likely that in the 
case record, his words were spoken in his own language and were translated into Chinese” (Barbieri-Low 
2016, 33). But if this is so, then Wuyou 毋憂 most likely also is simply a phonetic transcription of his native 
name, rather than a pun chosen to mock him, as implied by the literal translation “Without troubles” 
provided by the authors for the name (Barbieri-Low and Yates 2016, 1171). A quick survey of some of the 
names in the Zouyanshu understood as “punning” hints at the very thin ground on which the authors’ 
argument stands: (a) The supposedly ironic name Xin 信 is a very common Qin and Han given name. 
Loewe 2000 lists at least 45 people with the given name xin 信 (or a given name containing xin), including 
eight members of the Liu family as well as Zhou Xin 周信, a conscript soldier with Liu Bang who rose to 
governor 郡守 in a similar way as the Xin of Zouyanshu case 16 might have risen to prefect, as suggested 
by the reference to his military experience, and also Han Xin 韓信, a pivotal figure who through his military 
skills paved the way of Liu Bang’s victory – nobody has suggested so far that Han Xin’s given name should 
be understood not as his real name, but as an ironic pun alluding to his eventual participation in a rebellion 
against Liu Bang. Similarly, Wu 武 is such a common Han male given name that it is highly doubtful it 
would have been recognised as a pun (see the numerous examples in Loewe 2000 as well as in the 
manuscript sources, e. g. 少内武 in Liye 8-164+8-1475, 庫武 in Liye 8-26+8-752, 8-149+8-489, 8-173). 
The name of the accused in case 4, Jie 解, is translated by the authors as “‘to dismember’ or ‘coming apart’” 
(103) and understood as a “cruel pun” on the fact that he had been subjected to mutilating punishment in the 
past and in the case is accused of another offence punishable by mutilation. However, Jie is a common Qin 
and Han given name (at least 10 examples in Loewe 2000; in manuscript sources see e. g. 燧長宋解 “watch 
tower head Song Jie” in Juyan 143.9, 蓬里公乘蘇解 “Su Jie, rank gongsheng, from Peng village” in Juyan 
218.31, and again 蓬里蘇解年廿四 “Su Jie, from Peng village, age 24 years” in Juyan 334.34); the 
interpretation as a pun also runs into semantic problems: when translating jie 解 as “to dismember”, the 
authors might think of contexts such as the famous story in the Zhuangzi (3, 55) of the cook artfully 
preparing a piece of cattle, but here jie means “to release the meat from the joints and bones”, a sense not 
associated with mutilating punishments, in the context of which the word is never used (in contrast to e. g. 
zhan 斬). As for Nan 南, Loewe 2000 lists Li Nan 李南, a woman, and two women with the given name 
Nan but no recorded family name; in manuscript sources, it is found as a female name in Liye 8-145v (E V) 
(because of the female name bi 婢 in the same list of five workers), in Juyan 29.2 and Juyan xinjian 
 33 
All this does not mean that the Zouyanshu contains the originals of the actual documents of which 
it is comprised. It would be more than surprising if the originals were kept by the obviously 
relatively low-ranking official buried in Zhangjiashan in the south of the empire, far removed 
from the capital. It is almost certain that the Zouyanshu found in Zhangjiashan contains only 
copies of the original documents (which possibly had undergone some kind of editing and/or 
abbreviation), while the originals probably were kept in the archives of the imperial court. This is 
also supported by the relatively consistent handwriting, which does not differ from case to case.
34
 
                                                                                                                                                         
E.P.T.65:383; considering the relative overall scarcity of extant female names, this suggests that Nan 
actually was a very common name for women and hardly would have been recognisable as a pun. Other 
alleged puns also run into semantic problems: The authors treat nei 內 (case 12) as a synonym of liu “to 
hold back” and give its meaning as “to hold inside”, but fail to provide any evidence that it was actually 
used in that sense (which is different from the usual “to enter, to put inside”). Tui 㢈 (case 18) is explained 
by the authors as “collapsed or ill-omened house”, but this word does not seem to be attested outside the 
Shuowen jiezi and much later dictionaries; a Qin/Han usage of the graph for a word with this meaning 
would need to be documented. Gouli 㝅禮 (case 22) is explained by the authors as “He Who Considers the 
Rites as Childish” (p. 104), but again, no documentation is provided for this interpretation of the name. 㝅 
seems only to be found in the Shuowen jiezi (and not other Han and pre-Han literature), and there is glossed 
as ru 乳 (“breast; to breast feed; to give birth), which in turn is explained as “to breast feed” by Qing 
commentator Duan Yucai. “To feed/nourishes the rites” would be quite different from “to consider the rites 
as childish”. The second element of the name does appear as a given name in Qin and Han (Loewe 2000 
lists at least six persons: Ding Li 丁禮, Zheng Li 鄭禮, and four 劉禮). The evidence for puns is insufficient 
for all of these names. The latter two names, in particular, do not provide any evidence for a supposed 
“Legalist leaning” (p. 103) of the Zouyanshu. 
34
 Daniel Morgan (2015), based on a detailed comparison of characteristic features of certain characters, 
tentatively identifies two hands in the Zouyanshu manuscript from Zhangjiashan, which he calls “Scripteur 
A” and “Scripteur C”. Scripteur C, according to Morgan, appears concentrated in slips 75-84 (first half of 
case 16; most of the second half, slips 85-91, Morgan assigns to Scripteur A), 99-120 (case 17), 162-196 
(cases 19-21), and mixed with Scripteur A in slips 217-228 (second half of case 22) (Morgan 2015, 26). 
According to Morgan’s analysis, while Scripteur A cannot be identified in any of the other Zhangjiashan 
manuscripts, Scripteur C also wrote parts of the Suanshushu manuscript and in one section of that 
manuscript can be identified with segments that pose mathematical exercise questions, which are then 
answered in the immediately following segment by a different hand (“Scripteur E”) (Morgan 2015, 23). 
This back-and-forth leads Morgan to conclude that Scripteur C acts in a kind of “leader/teacher” role, and 
that the interaction between the two hands in the Suanshushu manuscript “reflects a learning environment, 
wherein scripteur C is leaving assignments for scripteur E to fill out, then coming back and correcting or 
filling in what is wrong”. This would also provide “strong positive evidence […] of the status of the text as 
a ‘real text’, not a mingqi.” (Morgan 2015, 25). The implications of this for the Zouyanshu manuscript are 
not fully clear, particularly in regard to the production of the manuscript and its pre-burial relation to the 
tomb owner. However, if this analysis holds true, it would support the conclusion that both the Suanshushu 
and the Zouyanshu were integral texts (rather than a random collection of mathematical problems and legal 
 34 
It is also possible and indeed likely that cases 1-18 were in some way or other edited for 
incorporation in the Zouyanshu. This is particularly evident for cases 6-13, which only contain the 
finding of facts, the submission formula in its shortest form (yi zui 疑罪 “we are in doubt as to 
whether [the accused] is liable to punishment”), and the imperial court’s decision. It is certain that 
for each of these cases, a detailed record similar to those of the other cases existed, and that the 
Zouyanshu therefore only contains highly abbreviated versions of the full record. It is unclear 
whether in these cases only the finding of facts was submitted to the imperial court, maybe 
because the finding of fact was considered sufficient to decide the specific legal question (mostly 
simple questions of subsumption, in contrast to cases 1-5 which required detailed attention to the 
accused’s defence), or whether, maybe more likely, full records had been submitted originally, 
which then had been abbreviated for inclusion in the Zouyanshu, presumably because the 
abbreviated form was considered sufficient for the Zouyanshu’s purposes. However, to the extent 
that cases 1-18 were edited or abbreviated, the editing left the basic structure of the original 
judicial documents intact, which corresponds to that of other archaeological evidence. The fact 
that a number of case records contain segments that exclusively deal with the handling of the 
original documents, such as notes about the person to be addressed in the reply or the original 
number of slips, provides strong evidence that the Zouyanshu versions are close to the original 
documents. 
Cases 19-20: literary productions with unknown base in legal and historical 
fact 
Cases 19 and 20 are different from cases 1-18 in a number of respects: Both claim to record a legal 
case, but they have more the character of a narrative than of a documentary record. In terms of 
                                                                                                                                                         
cases) which were written and copied in a pragmatic context during the tomb-owner’s lifetime (and not 
after his death in a funerary workshop specifically for the purpose of burial, as some have suspected) and 
which had a specific this-worldly pragmatic use. 
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structure, both texts are not organised around a procedural sequence, but in a way aimed at 
rhetorically enhancing the literary effectiveness of a narrative. Both texts first quote legal rules 
which are characterised as having been valid “in the past” (yishi 異時);35 then, a concise account 
of the case is given, introduced by jin 今 “in the present case”;36 after this the name of the judge is 
stated, in both cases an outstanding person of Chunqiu times. Next comes a dialogue between the 
judge and his sovereign: The judge reports his decision to the sovereign, the sovereign reacts 
surprised and somewhat disapproving. This is followed, at length, by the sophisticated reasoning 
of the judge for his decision. In the end, the sovereign can only utter his approval. This is a 
climactic structure: By first telling the decision in only terse words and immediately noting the 
disapproval of the sovereign, suspense is built up and then kept when the judge starts his reply by 
somewhat elaborately telling about his investigation or making general statements about the 
superior man. His decisive argument only follows in the end; the approving exclamation uttered 
by the sovereign serves to underline the wisdom of the judge. What these texts are really 
interested in is the latter’s wise decision. By first telling the judgement and only then the reasons, 
the sequential order of the documentary records is reversed for the sake of literary effectiveness. 
While the documents on which cases 1-18 are based have a defined function within the 
administration of law – submitting a doubtful case for decision or for approval by the higher 
authorities –, no such function can be discerned in cases 19 and 20. Cases 1-18 exhibit no distance 
between the composition of the text and its content; to the contrary, the use of polite formulae of 
address and the notes about the handling of the documents disallows any thought about such a 
distance. Cases 19 and 20 on the other hand use the expression yishi 異時 “in the past” (literally: 
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 Zouyanshu 162, 174-175. For the meaning of yi shi 異時 as “past” (contrasting with jin 今) see Shiji 6, 
254 and Shiji 30, 1430 (with commentary by Sima Zhen). 
36
 Zouyanshu 162, 175. Jin 今 here does not contrast with the yi shi introducing the case, but is used to 
delimit the specific case from the general rule quoted in the preceding sentence. See Zouyanshu 183 for a 
similar usage. 
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“in different times”), thereby making explicit the great temporal distance between the 
composition of the text and the events narrated in them. In cases 1-18, the actual event is the 
submission of the document to the higher authorities and the latters’ decision which is handed 
down in return; in relation to this, the offence and its prosecution are only sub-plots. 
Cases 19 and 20 also do not exhibit the density of external and historical references present in 
cases 1-18. In cases 19 and 20, both judges can be identified as historical persons.
37
 But these are 
not officials whose name survived by chance in a work of history (like that of the taipu 太僕 in 
case 3), but personages who at least since the Zhanguo period had been well-known members of 
the Confucian pantheon, and might have been chosen exactly for this fact. Beyond this, little more 
can be said than that case 19 is set in Chunqiu-period Wei 衛,38 case 20 in Chunqiu-period Lu 
魯.39 Due to the absence of any calendrical information, dating is possible only to the extent that 
the lifetime of the judges can be determined from other sources. 
It is also impossible to determine to what extent the legal information in cases 19 and 20 is based 
on historical fact. Like case 19, the Hanfeizi cites the stipulation that carelessness in preparing 
food for a ruler is punished with the death penalty,
40
 which might be taken as evidence for the 
actual existence of such a rule. However, the Hanfeizi stories mentioning this are so similar to 
Zouyanshu case 19 that they either are the source for the Zouyanshu story, or derive from a 
common source. In either case, they cannot be used to prove the historicity of the stipulation. The 
Zuozhuan contains the notorious story in which Duke Ling 靈 of Jin 晉 has his cook killed for 
serving him a bear paw which is not completely cooked; however, this punishment is clearly not 
based on a law and is given in the Zuozhuan as an example of (extralegal) behaviour unbecoming 
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 Details see below under the discussion of dating. 
38
 Zouyanshu 168. 
39
 Zouyanshu 174. 
40
 Hanfeizi 31, 189. 
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to a ruler (bu jun 不君),41 so that the Zuozhuan also cannot be counted as evidence. As for 
Zouyanshu case 20, even though the threshold amounts that trigger a more severe punishment 
differ, the stipulations about theft quoted in case 20 as valid in Chunqiu period Lu
42
 are in their 
structure so similar to the Qin and Han stipulations
43
 that it is impossible to decide whether we are 
presented with an actual early precursor of the Qin and Han rules, or if Qin and Han law is 
projected back into the Chunqiu period. None of the two terms for hard labour convicts used in 
case 20, baitu 白徒 and chang 倡,44 are known from any other sources in this meaning. The term 
baitu is only found in the meaning “recruits who have not yet undergone regular military 
training”,45 while chang is found in Han and pre-Han sources in the sense “performer of song, 
music, theatre; professional entertainer”.46 In case 20, the term xianguan shi 縣官事 “government 
business; official business” is used in a supposed law of Chunqiu period Lu.47 However, even 
though some units of territorial administration were already called xian 縣 in the Chunqiu 
period,
48
 a systematic division of a whole state into xian, which is presupposed by the general 
stipulation quoted in case 20, was first undertaken in Qin in the fourth century BC. Most 
significantly, the introduction of the term xianguan 縣官 in this sense can be dated precisely to the 
year 221 BC, the year of the unification of the empire under Qin Shihuang,
49
 based on documents 
found in Liye. These include a list of terms and designations to be replaced by new ones, 
including the instruction to substitute the new term xianguan 縣官 “government” for both the old 
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 Zuozhuan Xuan 2,288,7. 
42
 Zouyanshu 174. 
43
 See Ernian lüling 55-56 for the punishment of theft in Han; the equivalent Qin rules can be deduced from 
Longgang 273, 275 and Falü dawen 1-2, 33-36, 38-39, 42, 49=RCL 1, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34. 
44
 Zouyanshu 174-175. 
45
 Guanzi 5, 15; 6, 31; 84, 415-416; Lüshi Chunqiu 8, 81; Hanshu 51, 2357. See also Li Xueqin 1995, 41. 
46
 Guanzi 20, 120; 66, 339; Shiji 43, 1833; 125, 3195. See also Li Xueqin 1995, 41. 
47
 Zouyanshu 175. 
48
 Zuozhuan Cheng 6,359,13; Zuozhuan Ai 2,797,5. 
49
 See page 85 below. 
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wang shi 王室 “royal house” and gong shi 公室 “ruling house”.50 Other items on the same list are 
known from the Shiji account of how King Zheng, in the 26
th
 year of his rule, marked his success 
in unifying the realm by introducing new terms and designations, most importantly huangdi 皇帝 
for wang 王.51 The composition of case 20 in its present form therefore can be placed with 
certainty after 221 BC. Most likely, the same is true for case 19.
52
 In view of this, it is unlikely that 
this stipulation is authentic. 
The themes discussed in cases 19 and 20 are not unique to the Zouyanshu. The Hanfeizi tells no 
less than two variants of a story that down to their very details closely resemble the Zouyanshu’s 
narrative about the cook suspected of tolerating a hair in his ruler’s dish.53 In both versions the 
story is set in the state of Jin 晉, and no judge is necessary to clear up the charge. In the Hanfeizi, 
the cook himself sets forth very much the same arguments as the judge in the Zouyanshu and with 
this succeeds to convince his ruler that not he, the cook, but somebody jealous of him must have 
placed the hair in order to harm him. In the Hanfeizi, the stories serve to illustrate the cui bono 
principle: To find the truth about a matter, a wise sovereign asks to whose benefit it is. While the 
exact story told in case 20 is not known from other sources, the point that not the scholar’s clothes 
(rufu 儒服) make the true superior man (junzi 君子) but his knowledge and his deeds is made in 
the Mozi,54 in the Zhuangzi,55 and in the Liji.56 The Zhuangzi passage, in particular, criticises the 
Confucian scholars for being all clothes but no substance: Zhuangzi convinces Duke Ai 哀 of Lu 
魯 to announce the death penalty for people wearing Confucian clothes without having the 
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 Liye 8-461r. See also Lau and Staack 2016, 153 note 752. 
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 Shiji 6, 236. Substitutions listed both in Liye 8-461r and the Shiji account include zhi for ming, zhao for 
ling, as well as Taishang Huang 太上皇 for Zhuang Xiang Wang 莊襄王. 
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 See page 85ff. below. 
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 Hanfeizi 31, 189. 
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 Mozi 48, 273. 
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 Zhuangzi 21, 132. 
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 Liji 41, 1668c. 
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appropriate knowledge,
57
 with the result that after five days one single man was left wearing 
scholars’ clothes (rufu) in the entire state of Lu. One of the central motifs in Zouyanshu case 20 – 
treating it as an offence to not live up to the standards implied by wearing a scholar’s attire – thus 
turns out to be of old provenance. Significantly, both the Zhuangzi and Zouyanshu variants of this 
theme are set in Lu. 
All of this indicates that the basic plot of cases 19 and 20 were taken from earlier material that had 
been in circulation for quite some time. The Zouyanshu introduces into these earlier narratives 
famous judges from the Chunqiu period and re-arranges the material so that the stories serve a 
new purpose: They demonstrate crucial qualities of a judicial official, namely to look beyond the 
surface of the evidence as it first presents itself, and beyond the surface of the letter of the law 
towards the principles that govern it. 
For all of these reasons, cases 19 and 20 do not present documents, but narratives that have been 
arranged with literary means and that serve to make a didactic point. Neither the specific content 
nor legal background of these narratives can be affirmed as historically accurate. Nevertheless, 
they are interesting precisely for their didactic purpose, which is more explicit than that of the 
documentary records and therefore gives important hints for the evaluation of the Zouyanshu as a 
whole. 
Cases 21-22: authentic material, presented for effectiveness in making a 
point 
The remaining two Zouyanshu cases 21 and 22 are slightly more difficult to characterise. Case 22 
differs from cases 1-18 in that it not only records one particular judicial proceeding, consisting of 
an interrogation initiated by a criminal complaint (gao 告),58 a finding of fact (ju 鞫)59 and the 
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 wu ci dao er wei ci fu zhe, qi zui si 無此道而為此服者，其罪死. 
58
 Zouyanshu 197. 
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concluding judgement (lun 論).60 In between this formal record, case 22 interjects a lengthy 
section which describes the investigation and all steps taken by the officials responsible for it in 
great detail, involving a change of the lead investigator. After the judgement, a further section 
praises the investigator’s skill and achievement in solving the case. Such information is 
uncharacteristic and contained in no other Zouyanshu case. The description of the investigation 
has no bearing at all on any legal matters. It is arranged in a fashion to underline the almost 
insurmountable problems in solving the case that threatened to frustrate the investigation. This 
serves, first, to build up suspense, and then, when the case has been solved, to reinforce the praise 
that is finally heaped on the investigator and the deft and thorough measures he has taken. The 
material therefore seems to have been arranged with the final praise-section in mind. 
However, on balance case 22 still is very close to the first category and has to be considered an 
actual document. In effect, case 22 is a request for a promotion of the lead investigator that was 
submitted to the royal Qin court.
61
 The effort of detailing the difficulty of the investigation has the 
purpose of stressing the abilities of the investigator, which in turn makes the request for his 
promotion more convincing. While there is no comparable document within the Zouyanshu or the 
received texts, we know that requests by officials to the court to promote outstanding colleagues 
were routine.
62
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 Zouyanshu 224. Both finding of fact and judgement, though not explicitly introduced by ju and lun, are 
clearly recognisable as such. 
60
 Zouyanshu 224. 
61
 This purpose is made explicit with the words ye yi bu zushi 謁以補卒史 “we request to fill with him the 
ranks of the secretaries-in-chief” (Zouyanshu 228). 
62
 The Qin manuscripts held by the Yuelu academy contain two cases which are similar requests for 
promotion and closely resemble in structure, language, and contents Zouyanshu case 22. See Wei yu deng 
zhuang 142-170 and Lau and Staack 2016, 218-246. While the first of these two cases is very fragmentary, 
the second one (Wei yu deng zhuang 150-170) is dated to the end of 242 BC, that is, almost the exact time as 
Zouyanshu case 22 from a Han tomb, which is dated to 241 BC. Like Zouyanshu case 22 features a violent 
robbery, attempts to mislead the investigators by planting false evidence (garments typical for a convict, in 
this case), drag-net type searches among the general population, a suspect who raises suspicion by a change 
of attire (here, a new, instead of a missing, knife and scabbard), thorough interrogation and confrontation 
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The nature of case 22 as an actual document is further confirmed by the fact that, like cases 1-18, 
it can be exactly localised and dated.
63
 The legal information contained in it, in particular the 
punishment for the theft, exactly corresponds to other sources.
64
 As a document, it uses polite 
formulae of address and is clearly integrated in a hierarchy of authorities. 
To conclude, case 22 is an actual document that diverges from the model of cases 1-18 insofar as 
it is a request for promotion and not concerned with legal problems as such. Because it does not 
focus on the actual legal decision, but on the steps taken to solve the case in order to emphasize 
the competency of the official suggested for promotion, it is not bound to follow the format used 
to document judicial proceedings for subsequent review, but follows a different format used for 
requests to promote judicial investigators. 
More difficult is case 21, which, in some respects, looks similar to cases 19 and 20: The 
applicable laws are, extensively, quoted in the beginning.
65
 The bulk of the case is made up of a 
discussion between a secretary to the minister of trials (ting[wei]shi 廷[尉]史) called Shen 申 and 
his superior,
66
 a discussion which in its structure resembles the discussion between the judges in 
cases 19 and 20 and their rulers: A judgement made by the minister of trials and his staff is 
surprisingly rejected by secretary Shen, who then enters into a dialogue with his superior and 
                                                                                                                                                         
followed by an admission of guilt and the handing down of the appropriate sentence, as well as a request for 
promotion of the investigators which highlights their skill and cleverness by emphasising the difficulty of 
the case and the danger posed by the criminal. The fact that these two closely resembling cases are from two 
different text collections in two different tombs from different periods suggests that such model requests for 
promotion were widely available, and that not only the structure, but also plot details of the underlying 
criminal cases were copied and adapted to ensure the greatest possible chances for the request of promotion 
to be granted. 
63
 The request originates with the deputy prefect of Xianyang (Xianyang cheng 咸陽丞) , i. e. with the 
prefecture-level administration responsible for the Qin capital (Zouyanshu 227). On dating issues see 
below. 
64
 Compare Zouyanshu 212 (the offender’s jue 爵-rank) and 224 (the offence and its punishment) with 
Ernian lüling 55 (punishment of theft) and 83 (privileges for holders of jue 爵-rank). 
65
 Zouyanshu 180-183. 
66
 Zouyanshu 189-196. 
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colleagues, which is conducted in a question-and-answer format. The case utilises a climactic 
structure, which ends in the approval of Shen’s opinion and reversal of the earlier judgement.67 
In other respects, case 21 is closer to the first category: It discusses a doubtful case which has been 
submitted by a lower-level authority. As the case is written from the perspective of the higher 
authority, it does not contain the respectful formulae that distinguish cases 1-18. However, with 
the instruction to the authorities of Du to pass a specific judgement, it is also part of the workings 
of a multi-tiered government. 
While the case contains no calendrical information, Du 杜 prefecture68 can be clearly identified. 
The officials of case 21, though referred to by name, are not illustrious people known from other 
sources who need to lend their fame to the decision. However, even though minister of justice 
(tingwei) Gou is not found in Shiji and Hanshu (which anyway give no complete listing of Qin 
officials), there is no reason to assume that he did not hold that office sometime in Qin. The legal 
stipulations and the procedure used are consistent with other sources. Also, the quoting of the 
applicable legal rules before the legal discussion is not unique to cases 19 and 20; rather, this 
seems to have been a general principle in legal records as – in a less elaborate form – a similar 
structure is found in cases 14, 15, 16, and 18.
69
 
Therefore, it is most likely that case 21 is based on an actual decision in an actual case, but that the 
discussion about this decision is not recounted in the way of an accurate protocol; rather, for the 
inclusion in the Zouyanshu the case was re-arranged and edited to render it most effective as an 
example of legal argument and reasoning. 
Precedent book with an agenda – the Zouyanshu as a text 
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 Zouyanshu 183, 188. 
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 Zouyanshu 65-67, 72-73, 93-95, 157-159. 
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collection 
Compiled and promulgated by the imperial court – Evidence from the 
situation of the find and the text’s name 
These observations about the individual Zouyanshu cases do not allow an immediate judgement 
about the character of the Zouyanshu as a whole, which needs to be discussed separately. Some 
first conclusions can be drawn from the fact that, on the one hand, the Zouyanshu was found in the 
tomb of an obviously not too high-ranking official in Southern China and that, on the other hand, 
it contains cases from different localities. This is a further indication that it must have been 
compiled at the imperial court, as only there an archive collecting cases from all over the empire is 
to be expected. The place of its discovery far from the capital suggests that it must have been 
distributed throughout the empire and was available to local officials. 
This, in turn, implies that the cases were not merely collected for archival purposes. The 
Zouyanshu is visibly different from the late 4th century BC case records found in a Zhanguo 
period Chu tomb in Baoshan,
70
 cases in which the tomb owner was involved as judicial official 
and which may not have been completely concluded at the time of his death. They are also 
different from the fragments of case records found in Juyan, which seem to have involved local 
authorities there in some way or other but otherwise have not much in common with each other. 
But first of all, the Zouyanshu, as a collection of texts, is defined by its title: Shu 書 is a generic 
term for written matter, including administrative and legal documents administrative documents 
of any kind. Shu is further specified by zou 奏 and yan 讞. The term yan is known since 
pre-dynastic Qin as a term for the submitting of a matter to a higher authority for decision. In Qin, 
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 Giele 1998, item III.05; the texts have been published in Hubei sheng Jingsha tielu kaogudui 1991; for a 
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such a submission was mandatory in certain cases, some of them judicial (such as the placing of 
anonymous letters
71
 or the killing or shaving of one’s successor son72), some of them general 
administrative (such as the changing or demolition of government buildings
73
). In early Han, yan 
acquires the more specialised meaning “to submit (a doubtful legal case) for decision (to the 
higher authorities)”; from then on, this became the exclusive meaning of yan. This change in 
meaning can be traced back to the following edict of the Gaozu emperor, which dates to 200 BC: 
獄之疑者，吏或不敢決，有罪者久而不論，無罪者久繫不決． 
自今以來，縣道官獄疑者，各讞所屬二千石官，二千石官以其罪名當報之． 
所不能決者，皆移廷尉，廷尉亦當報之． 
廷尉所不能決，謹具為奏，傅所當比律令以聞．74 
When doubts exist in a criminal case, the responsible officials often do not dare to make 
a decision. As a consequence, on those who are liable to punishment no judgement is 
passed for a long time, while those who are not liable to punishment are held in detention 
for a long time without a decision being made. 
From now on, criminal cases at the offices of prefectures and marshes in which doubts 
exist are each to be submitted for decision to the two-thousand bushel official to which 
the prefecture or marsh is subordinated. The two-thousand bushel official in turn applies 
the law
75
 and returns a reply in the case, stating the applicable sentence.
76
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 Falü dawen 53-54=RCL D 53. 
72
 Falü dawen 72=RCL D 58. 
73
 Qinlü shiba zhong 121-122=RCL A 64. 
74
 Hanshu 23, 1106. 
75
 dang 當 “(to consider legally apposite, to consider lawful:) to apply the law” refers here to an assessment 
of the legal issues at stake that is binding for the prefecture-level authorities; a dang is to be distinguished 
from the actual judgement (lun 論) which still had to be passed by the prefecture-level authorities. Dang 
here and below is not translated as an auxiliary verb “to have to [do something]” because otherwise the 
legal contribution of the higher-level authorities would not be specified, and because the procedural steps 
delineated (yan 讞, dang 當, bao 報, yi 議, ju wei zou 具為奏, fu 傅) are already authoritative by virtue of 
being included in the edict and therefore do not require an additional auxiliary verb. This interpretation of 
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Those cases which the [two-thousand bushel] official is unable to decide are all to be 
transferred to the minister of trials. The minister of trials on his part applies the law and 
returns a reply in the case. 
For those cases which the minister of trial is unable to decide, he carefully compiles a 
memorial for the emperor, attaches all applicable precedents, statutes and edicts and 
brings it to [the emperor’s] attention.
77
 
The two-thousand bushel office mentioned was that of the commandery governor (junshou 郡守) 
in the standard chain of territorial administration (the respective offices for the capital region and 
in wangguo 王國 “kingdom-fiefs” had different names).78 The edict makes clear that no 
independent investigations are to be conducted by the two-thousand bushel offices or the minister 
of trials, thus leaving matters of fact entirely to the prefectures and marches, while higher 
authorities had to decide on the doubtful matters of law. The Zouyanshu also provides ample 
evidence for this division of labour. 
Zou, finally, means “to memorialise to the emperor”. On the background of his particular sources, 
Giele suggests that zou specifically refers to memorials submitted by high-ranking capital 
officials with direct access to the palace grounds, in contrast to zhang 章-memorials (translated by 
Giele as “petitions”) which were submitted by provincial and low-ranking officials as well as 
commoners.
79
 This corresponds with the Gaozu emperor’s edict of 200 BC which stipulates that 
                                                                                                                                                         
dang is also supported by Yan Shigu, who glosses dang as chuduan 處斷 “to deliberate and decide” 
(commentary of Yan Shigu to Hanshu 23, 1106). 
76
 Zui ming 罪名, literally “the name of the punishment”, i. e. the applicable sentence. 
77
 See also Lau and Lüdke 2012, 8f. 
78
 While the exact titles varied throughout the Han, xiang 相 (Hucker no. 2303) was a common title for the 
centrally appointed 2000-bushel administrator of a fiefdom, while jingzhao yin 京兆尹 (Hucker no. 1192) 
was the most widely used term for the 2000 bushel office of governor of the capital center, i. e. the 
commandery-level administrator of the metropolitan region. 
79
 Giele 2001, 119. 
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as a last resort, the minister of trials, was to memorialise (wei zou) the doubtful case to the 
emperor, who was the final judicial and legal authority. On the other hand, the Zouyanshu cases 
suggest that zou was also used by commandery heads.
80
 However, this question can be left open in 
our context: It seems clear that zou addressed the emperor directly, and it needs to be assumed that 
any submission by a commandery on a judicial matter went first through the agency of the 
minister of trials (tingwei) before reaching the emperor. 
The title “Zouyanshu” therefore refers to documents concerning doubtful cases which originally 
had been submitted for decision by prefectures or marches to commandery-level governments 
and had been passed on to the minister of trials, who finally memorialised the cases to the 
emperor. 
The question remains to what extent the title’s claim about the case collection does actually hold 
true. 
shu: It has already been argued that cases 1-18 and 22 in fact are actual documents; case 21 
reproduces an actual judicial discussion, even if the exact content might have been rearranged. 
yan: In the Zouyanshu, in fact only cases 1-13 and 21 were submitted as doubtful cases within the 
framework of the yan-procedure. Cases 14-16 and most likely also 17 and 18 were submitted to 
the imperial court (the royal court in case 17), although not as doubtful cases, but because 
approval of the judgement was required. Case 22, essentially a request for a promotion, and of 
course cases 19 and 20 within the Zouyanshu have the greatest distance to the yan-procedure in its 
early Han form. 
zou: Zou implies the involvement of the ruler. In the Zouyanshu, cases 14,81 2282 and most 
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 Zouyanshu 68, 98 (reading zou for feng 奉), 154, 228. 
81
 Zouyanshu 68. 
82
 Zouyanshu 228. 
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probably case 16
83
 use zou at the end of the submission and thereby indicate that the document 
was intended for the emperor. Cases 3 and 5 explicitly note that a decision was only made after the 
case had been brought to the emperor’s attention (yi wen 以聞, see the edict of 200 BC).84 In cases 
19 and 20, the judicial decision is approved by the Chunqiu ruler, and case 20 even uses zou when 
the decision is first submitted to him;
85
 even though these two cases stand out in many respects, 
they fulfil the requirement of a judicial decision made or approved by the ruler as the highest legal 
authority. Case 18 notes that on the same matter a separate memorial had been submitted (bie zou 
別奏),86 thereby indicating the personal involvement of the emperor, so that it is highly likely that 
the whole document was reviewed by him. Cases 17 and 21 note the involvement of the minister 
of trials,
87
 while cases 1, 4, and 6-13 introduce the final decision with ting bao 廷報 “reply of the 
(imperial) court”;88 this leaves open the involvement of the emperor, but at least locates the final 
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 In Zouyanshu 98, feng 奉 should be emendated to zou 奏, which in the palaeographic script is almost 
identical; compare zou in almost identical passages in Zouyanshu 68 and 228. 
84
 Zouyanshu 26, 47, 68. Yi wen 以聞, when used without an explicit object, is the standard phrase that is 
used when an official presents a subject directly to the ruler. Compare the following passages which carry 
enough context to exclude any ambiguity: Shiji 20, 464-465; 28, 1392; 69, 2266-2267; 101, 2746; 118, 
3093-3094; Hanshu 44, 2152-2153. See also the edict of 200 BC on the yan-procedure quoted above. 
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 Zouyanshu 176. 
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 Zouyanshu 154. 
87
 Zouyanshu 121, 184. 
88
 Zouyanshu 7, 34, 50, 52, 53, 54-55, 57, 59, 60, 62. In these instances, ting clearly refers to the imperial 
court, not to the offices of a prefecture or commandery as is the case in Zouyanshu 100 and possibly 
Zouyanshu 56 and sometimes in other sources (RCL A 4, A 21, A 64, D 79, A 105, E 20, E21). When ting 
refers to the offices of a prefecture, this is usually either explicitly stated (xian ting 縣廷 “prefecture 
offices”) or clear from the context, see Yong ting 雍廷 “the offices of Yong prefecture” in Zouyanshu 100. 
The one instance where ting is interpreted as referring to the offices of the commandery governor clearly is 
an exceptional one: 
「辭者辭廷。」‧今郡守為廷不為？為也。(Falü dawen 95=RCL D 79) 
“Those who make a statement make the statement at the court.” – Given [an appropriate matter], are [the 
offices of] the commandery governor considered a “court” or not? – They are. 
The expression jin 今 makes clear that in this rule, ting would ordinarily have been understood to refer to 
something else than the offices of the commandery governor (probably to the prefectural offices); otherwise, 
the Falü dawen question would not have been necessary in the first place. Jin here does not mean “now” in 
a temporal sense, but shifts the focus from the standard case to cases where making a statement at the 
commandery offices might be considered appropriate. Apart from such special cases, ting in the Shuihudi 
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decision at the imperial court. Only cases 2 and 15 do not contain a reference to the involvement 
of the emperor or of the imperial court. However, even though in these latter groups of cases 
(reference only to ting or tingwei, or none at all), the involvement of the emperor is not made 
explicit, it is very likely that they also were approved by the emperor himself. This is indicated by 
the distribution of the case collection throughout the Han empire, suggested by its discovery in 
relatively remote Jiangling. Imperial approval would have given the cases the value and 
legitimisation for empire-wide promulgation and at the same time a normative status similar to 
that of the statutes and edicts which derived their validity from their enactment by the sitting 
emperor and his predecessors. 
If the Zouyanshu originated at the imperial court and was compiled as an authoritative document 
for empire-wide promulgation, it is most likely that the compilation work itself was the duty of 
the minister of trials (tingwei 廷尉) and his agency. The minister of trials was the highest court 
official overseeing judicial matters and in this function provided the link between the judicial 
bureaucracy and the emperor as the final authority in legal matters. The Gaozu emperor’s edict 
instituting the yan-procedure, discussed above, demonstrates that all cases submitted to the court 
and finally to the emperor passed through his agency, and that the minister of trials must have had 
access to, and probably kept, an archive of precedents and other relevant legal material. After the 
compilation, it most likely also was the task of the minister of trials and his agency to organise the 
empire-wide distribution among legal officials of a case collection like the Zouyanshu in the 
emperor’s name. 
                                                                                                                                                         
legal texts routinely refers to the royal Qin court, in particular in the expression ting xing shi 廷行事, which 
refers to a binding interpretation of the statutes which could only be issued by the royal court. More to the 
point, ting bao in the Zouyanshu cases introduces a decision in cases which the prefecture or commandery 
was unable to decide; this decision certainly cannot be made by the prefecture or commandery. Also, at the 
same place in the procedural model (see below) where cases 1 and 4 use ting bao, cases 3 and 5 convey a 
decision by the emperor, which means that it is extremely unlikely that ting bao refers to anything else than 
the imperial court. 
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Precedent book and guide on legal procedure and interpretation – 
Evidence derived from comparison with other texts 
In order to understand the Zouyanshu’s function, it is instructive to compare it with other texts 
that, while clearly different from the Zouyanshu, overlap in certain respects. 
The Fengzhen shi 封診式 from Shuihudi 
The Fengzhen shi 封診式, one of the texts found in Shuihudi and dating to the third century BC, 
is a guide to correct procedure in criminal cases. It contains instructions on how to conduct an 
interrogation and in which situations to resort to judicial torture; but in its main part, it is made up 
of model records on procedure and investigation in different types of legal cases. In some 
instances, explicit instructions on procedure are interspersed within the model records. The 
following is a typical example: 
覆  敢告某縣主：男子某辭曰：「士五（伍），居某縣某里，去亡。」可定名事
里，所坐論云可（何），可（何）罪赦，或覆問毋（無）有，幾籍亡，亡及逋事各
幾可（何）日，遣識者，當騰騰，皆為報，敢告主。89 
[How to conduct inter-agency inquiries by way of] review – [Model report:] I venture to 
report to the head of prefecture X: Male X made the following statement: “I am a 
member of the rank and file, I am from village X of prefecture X, I have absconded.” – 
[For such a report] you should determine: 
- his name, status and village [of registration], 
- for which [offences] he has been held liable or which judgement has been passed 
against him, 
- which punishments have been amnestied, 
- and if there is any matter on which inquiries by way of review [are called for] or not, - 
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[in this case particularly] for how long the absconding is registered, and 
- for how many and on which days he did either abscond and/or evade service 
obligations. 
Dispatch a knowledgeable person, [for all information of] which by law a copy is to be 
forwarded a copy is to be forwarded;
90
 on all of this a reply is to be made. – [Conclude 
this report with the formula:] I venture to report to the official in charge. 
As this example shows, the Fengzhen shi deals with criminal procedure, the different officials 
involved in it, and the way it is to be recorded. As the Zouyanshu cases mostly document full 
proceedings, they also can be understood as model records intended for instruction on correct 
criminal procedure. In fact, the Fengzhen shi reflects the same basic judicial procedures that are 
applied in the cases of the Zouyanshu. The Fengzhen shi also is an important source for 
understanding the Zouyanshu: It explains, for example, the procedure of jie 詰 “to confront (an 
accused or a witness)”,91 and it provides an example92 on how the procedural requirement of bu 
jian zhe bi an zhi xiao shang 捕奸者必案之校上 “when arresting a person for fornication, one 
has, without exception, to lay hold on him/her on the place of copulation”, which is mentioned in 
the Zouyanshu,
93
 could be fulfilled. Of the Zouyanshu, case 22 is the closest to the Fengzhen shi, 
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 Fengzhen shi 13-14=RCL E 5. 
90
 For teng 騰 see Lau and Lüdke 2012, 238f. note 1184. 
91
 Fengzhen shi 2-5=RCL E 2; compare jie 詰 and jie 解 in Zouyanshu passim. 
92
 Fengzhen shi 95=RCL E 25. 
93
 Zouyanshu 182-183. There has been much discussion about the understanding of this phrase, which in 
various variations is also found Fengzhen shi 95=RCL E 25 and Wei yu deng zhuang 193-206=Lau and 
Staack 2016. For a detailed overview of the arguments see Lau and Lüdke 2012, 290. The basic import of 
the phrase is clear enough from Zouyanshu case 21: Fornicators had to be arrested on the spot (and not, e. g., 
only the next morning), otherwise prosecution was not permissible. Contrary to Lau and Lüdke 2016, an 案 
is here understood as writing an 按 “to grasp with the hand and press down, to lay hold on” (Shiji 107, 
2850=Hanshu 52, 2387), while jiao 校, based on context and semantic-syntactic considerations, is here 
understood as an elsewhere unattested noun “lair of lovers; place of copulation” which is etymologically 
related to jiao 交 in the sense “to copulate”; the mu 木 signifier might suggest a bedstead, or planks, or even 
twigs used for this purpose (Barbieri-Low and Yates 2016, 1388 note 16 independently make a similar 
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because it documents in detail not only the interrogation of the suspect, but all steps taken during 
the investigation of a robbery. This echoes the detailed model records of investigations found in 
the Fengzhen shi. 
On the other hand, the Fengzhen shi is clearly different from the Zouyanshu in two important 
respects: (1) It is only concerned with procedure, but not with the legal issues at stake; this is 
evident from the fact that it does not contain any judicial decisions. In contrast, difficult legal 
issues are the main focus of the Zouyanshu, where the documentation of a full trial mainly serves 
to highlight the legal issues at stake. (2) Unlike the Zouyanshu, the Fengzhen shi is not concerned 
with individual cases. To the extent that actual case records formed its basis, these were 
generalised to a degree that no individual information has been left. The example quoted above is 
not concerned with a particular case of absconding, but with the correct steps to be taken with any 
such case. While in the Zouyanshu, the occasional use of cyclical characters instead of some 
personal names serves to anonymise and to draw attention to the legal issues, in the Fengzhen shi 
the use of cyclical characters for personal names and of mou 某 for all other individual 
information (such as place names) serves to generalise; in effect, this gives the individual sections 
the character of a form that needs to be filled in by replacing the cyclical characters and mou with 
the actual information from the case. 
                                                                                                                                                         
suggestion). This suggestion has the advantage of preserving the locative sense of shang 上, which can 
naturally follow after a noun describing a place, but would be difficult to explain after a (nominalised) verb 
of action, if jiao 校 here were to be understood as writing jiao 交 “to copulate” (in the latter case, jiao zhong
交中 or jiao zhi shi 交之時 “during copulation” would be expected instead). This interpretation also would 
explain why the rule does not simply use the appropriate legal term jian 奸 “to fornicate” instead of jiao 交 
“to copulate” which usually is reserved to animals (e. g. Lüshi chunqiu 11, 104): To apprehend someone “on 
the place of copulation” (jiao shang 校上) is a slightly wider standard than “during the act of fornication” 
(jiao zhong 交中 or jian zhong 奸中). The latter, stricter standard for the arrest of offenders might have 
made conviction for jian almost impossible.  
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The Falü dawen 法律答問 from Shuihudi 
The Falü dawen 法律答問, also found in Shuihudi and dating to the third century BC, is a guide 
to the correct interpretation of the statutes in a question-and-answer format. It contains definitions 
for difficult or dated legal terms, but the majority of the questions address problems concerning 
the correct application of the statutes. In some respects the Falü dawen is close to the Fengzhen 
shi, in others to the Zouyanshu. 
The most important common point with the Zouyanshu is the fact the Falü dawen deals with legal 
issues, namely the correct interpretation of the statutes which forms the basis for correct judicial 
decisions. Unlike the Fengzhen shi, it is not concerned with procedure at all. The majority of the 
Falü dawen questions deal with situations that defy easy subsumption under the existing rules, 
either because it is not clear if a given rule is applicable at all, or because it is not clear which rule 
is applicable. The first type of problem – is a rule applicable or not – corresponds to legal 
problems dealt with in Zouyanshu cases 1-5 and 21, the second type of problem – which rule is 
applicable – corresponds to the legal issues discussed in the Zouyanshu cases 6-13. 
Two pairs of examples will demonstrate this: 
「內（納）奸，贖耐。」今內（納）人，人未蝕奸而得，可（何）論？除。94 
“Supplying a person for fornication is punished by paying for redemption from 
shaving.” – If now a person is supplied [for the purpose of fornication], but is caught 
before he or she consummates the fornication, what judgement is to be passed? – [The 
supplier] is exempted from punishment. 
This Falü dawen example can be compared with case 3 of the Zouyanshu, which concerns the 
following stipulation (not fully quoted in the Zouyanshu): 
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 Falü dawen 65=RCL D 52. 
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［從諸侯］來誘［…］者磔。95 
For coming [from the territory of the feudal lords] in order to lure somebody [to their 
territory], one is executed by dismemberment. 
The Zouyanshu case itself is best summed up in the initial statement of the accused: 
闌曰：「南齊國族田氏，徙處長安，闌送行。取（娶）為妻，與偕歸臨菑（淄）。
未18出關得。」96 
Lan: “Nan is of the lineage of Tian, the [former] ruling house of [the feudal state] Qi. She 
has been resettled to Chang’an, to where I accompanied her on her travel. But then I took 
her as my wife and wanted to return home to Linzi together with her. We were caught 
before we had crossed the border control station.” 
The Falü dawen example concerns the legal rule that supplying a person for fornication with 
another person is punishable. The question posed is whether supplying a person for fornication is 
also punishable in a case where the fornication is not actually committed, in other words, whether 
it is sufficient for punishment that the action of supplying has been committed with the illegal 
purpose of fornication in mind even if this purpose has not been achieved. The Zouyanshu case 
concerns the same type of problem, although the question is the opposite one: Does taking a 
woman back to the feudal territory of Qi qualify as the offence “coming from the feudal lords in 
order to lure somebody to their territory” even if 
(a) the accused did come to the territory of Han proper not for the purpose to lure the woman away, 
but for the opposite purpose of accompanying her to her resettlement place, and 
(b) the accused tried to take the woman back to Qi not for the purpose of supplying her to a feudal 
lord’s cause, but for the personal reasons of living with his wife? 
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 Ernian lüling 3; first three characters missing, but emended according to Zouyanshu 21, 22, 25. 
96
 Zouyanshu 18-19; see Lau and Lüdke 2012, 117ff. 
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(In case 3, the emperor eventually decides that such a situation does not qualify as the offence).
97
 
In the Falü dawen case, intent as the fault element (mens rea) of the offense is present, but not all 
conduct elements (actus rei); in the Zouyanshu case, all conduct elements of the offence are given, 
but not intent as the fault element. Both cases thus deal with the same kind of legal issue, namely 
the relationship between the subject’s mental state and his positive actions, and the implied 
question whether punishment for a certain offence is called for if one of the two elements is 
missing. 
A second pair of examples demonstrates that both texts also deal with a second type of legal 
problem, namely what offence is applicable to a given action: 
盜封嗇夫可（何）論？廷行事以偽寫印。98 
What judgement is passed for illegally sealing [a document] as the overseer [of an 
office]? – It is the practice of the court to treat this as “forging a seal”. 
Compare this Falü dawen section with the following Zouyanshu case: 
●•蜀守𤅊（讞）： 
佐啟主徒，令史冰私使城旦環為家作。告啟，啟𧧻（詐）薄（簿）曰：治官府。 
疑罪。 
•廷報：啟為偽書也。99 
  As Governor of Shu, I submit for decision: 
When Assistant Qi was in charge of convict labourers, Secretary-in-charge Bing for 
private purposes employed the ‘earth pounder’ convict Huan to do work for his 
household. When he told this to Qi, Qi made a fraudulent entry in the [convict] register, 
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 Zouyanshu 26-27. This is implicit in the fact that the accused is not given the death penalty mandatory for 
the offence of “coming from the feudal lords in order to lure somebody to their territory”. 
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 Falü dawen 56=RCL D 45. 
99
 Zouyanshu 54-55. See Lau and Lüdke 2012, 161ff. 
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which read: “(Huan) repairs a government building”. 
We are in doubt about the punishment. 
 Reply from the imperial court: [The statutory offence committed by] Qi is ‘making 
false documents’. 
Both passages concern a fraudulent action that is perceived as clearly illegal, but to which none of 
the existing rules is clearly applicable, as in neither case, actual forgery is involved. In one case, a 
genuine (as opposed to a forged) seal is used. In the other, a genuine official makes a genuine 
(though fraudulent) entry in a genuine register. The problem is solved in each case by analogous 
application of the law: In the Falü dawen passage, the offence of “forging a seal” is applied 
because the effects of forging a seal and of misusing a seal are the same. In the Zouyanshu case, 
the offence of “making a forged document” is applied because the effects of forging a document 
and of intentionally making a wrong entry in a genuine document are the same. 
The comparison of the Zouyanshu with the Falü dawen and Fengzhen shi suggests that important 
functions of the Zouyanshu included to serve as a guide for deciding certain difficult legal issues 
and as a model for correct procedure and documentation. 
Despite these similarities, the Zouyanshu, documenting individual cases unlike both Shuihudi 
texts, clearly belongs to a different type of legal literature, which also implies that its functions go 
beyond those of the Falü dawen and Fengzhen shi. The Zouyanshu is the earliest known example 
of a collection of precedents. The character of these cases as precedents results from the fact that 
they have been decided or approved by the highest judicial authorities, which invests them with a 
normative character. 
Precedents mentioned in other sources: Ting xing shi 廷行事 and bi 比 
As in most legal systems, precedents played an important role in early China. The Falü dawen 
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frequently mentions ting xing shi 廷行事, probably best translated “practice of the court”,100 
when an interpretation of a law is given that does not directly follow from its wording or even 
runs counter to it. This implies precedents, as an interpretation not deducible from the law must 
have been occasioned by a particular case; however, from the limited evidence it is not clear 
whether ting xing shi specifically refers to a set of documented and archived precedents which 
were used in subsequent decisions, or more abstractly to a long-standing practice to settle a 
particular type of cases in a certain way which might not necessarily be reflected in specific 
archived case records. 
One of the earliest direct references to precedents is found in the Gaozu emperor’s edict 
re-establishing the yan 讞-procedure. The edict stipulates that the minister for trials (tingwei 廷
尉), before submitting a case to the emperor for decision, has to attach “all applicable precedents, 
statutes and edicts” (fu suo dang bi lü ling yi wen 傅所當比律令以聞).101 The word used here is 
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 The translation “practice of the court” is suggested by Hulsewé in RCL D 30, 33, 45, and 126-130. In 
RCL D 47 and D 48, Hulsewé translates “precedent of the court”, in RCL D 53 “precedents of the court”. In 
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constituting precedents. If xing is a (nominalised) verb with shi as its object “the court’s conducting of 
official affairs, the way in which the court conducts official affairs”, then the focus is on xing “the court’s 
conducting”, i. e. the court’s practice. In any case, ting must refer to the royal court (otherwise, its 
practice/precedents would not have the normative character implied by the Fengzhen shi), and shi should be 
understood as a reference to official state affairs in general, including, but not limited to judicial cases, in 
the same way as it is after 221 BC used in the technical term xianguan shi 縣官事 “government affairs” 
(otherwise, zhi yu 治獄 “trying criminal cases/criminal cases already tried” or another expression specific 
to judicial contexts would have been used). If this is correct, the translation “practice of the court” would 
have the advantage of better suggesting the general administrative meaning, as opposed to “precedents of 
the court”, which tend to be associated with legal precedents in the narrow sense (although one certainly 
can speak of administrative precedents, too). 
101
 Hanshu 23, 1106. For a full quote and translation of the edict see above. 
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bi 比, literally “comparable [case]”, which is the proper early Chinese word for “legal precedent”. 
The instruction to the minister of trials to attach precedents as a matter of routine implies that an 
archive of precedents was kept at the court already in 200 BC, and the fact that actual cases from 
as early as 246 BC are included in the Zouyanshu indicates that such an archive had been kept for 
at least fifty years and was carried over from Qin into the Han. 
In Han, precedents grew in number and importance. The Hanshu reports that at the end of the 
Wudi emperor’s reign, there were 13,472 precedents for deciding capital cases alone (sizui jueshi 
bi 死罪決事比);102 the Weishu, with the character 萬 missing, gives the number of 3472 
precedents for capital cases, and 26272 overall for the same period.103 Noting the proliferation of 
precedents, the Hanshu writes: 
是以郡國承用者駮，或罪同而論異．姦吏．．．所欲活則傅生議，所欲陷則予死
比．104 
“For this reason, the commanderies’ and domains’ application [of the many laws and 
precedents] was contradictory. In some cases, though the liability to punishment was the 
same, the judgement was different; treacherous officials… in the cases of those whom 
they wished to live attached [a precedent containing] a reasoning for sparing their life, 
and to the cases of those whom they wished to trap (in the death penalty) they consigned 
a precedent for [the application of] the death penalty. 
While this remark is interesting for its criticism of the potential for arbitrariness and uneven 
standards in an overly complicated legal system, it is even more important for the following two 
implications: (a) Precedents, rather than simple exegesis of the statutes, were decisive for many 
cases; (b) collections of precedents must have been widely distributed, as they were obviously 
available to at least to judicial officials in every commandery or equivalent unit of territorial 
administration. 
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Dong Zhongshu’s 董仲舒 Chunqqiu jueyu 春秋決獄: A collection of precedents reflecting 
(or promoting?) the “Confucianization of the law”? 
The earliest case collection associated with a specific name is Dong Zhongshu’s 董仲舒 
Chunqqiu jueyu 春秋決獄.105 At the same time, due to its association with the Chunqiu tradition, 
this is the only legal work mentioned in the Hanshu’s “Yiwen zhi” 藝文志, where it is given as 
the Gongyang Dong Zhongshu zhi yu 公羊董仲舒治獄 in 16 pian 篇.106 The Houhanshu quotes a 
memorial by Ying Shao 應劭 as giving the following report about the origin of the case collection: 
Dong Zhongshu, after having resigned from office under the pressures of age and illness, was still 
called on by Zhang Tang 張湯, then minister of trials, for his opinion when legal disputes at the 
court had arisen; as a result, Dong Zhongshu compiled the Chunqiu jueyu which contained 232 
cases.
107
 
If this account is to be believed, the context of its compilation would suggest that the Chunqiu 
jueyu was based on actual cases which, maybe, were decided by the court according to Dong 
Zhongshu’s advice and thus had the force of precedents. However, the few extant cases surviving 
in later compilations and attributed to the Chunqiu jueyu do not contain any personal names, place 
names or at least the authorities involved. Some of these cases also sound hypothetical: It seems, 
for example, unlikely that a father accidentally hit by his son who came to his rescue in a fight 
would request from the authorities that his son would be punished with death for this.
108
 For these 
reasons, it is difficult to decide to what extent Dong Zhongshu’s work, if the surviving cases 
indeed can be attributed to it, can be considered a collection of actual precedents, or rather of 
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 This is assumed in the case quoted in Taiping Yulan 640 (quoted in Cheng Shude 1963, 164), as ou fu 毆
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“unfilial conduct”, see Ernian lüling 35. 
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hypothetical cases devised to demonstrate certain points. Instructive for the evaluation of the 
Zouyanshu is the assumption that this case collection had a specific agenda: Its title indicates that 
the work, for deciding legal cases, intended to employ Chunqiu thinking, which earlier had not 
been associated with the administration of law. It is commonly assumed that this means that the 
Chunqiu jueyu advocates a radical departure from earlier Han legal practice, a Confucian turn that 
gives precedence to people’s intentions over positive facts. In support of this view, a statement 
found in the Yantie lun is often quoted: 
春秋之治獄﹐論心定罪﹐志善而違於法者免﹐志惡而合於法者誅。109 
When trying criminal cases according to the Chunqiu, a judgement about [the accused’s] 
mind is made in order to decide about his punishability: When his intentions were good, 
he is relieved [of punishment] even if [his actions] contravened the law, when his 
intentions were bad, he is punished even if his actions agreed with the law. 
However, a careful analysis of the extant Chunqiu jueyu cases and other relevant sources would 
show that the Chunqiu jueyu, while having a specific agenda, not so much marks a radical 
“Confucian turn” in legal theory, in particular in view of the fact that in Qin and early Han the 
intentions of an accused are already taken into account (as the Falü dawen and Zouyanshu 
examples quoted above show). Rather, the Chunqiu became attractive as an intellectual 
framework that allowed to discuss old questions that so far often had been decided on a 
case-to-case basis in a seemingly more stringent, methodological reflected and intellectually 
convincing way. While this hypothesis would need to be validated by a detailed study, an 
example will demonstrate its plausibility: 
甲有子乙以乞丙﹐乙後長大﹐而丙所成育。甲因酒色謂乙曰﹕汝是吾子。乙怒杖
甲二十。甲以乙本是其子﹐不勝其忿﹐自告縣官。仲舒斷之曰﹕甲生乙﹐不能長
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育﹐以乞丙﹐於義已絕矣。雖杖甲﹐不應坐。110 
A has a son
111
 B which he
112
 gave to C; afterwards, B grew up, being raised by C. While 
drunk,
113
 A told B: “You are my son”. B got angry and dealt A twenty blows with a stick. 
B originally being his son, A was unable to overcome his anger [about the incident] and 
in person lodged a criminal complaint against [B] with the government authorities. 
[Dong] Zhongshu decided in the following way: A gave life
114
 to B, but was not able to 
raise [the child] and therefore gave [the child] to C, so that [B’s] rightful duties [toward 
A] had already ceased to exist.
115
 Therefore, although [B] beat A with a stick, [B] should 
not be held [criminally] liable. 
This case is not about intent or intentions (as could be argued for only two of the six extant cases 
attributed to the Chunqiu jueyu); it does, in particular, not dwell on the question whether the son 
assumed that A was indeed his parent. Rather, the case focuses on the duties within family 
relationships. Dong Zhongshu argues that by giving up the child, not only the relationship 
between child and parent, but also their duties towards each other have ended. Both the argument 
and the resulting decision correspond to case 21 of the Zouyanshu, where the laws about unfilial 
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 Tongdian 通典 69, cited according to Shen Jiaben 1985, 1770 and Cheng Shude 1963, 164. 
111
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conduct are found inapplicable in the case of woman who engages in fornication besides the 
coffin of her deceased husband: The relationship between a husband and wife requires that the 
wife treats her husband with the highest respect, but the death of the husband terminates not only 
the relationship, but also the wife’s legal duty to respectful conduct, in the same way as a child 
cannot be held accountable on a charge of bu xiao 不孝 committed against a deceased parent. The 
crucial methodological difference between the Zouyanshu case and the Dong Zhongshu case is 
that in the former, the principle that showing disrespect to one’s father after his death would not 
result in criminally liability is stated and agreed on, but not substantiated. In the Dong Zhongshu 
case, the concept of yi 義 “righteousness, righteous duties”, which is grounded, among others, in 
the Chunqiu tradition, is introduced and used to substantiate the decision. This constitutes an 
attempt to find a universal concept which reaches beyond the immediate legal rules, a concept 
with a claim to universal validity, in order to justify a decision in a case for which straight 
subsumption does not seem to work and therefore interpretation is required, as the applicable 
legal rules are silent about the issue at hand and cannot provide guidance. 
The approach in Zouyanshu case 21 is to identify a potential interpretative principle 
independently from explicit legal or other norms, test its validity by applying it to different 
situations, starting with the most straightforward, non-controversial situations and gradually 
establishing its applicability in more difficult ones, thereby convincing the audience of judicial 
officials that this principle should be consistently applied. The consensus about the validity of the 
principle is not presumed from the outset, but gradually arrived at. The legitimation of the 
principle is sought not in an external ethical framework, grounded in non-legal texts, but in the 
ultimate consensus of the judicial officials about the applicability of the principle to the most 
basic situations, and in a step-by-step demonstration that the more controversial situations, in 
their core, correspond to the most basic ones. In contrast, in the Chunqiu jueyu case, the decision 
is legitimised by reference to an ethical principle, yi 義, grounded in texts which derive their claim 
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to validity from the perspicacity of the sages to whom they are linked, similar to the way in which 
the statutes derive their claim to legitimacy from the the current, but even more important from 
the former rulers who enacted them. 
In terms of actual legal content, a case heralded as emblematic for the “Confucianization of the 
law” arrives at the exact same conclusions as one from Qin which supposedly stands at the exact 
opposite ideological end. This suggests that the crucial change was not one of legal substance. 
Rather, for legal specialists, trained to decide cases based on norms found outside the case at hand, 
i. e. in the statutes and edicts, it must have been attractive to have at their disposition an even more 
fundamental layer of norms beyond the legal rules, which could provide a basis for reproducible 
decisions in those cases where the legal rules failed to provide clear guidance, either because they 
did not seem to address the specific situation at hand, or because they seemed mutually 
contradictory. 
Other named precedent collections 
In addition to Dong Zhongshu’s Chunqiu jueyu, the received literature mentions a number of 
other Han named case collections, which are even closer to the Zouyanshu in that they are not so 
much associated with a particular scholar, but directly with the court as highest judicial authority; 
their origin also lies not so much in an intellectual tradition, but in exigencies of the 
administration of justice. Most important among them are the Tingwei jueshi 廷尉決事 of 
unknown origin, but probably from Eastern Han, to which four extant legal cases are attributed,
116
 
as well as the Cisong bi 辭訟比 in seven juan 卷 and the Jueshi dumu 決事都目 in eight juan 卷. 
The latter two were submitted to the emperor by Bao Yu 鮑昱 (10?-82 AD) and acquired the force 
of law after imperial approval.
117
 According to the Dongguan Han ji, their agenda was to simplify 
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the complicated legal system and to impose a unified interpretation of the law in order to 
guarantee legal certainty and a speedy resolution of law suits.
118
 Three extant cases are attributed 
to the Cisong bi, which is said to have been compiled by Bao Yu’s aide Chen Chong 陳寵.119 
The Zouyanshu’s specific agenda – Evidence derived from internal 
analysis 
The comparison of the Zouyanshu with the Shuihudi texts has shown that one of its functions 
must have been to serve as a guideline for procedure and for the solution of tricky legal issues. In 
addition, its cases, by virtue of having been decided by the imperial court or the emperor himself, 
had the authority of precedents, which played an important role in the legal system. However, the 
fact that the Zouyanshu seems highly selective, including cases from all over the empire and both 
from Qin and Han, and in particular the addition of different material alongside the yan 讞-cases 
proper, including stories (cases 19 and 20) which clearly want to make a point, suggests that the 
Zouyanshu, like some of the later case collections, had an agenda that went beyond its purposes as 
precedent collection and interpretative/procedural guide. 
Therefore, the question has to be asked according to which criteria exactly those cases that are 
included in the Zouyanshu were selected. In other words, which points did the court, as the 
presumed compiler of the Zouyanshu, intend to make, on which points did the court intend to 
educate local judicial officials? The absence of explicit information, such as a preface stating the 
Zouyanshu’s purpose, does not allow any definite conclusions. However, the recurrence of certain 
themes does support some inferences. I will deal here only with those aspects of the Zouyanshu 
that go beyond its functions as a collection of precedents for correct decisions and as model 
records for the correct application of the core judicial procedure (i. e. for those steps required to 
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arrive at a finding of facts). 
Providing models for the yan 讞-procedure 
A first important function of the Zouyanshu most likely was to educate local judicial officials not 
only about criminal procedure in general, but also about the yan 讞-procedure in particular. This 
is suggested by the fact that yan is part of its title, that the majority of cases (13 of 22) had been 
submitted for decision, and by the extraordinary closeness of the Zouyanshu’s compilation 
between 196 BC and 185 BC
120
 to the edict of 200 BC re-establishing the yan-procedure in Han – 
not more than ten years, but probably only five years. We now know that a similar procedure for 
higher-level review of doubtful cases already existed in Qin.
121
 Also, it is likely that at least some 
of the Han officials, especially local career officials such as judicial secretaries (yushi 獄使) and 
secretaries-in-charge (lingshi 令史), had already served under the Qin and therefore some 
knowledge of the procedure.
122
 However, the edict of 200 BC addresses existing shortcomings 
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 This could well have applied for the owner of tomb 247 in Zhangjiashan. Though the entry xiang wei 
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where he was buried), and 9 years under Han until he retired in 194 BC. Thus, in the course of his career he 
would have experienced considerable changes in political circumstances and with this in administrative 
practices and legal arrangements. As an experienced Qin career official, he might habe been quite valuable 
for a Han rulership intent on securing their power. 
 65 
and the administration of justice, especially a backlog in cases which were left undecided due to 
difficult legal issues. Therefore, it can be assumed that the existing problems, coupled with 
uncertainty about the applicable procedures under the new regime and a possible shortage of 
experienced local officials after the devastations of the wars made it necessary not only to 
re-establish the yan-procedure to ensure a speedy resolution of doubtful cases, but also to educate 
officials not only on what type of legal problems were to be submitted for decision, but also what 
format was to be used. Both points are well served by the Zouyanshu. Its yan-cases all deal with 
legal issues which are easily understood as falling into the two categories already mentioned, 
namely (a) uncertainty about which offence has been committed in cases that cannot literally 
subsumed under one of the existing laws (cases 6-13), and (b) uncertainty whether an offence has 
been committed at all in cases where the accused brings forward arguments for his justification 
that do not prima facie seem unreasonable (cases 1-5). Even more important, some of the 
yan-cases contain remarks by the court about the quality of the original submission: In case 3, the 
imperial court states that the “you indeed have ascertained [the facts] submitted for decision” (yan 
gu you shen 讞固有審),123 taking up and confirming the prefecture’s assertion, concluding its 
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finding of facts (ju 鞫), that those facts “have been ascertained” (shen 審). In contrast, in case 4 
the prefecture is admonished by the court because “as the statutes are explicit on this, by law the 
case should not have been submitted for decision” (lü bai, bu dang yan 律白，不當讞).124 The 
Zouyanshu is also valuable as an instruction on how to submit a case for decision, as it fully 
documents five such submissions, including the formulae that introduce and conclude them. The 
information contained in these formulae serves the bureaucratic purposes of identifying the 
officials involved with the case at the prefecture level and of clearly communicating the purpose 
of the document to the higher authorities, but it has no bearing on the legal issues and would 
therefore have been unnecessary in a mere collection of legal precedents. 
Suggesting techniques for effective investigation 
The Zouyanshu also lent itself to educate local judicial officials about techniques of effective 
investigation. This is the theme especially of cases 19 and 22, but also of case 17: Case 22 on its 
surface is a request for promotion. However, as such it would have had no meaning for local 
officials not concerned with that particular promotion. The official in question is suggested for 
higher office because he has managed to solve a particularly difficult case, in which the offender 
has resorted to considerable cunning in order to put the investigators on the wrong track and to 
                                                                                                                                                         
deng zhuang 140, where a basic fact, not a matter of legal interpretation is in doubt). The (unstated) reason 
for the authors’ claim is the higher authority’s subsequent comment bu dang yan 不當讞 “by law this 
should not have been submitted” in Wei yu deng zhuang 30. But, first of all, it is far from clear whether this 
comment refers to the full submission, or only to parts of it (i. e. to the punishment of the people in involved 
in the arrests in question, but not to the punishment of officials involved in the original trial). More 
importantly, in none of the other two instances where yan gu you shen is found is there any indication that 
the submission would have been considered unnecessary. Therefore, yan gu you shen should simply be 
understood as an affirmation, made by the higher authorities, that the finding of facts submitted by the 
lower authority is complete and sufficient to decide any doubtful matters of law, whether or not the higher 
authority deems those points of doubt as serious enough to have warranted submission in the first place (if 
a submission had been found bu shen 不審 “not factually ascertained”, the submission presumably would 
have been returned for further investigation to the lower-level authority, with no comment at all made by the 
higher authority on matters of legal interpretation). 
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throw suspicion on somebody else. When nothing else seemed to help, the judicial secretary in 
charge of the case went public and appealed for people to come forward with clues, very much in 
a way modern police forces would act when faced with an investigative cul-de-sac. The reason for 
the inclusion of the case in the Zouyanshu must have been that it describes in detail this and the 
other investigative means crucial for cracking the case, thereby providing a model for other 
judicial officials. Case 19, though set in the Chunqiu period and probably of little value in Han in 
terms of legal issues, can be read as an appeal not to rely on the first impression when 
investigating an offence, but to carefully evaluate the situation, factor in all possible causes and to 
resort to logic when drawing conclusions. Case 17, finally, illustrates the considerable risk that a 
wrong judgement might be passed (and that the responsible officials make themselves liable to 
punishment for this) if, instead of investigating all leads thoroughly, torture is applied too early 
and indiscriminately. 
Warning against undue reliance on torture 
Case 17, in particular, can be read as warning not to use torture before all other means have been 
exhausted and when the statements of the accused are not contradicted by hard evidence. In case 
17, the accused under torture wrongly incriminates an acquaintance of conspiring to steal a cow 
with him. Instead of verifying the acquaintance’s alibi with independent witnesses (a step which 
in the retrial finally exonerates the acquaintance), the investigating officials resort to torture to 
extort a confession. This contrasts with the positive example of case 22, where torture is only 
threatened to the accused as a means to extract a confession after his explanations become 
indefensible in the view of both hard physical evidence and mutually consistent statements of 
multiple independent witnesses. 
Warning against official misconduct 
In a relatively large number of Zouyanshu cases, officials, some of them high-ranking, are not the 
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investigators, but themselves the objects of criminal investigation; this includes at least three 
prefects (ling 令) and two judicial secretaries (yushi 獄史). As the law specified (mostly minor) 
punishments for many instances of negligence or even ineffectiveness in office, some 
prosecutions were part of an official’s professional risk; an example is the case of a soldier posted 
at the border who did not manage to apprehend a fugitive slave,
125
 or the case of a constable 
(qiudao 求盜), eventually acquitted, who had to resort to force when making an arrest and then 
was faced with a charge of causing injury.
126
 But other cases seem to make a point of reminding 
officials, especially those in a position of responsibility, to act strictly according to the law and to 
sternly warn them against overstepping their authority or even engaging in criminal behaviour. 
Cases 9-10 and 12 can be read as warning officials that false records will be punished in the same 
way as the forging of documents even if they did only write down false information and did not 
resort to actual forgery.
127
 Case 13 makes it clear that even accepting favours as trivial as a piglet 
and some wine will be punished as bribery.
128
 Even more relevant are cases 15, 16, and 18: Case 
15 makes the point that an official who commits theft in office will be prosecuted like everybody 
else, and, unlike everybody else, will not be granted any reduction in punishment or opportunity 
to redeem himself from it.
129
 Case 16 concerns a prefect who has ordered the killing of a 
subordinate because the latter did not submit to all of his wishes. The crime is vigorously 
prosecuted without regard to the prefect’s position, rank or the alleged insubordination of the 
subordinate, and before being sentenced to death, the prefect is sternly admonished during his 
interrogation: 
信，長吏，臨一縣，上所信恃，不謹奉灋（法）以治，└至令蒼賊殺武。130 
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Xin, as a senior official you oversee a prefecture and thus are trusted and relied upon by 
the ruler. Nevertheless, you did not conscientiously uphold the law in order to govern 
according to it. You even carried matters so far as to order Cang to kill Wu with malice. 
In case 18, a similar reproach is levelled against a prefect who passed only lenient sentences 
(rather than capital punishment) on deserters in a military campaign, with the intent to reassure a 
restive population in recently conquered border territory. During his prosecution on the orders of 
the Qin court and before his eventual conviction to a hard labour punishment, the prefect his 
reprimanded: 
見罪人，不以法論之。。。雖論奪爵令或〈戍〉，而毋法令。人臣當謹奏〈奉〉法
以治。131 
Though you realised [that you were dealing with] offenders, you did not pass judgement 
on them according to the law…Even though you passed the judgement to take away their 
ranks and to call them up into the [regular] army, you nonetheless [in doing so] did not 
follow the statutes and ordinances. Yet it befits His Majesty’s vassals to conscientiously 
uphold the law and govern according to it. 
The phrase jin feng fa yi zhi 謹奉法以治 is identical here and in case 16, suggesting that the 
inclusion of these cases in the Zouyanshu is no coincidence, but reflects a conscious choice. The 
words used to rebuke the two prefects highlight the concern that local officials strictly adhere to 
the law and do not overstep their authority. This concern was even more acute because of the 
vastness of the territory the newly formed Qin and Han empires sought to administer. In the 
absence of modern communication and infrastructure, any attempt at directly running day-to-day 
affairs from the centre was doomed to fail. Therefore, the establishment of central control relied to 
a large extent on the degree to which the law was effective in conveying the authority of the 
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central government down to the local level and ensuring the compliance of local officials. Case 18 
demonstrates that in the case of lapses in adhering to the law, it could take many months, and the 
dispatch of investigators over several hundred kilometres, to rectify the situation.
132
 
Insisting on due process 
An important aspect of the Zouyanshu is its emphasis on due process, an emphasis which, going 
beyond a mere pre-occupation with correct procedure and a full investigation, also includes 
giving fair consideration to the accused. This is particularly important in a system which did not 
know any separation of powers, and where the local officials had to reconcile the conflicting aims 
of effective law enforcement and delivering justice or at least equity. This dual concern is, for 
example, reflected in the edict of 200 BC, which cites as reasons for the establishment of the yan 
讞-procedure the two existing shortcomings of, on the one hand, offenders not being timely 
punished and, on the other hand, innocents languishing in prison if a case is not quickly decided 
due to uncertainty about legal issues. While both lawlessness and the perception of injustice 
would have undermined the legitimacy of the state, any system with little formal separation of 
powers tends to subordinate equitable dispense of justice to the requirements of law enforcement, 
the results of which can be more easily measured. In such a situation, the Zouyanshu advocates 
the strict application of harsh punishments wherever they are warranted, but not if this comes at 
the cost of justice. Cases 1-5 emphasise that any statement of the accused with the potential to 
exonerate him must be fully considered, and that the case has to be submitted to the higher 
authorities for decision if there is any doubt about the validity of the accused’s arguments. In case 
21, it is a matter of course that an offence, even if there is no doubt that it has been committed, 
cannot be punished if a procedural requirement has not been met. And even if there is agreement 
that the offence is quite reprehensible, it is inadmissible to punish it as another offence by way of 
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faulty analogy. 
Demonstrating good legal reasoning 
Finally, the Zouyanshu can be understood as a demonstration of methods and techniques for legal 
reasoning. While it does not reflect on them, it contains a number of quite sophisticated examples 
that demonstrate the application of these methods and techniques. Among them are the technique 
of teleological reduction,
133
 i. e. the extrapolation of a given norm’s ultimate aim, in order to 
decide about its applicability; the use of precedents for the same purpose;
134
 and the analogous 
application of a norm to a situation not directly covered by an existing norm.
135
 
The significance of the Zouyanshu as a record of facts and a 
normative text 
Due to the small number of cases and the Zouyanshu’s selectivity, it is impossible to judge how 
representative the Zouyanshu cases are for the way in which the administration of justice was 
actually conducted in Qin and Han. However, above and beyond preserving the actual records of 
a small number of trials, the Zouyanshu indicates how the administration of justice was supposed 
to be conducted in the view of the central authorities. That is, while the individual Zouyanshu 
cases should be taken as accurate descriptions of the trials they record and as such have a 
descriptive value, for an evaluation of their wider significance and of the Zouyanshu as a 
collection of cases a normative reading is most appropriate. 
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Dating of the Zouyanshu and its cases 
The Zouyanshu poses several problems of dating; at question are 
a) the date at which each of the events reported in the individual Zouyanshu cases took place; 
b) the date at which each of the Zouyanshu cases was first recorded; 
c) the date at which the Zouyanshu was first formed as a body of texts; and 
d) the date when the copy of the Zouyanshu found in Zhangjiashan tomb 247 was written down. 
The terminus ante quem: The date of the tomb 
Of equal importance for all of these questions is the date when the Zouyanshu manuscript was 
entombed in Zhangjiashan, which is the terminus ante quem for all dating questions. This date can 
be derived quite precisely from the finds in Zhangjiashan. A comparative analysis of the artefacts 
found together with the bamboo texts in Zhangjiashan tomb 247 shows that the tomb is later than 
the Qin tombs of Shuihudi in Yunmeng, and close to the Western Han tombs of Fenghuangshan in 
Jiangling.
136
 As the former of these tombs date to 260-217 BC, the latter to 179-141 BC,
137
 this 
gives a time frame for Zhangjiashan tomb 247 of 217-141 BC. More exact dating is possible when 
the texts found in tomb 247 are taken into account: Most importantly, the tomb contained a 
calendrical table (lipu 曆譜) which lists the cyclical characters (ganzhi 干支) for the first day of 
each month (shuo 朔) from the fifth to the twelth regnal year of the Gaozu emperor (202-195 BC), 
for the seven years of the Huidi emperor’s reign (194-188 BC) and for the first two regnal years of 
the empress Lü (187-186 BC). Even though the calendrical table does not explicitly name the 
reign periods, these can be deduced without ambiguity from the sequence of the year numbers and, 
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first of all, from the series of cyclical characters.
138
 Besides these calendrical details, the table also 
provides some biographical information: A broken strip probably belonging to the first year in the 
table (202 BC), notes …Xin xiang wei Han 新降為漢 “Xin139 submitted to become a Han 
[subject]”,140 i. e. as a former subject of Xiang Yu’s Chu kingdom submitted to Liu Bang’s 
authority, who in the same year had secured victory over Xiang Yu, thus was able to extend his 
reign over the whole Chu area and consequently proclaimed himself emperor.
141
 Under the first 
year of the Huidi emperor (194 BC), the calendrical table notes liu yue bing mian 六月病免 “in 
the sixth month, relieved [from office] due to illness”.142 It can be assumed that this piece of 
biographical information pertains to the person buried in the tomb. This can be inferred from 
biographical data found in other tombs, such as the information contained in the Biannianji of 
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 Compare Zhang Peiyu 1997 and Xu Xiqi 1997. Of the 173 shuo-days for which the ganzhi are still 
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phrase xiang (wei) Han 降（為）漢 ever modified by a stative verb (such as xin) in adverbial usage, but often 
preceded by a personal name as its subject (e. g. Shiji 16, 783f., 790). Xin 新 is known as personal name in 
Han (e. g. Hanshu 15B, 491). Xin jiang 新降 occurs 17 times in the Houhanshu, 15 of these in the “Nan 
Xiongnu liezhuan 南匈奴列傳”, often in expressions such as suo xin jiang 所新降, xin jiang zhe 新降者, 
or zhu xin jiang Hu 諸新降胡, always referring to Xiongnu tribespeople who have “recently been 
subjugated”, as opposed to minority people who had been part of the Han empire for a longer period (Hou 
Hanshu 89, 2952, 2954, 2955, 2959). In all of these instances, xin is used as an adjective to modify a 
nominal use of the transitive verb jiang 降 (the transitive use is explicit from the use of suo 所 in one case), 
in contrast to Lipu 2 and to the examples in Zouyanshu, Shiji and Hanshu, where we find a verbal use of the 
intransitive verb xiang 降 (intransitive use evident because the person who has submitted functions as the 
explicit or implicit grammatical subject of xiang). Even if the slip Lipu 2 is broken, in the context of this 
calendrical table a distinction between “recently submitted” versus an unstated “submitted earlier” does not 
seem to make sense. 
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 On xiang wei Han see Zouyanshu 9; 12; 14; 38. 
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 Shiji 8, 378-380. 
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 Lipu 10. 
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Shuihudi tomb 11, which is consistent with the age and probable profession of the person buried 
there.
143
 As the calendrical table ends with the year 186 BC, is safe to assume that the burial in 
tomb 247 took place in 186 BC or very shortly thereafter. This is consistent with information 
derived from other texts excavated from tomb 247: The early Han collection of statutes has the 
original title Ernian lüling 二年律令 “Statutes and edicts [in force in/since] the second year”.144 
The “second year” referred to in the title most likely is the second regnal year of empress Lü (186 
BC), as some of the statutes grant explicit privileges to descendants of Lü Gong 呂公,145 the Lü 
empress’ father (died in 202 BC, posthumous title: 呂宣王).146 These privileges were extended to 
fewer generations of descendants of all other kings (wang 王), a status accorded to brothers and 
sons of the Gaozu emperor Liu Bang 劉邦. It is therefore evident that the Ernian lüling values the 
Lü family higher than the Liu family. Also, the Lü empress’ father in the Ernian lüling is referred 
to by his posthumous title Lü Xuan Wang 呂宣王, about which the Hanshu explicitly notes that it 
was only conferred retroactively (zhui 追) in 187 BC by the Lü empress after she had assumed 
imperial power.
147
 As the relatives from her lineage were quickly persecuted after the death of the 
Lü empress,
148
 the Ernian lüling must date to her reign period.149 Therefore, for the purposes of 
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 Most scholars have followed the Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Han mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu (2001, 133 and 
2006, 7) to identify the “second year” in the title Ernian lüling with the second regnal year of empress Lü, 
though a few scholars have suggested that the “second year” refers to either the second regnal year of the 
Gaozu emperor (201 BC) or of the Huidi emperor (193 BC), see the list in Peng Hao et al. 2006, 87 note 1 
to Ernian lüling 1v. Li Li (2009, 345-354) gives an overview of the arguments for the different positions. 
For example, Cao Lüning (2005, 1-12), argues that because the character ying 盈, which also forms the 
Huidi emperor Liu Ying’s 劉盈 personal name, is not tabooed in the Ernian lüling¸ it cannot date to Huidi’s 
reign or later. However, beyond a few isolated examples of taboo characters, Cao Lüning fails to back this 
argument up by a comprehensive analysis of the use and non-use of taboo characters in legal manuscripts, 
does not address the question to what extent character taboos would have applied after an emperor’s death, 
and fails to mention contradicting evidence, such as the multiple use of zheng 正, which, if taboos would 
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the following discussion and to be on the safe side, 180 BC shall be assumed as terminus ante 
quem, even though both the lipu and the Ernian lüling indicate that the burial Zhangjiashan tomb 
247 took place in 186 BC or very shortly thereafter. 
It would be tempting to assume that at least the legal material found in the tomb dates to the time 
before the tomb owner was relieved from office in 194 BC; however, the example of the Ernian 
lüling shows that the tomb owner either had an interest in, and access to, legal material even after 
his retirement, or that colleagues, friends or family members were able to supply him with the 
most up-to-date legal material for his last journey. 
The date of the events and proceedings reported in each 
case 
The first dating question pertains to the events reported in each individual Zouyanshu case. 
                                                                                                                                                         
have been strictly observed in legal manuscripts, should have been tabooed on account of the Qin ruler’s 
name Ying Zheng 嬴政 in texts presumably dating from his reign. Even if taboo characters were used in 
legal texts, it is entirely possible that the taboo did not apply any more after the emperor’s death, especially 
for texts written either before or after the emperor’s reign. Cao Lüning calls into question the Hanshu’s very 
explicit statement that the title Lü Xuan Wang 呂宣王, mentioned in Ernian lüling 85, was conferred by the 
Lü empress to her father only retroactively in 187 BC, but does not supply any supporting evidence beyond 
the contention that the Shiji was composed earlier than the Hanshu, but this observation is of limited help, 
as the Shiji does not give any date for the introduction of the Lü Xuan Wang title, as Cao Lüning himself 
observes. Absent evidence calling the Hanshu version in question, Ernian lüling 85 must date from 187 BC 
or later. Also, there is no evidence that would indicate that slip Ernian lüling 85 was later inserted into a 
manuscript copy that had been produced earlier; e. g., there is no obvious difference in handwriting between 
Ernian lüling slip 85 and the following slip 86, which does contain the character ying 盈. In conclusion, it is 
most likely that the Ernian lüling copy found in Zhangjiashan tomb 247 was produced in 187 BC or later 
(even though, of course, it contains many rules that already had been in force from much earlier), and that 
the “second year” referred to in its title is the second regnal year of empress Lü. However, it has to be noted 
that a different interpretation of the title does not necessarily imply a different date ante quem for the 
Zhangjiashan texts. E. g., even if the title is understood to refer to a (supposed) original creation of the Han 
code in the second regnal year of the Gaozu emperor (205 BC, i. e. a very early date in view of the fact that 
victory over Xiang Yu had not yet been secured), this would still not question the Ernian lüling as further 
evidence for the date ante quem as long as it is accepted that the Zhangjiashan version contains stipulations 
such as Ernian lüling 85 added in 187 BC or later. 
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Cases 19 and 20 are set in the Chunqiu period: Case 19 in the state of Wei 衛,150 case 20 in the 
state of Lu 魯.151 No actual dates are provided, and the incumbent rulers who make an appearance 
in the respective cases are not mentioned by name, but simply referred to by jun 君 “ruler”. 
However, the person entrusted with the task of the judge is named. In both cases these are famous 
personages known from received texts who also appear in the Zuozhuan: In case 19, the judge is 
Shi You 史猷,152 who is to be identified with Shi Qiu,153 style Zi Yu 子魚, an official in the state 
of Wei who flourished 544-534.
154
 In case 20, the judge is Liuxia Ji 柳下季, another name of 
Zhan Huo 展獲, who flourished 634 BC.155 
The events reported in case 19 are therefore set in the second half of the sixth century BC, the 
events of case 20 in the second half of the seventh century BC. However, the fact that these two 
cases involve famous persons of the Chunqiu period does not imply a judgement about their 
historicity, which is questionable.
156
 
To summarise the results for cases 19 and 20: 
- case 19: 2nd half 6th century BC 
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 Both you GSR 1096t and qiu GSR 1096q are part of the same phonetic series. Both the judge in case 19 
and the Shi Qiu mentioned in other texts are said to live in Wei. On the identification see Zhangjiashan 
ersiqi hao Han mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 2001, 226 note 4 and Li Xueqin 1995, 41. 
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 The dates are derived from the mentioning of Shi Qiu under the 29
th
 year of Duke Xiang of Lu (544 BC) 
(Zuozhuan Xiang 29,546,11) and a story involving Duke Ling of Wei who reigned 534-493 BC (Hanshi 
waizhuan 7.21, 55). Shi Qiu is also mentioned in Zuozhuan Ding 13,8,12; Xunzi 4, 32; 6, 58; and Lunyu 18, 
335. 
155
 The date is based on Liuxia Ji being mentioned under the 26
th
 year of Duke Xi of Lu (634 BC) 
(Zuozhuan Xi 26,197,3). Liuxia was the name of his fief, Ji as well as Qin 禽 where his courtesy names (zi 
字), Zhan his lineage name (shi 氏), Huo his given name (ming 名), and Hui 惠 his posthumous title (shihao 
諡號). Liuxia Ji is also mentioned in Zhuangzi 29, 426; Lunyu 21, 388; 18, 340; Mengzi 10, 397; and 
Zuozhuan Wen 2,232,12. 
156
 See the arguments above. 
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- case 20: 2nd half 7th century BC 
The other cases in the Zouyanshu are set in Qin or Han. This clearly follows from the following 
evidence, among others: 
a) They refer to the multi-tiered Qin/Han system of territorial administration (li 里 “villages” – 
xiang 鄉 “township” – xian dao 縣道 “prefecture or march” – jun 郡 “commandery” – ting 廷 
“imperial court” as seat of the central government) and use the Qin/Han titles for the officials 
that are responsible for the administration of law at each level of government (ling 令 “prefect” 
on the xian-level, shou 守 “governor” at the jun-level, tingwei 廷尉 “minister of trials” at the 
central government, to name but the most important); 
b) They use Qin and Han place names (most obvious is Xianyang 咸陽 for the Qin capital in cases 
17
157
 and 22
158
); 
c) Some of them refer to datable external events, such as the civil war 209 to 202 BC during which 
Liu Bang and Xiang Yu competed for power,
159
 or the resettlement of families from Qi to 
Guanzhong at the turn of the year from 199 to 198 BC;
160
 
d) The legal procedure as well as the legal terminology used in these cases closely resemble, 
sometimes in a more evolved form, the procedure and terminology known from the Qin legal 
texts of Shuihudi. 
Most importantly, point (a) in particular implies a date post quem, insofar as cases 1-18 and 21-22 
must be from some time after 350 BC, when Qin moved its capital to Xianyang 咸陽 and 
instituted the multi-tiered system of territorial administration with its corresponding officials 
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associated with the reforms of Shang Yang 商鞅.161 
Most of these Qin or Han cases in the Zouyanshu (cases 1-18, 21-22) contain some calendrical 
information. This can refer to different points of time in relation to the case, namely the time 
- when the events under judicial scrutiny happened (E), 
- when judicial proceedings were initiated (J), 
- when the case was submitted to a higher authority (S), 
- when a decision was reached by the lower authority or conveyed by the higher authority (D). 
However, none of the cases explicitly provides the reign period, i. e. we find only “eleventh 
year”162 instead of “eleventh year of Gaozu” and so forth. Still, under the premise that all cases 
except 19 and 20 are from after 350 BC (the terminus post quem) and from before 180 BC (the 
terminus ante quem), exact dating is fairly straightforward when using the calendrical information 
supplied in the texts themselves. Ambiguities in regard to the reign period can be resolved in most 
cases, because the cyclical characters given in the Zouyanshu for a particular day appear only in 
certain months; even better is the situation if the Zouyanshu provides cyclical characters for the 
first day of the month (shuo 朔), as it is rare that more than one of the possible months in different 
reign periods has the same shuo. 
In this way, the following dates can be calculated without any doubt for the events and 
proceedings recorded in the Zouyanshu (with E referring to the time of the event in question, J to 
the time of the initiation of judicial proceedings, S to the time when the case was submitted, and D 
to the time when the decision was made): 
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- case 1: 196 BC (J, S) 
- case 2: 196 BC (J, S, E), 201 BC (E) 
- case 3: 197 BC (S, D) 
- case 5: 197 BC (S, J) 
- case 14: 199 BC (D), 200 BC (S) 
- case 15: 200 BC (S) 
It is noteworthy that in this list cases of the same type (see below) were submitted at roughly the 
same time: cases 1-3 and 5, all requests for decision of a doubtful case (yan 讞), were submitted in 
196 and 197 BC, while cases 14 and 15, probably requests for approval of a sentence, were both 
submitted in 200 BC. Also, the fact that cases 1-3 and 4 (see below) are all from after 200 BC is 
consistent with the record in the Hanshu that the procedure for submitting doubtful cases (yan) 
was re-established in Han by the Gaozu emperor in 200 BC.
163
 
This leaves the following more complicated cases: 
- case 4: 200-197 BC, probably 197 BC (S): 
The only calendrical information in this case is “twelfth month, day renshen” (shier yue renshen 
十二月壬申),164 i. e. a month and day are given, but no year. However, the request for decision 
(yan 讞) is submitted by “Deputy Prefect Xi of Hu 胡 Prefecture”. As a person with the same 
name and title in the same prefecture also appears in case 3,
165
 which is from 197 BC, it is 
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 Hanshu 23, 1106; full text and translation see above. As noted above, the Yuelu documents show that a 
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plausible to assume that both cases were submitted by the same Deputy Prefect Xi, and therefore 
are from around the same time. Within the two decades preceding and following the year 197 BC 
(207 BC – 186 BC), the twelfth month of the year 204 BC, of each of the years 201-197 BC and of 
each of the years 190-186 BC contain a day renshen. Of these years, 204 BC is very improbable, 
because it is both rather far from 197 BC, they year of case 3, and also conflicts with the record 
that the procedure for submitting doubtful cases was re-established in Han only in 200 BC, a 
record which is consistent with all cases that can be dated with certainty. The same argument also 
excludes the year 201 BC. The years 190-186 BC (5
th
 year of the Huidi emperor – 2nd year of 
empress Lü) are too far from 197 BC on the other end and also would, improbably, make case 4 
the only case in the Zouyanshu from after the Gaozu reign. Therefore, case 4 is almost certainly 
from one of the years 200-197 BC, but most probably from 197 BC in view of the fact that all 
other yan-cases were submitted either in 197 BC or 196 BC even if not originating from the same 
prefecture. 
- cases 6-13: 200-195 BC (S): 
These cases are all very short and contain no calendrical information at all. But like cases 1-5, 
they all contain a request for the decision of a doubtful case (yan 讞), albeit submitted not by a 
prefect (ling 令), but by a commandery governor (jun shou 郡守) at the next higher level of 
territorial administration. Therefore, they should be from after 200 BC, the date of the 
re-establishment of the yan-procedure in Han. As no Zouyanshu case which can be dated with 
certainty is later than the Gaozu reign, they should also be not later than 195 BC. 
- case 16: 201 BC (E, J): 
This case contains three dates with month and cyclical character for the day, but no year. Since in 
the time frame in question the cyclical characters fit only for the sixth year of Han Gaozu, the case 
must be dated to 201 BC. 
 81 
- case 17: 246 BC (J, D, E), 247/246 BC (E) 
This case contains cyclical characters for three days in the twelfth, second, and fourth months, 
respectively, of the “first year of rule” and for one in the tenth month of the “second year” of rule, 
namely: 
元年十二月癸亥166 (first year, twelfth month, day guihai) 
二月癸亥167 (second month, day guihai) 
四月丙辰168 (fourth month, day bingchen) 
二年十月癸酉朔戊寅169 (second year, tenth month with the first day guiyou, day wuyin) 
No reign name is mentioned, but the calendrical information completely fits
170
 the first (247 BC) 
and second (246 BC) years of the reign of King Zheng 政 of Qin, who as Shi Huangdi 始皇帝 in 
221 BC founded the Qin empire and reigned until 210 BC. Peng Hao,
171
 however, places the dates 
in the years 210 and 209 BC, in the first and second year of Huhai 胡亥, the second Qin emperor, 
who reigned under the name of Ershi 二世from 209 to 207 BC. This is based on the case record’s 
use of the term jiāpíng 嘉平 for the winter sacrifice, which according to the Shiji was officially 
introduced only in 216 BC.
172
 However, the shuò-day given in Ernian lüling 121 for the “second 
year” does not fit the known shuò-days for the second year of the Ershi emperor Huhai.173 
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2012, 66; and Xu Mingqiang 2013, i. e. preceding guiyou by four days in the sexagenary cycle, too much 
for a calculation mistake. Furthermore, according to these calendar reconstructions, neither in the twelfth 
nor in the second month of the first regnal year of the Ershi emperor there was a day guihai 癸亥, and also 
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Therefore, Peng Hao needs – implausibly – to further infer that the case record erred in assuming 
that the reign count was already changed in 210 when Huhai accepted the throne, and not only one 
year later as confirmed by all historical sources. In Peng Hao’s theory, the “second year” 
mentioned in Zouyanshu case 17 would then correspond to the year commonly recorded as the 
first year of the Ershi emperor’s reign. However, even for this year (210-209 BC), the shuò-day 
does not fit.
174
 As this, after Peng Hao’s article, has been corroborated by two independent 
palaeographic sources from Yuelu und Zoujiatai, a date in the Ershi reign can be excluded with a 
high degree of certainty. The only plausible options, and the only ones for which all the date 
information fits, are the first two years of the reign of King Zheng 政 of Qin. For the problem why 
the term jiāpíng 嘉平, three decades before its official introduction, is used in this case record, 
two solutions seem possible: As the term in this case record is used by common people within 
direct speech during their interrogation, not by officials, it might be the case that the term was 
already in popular use before it replaced the term là 臘 in 216 BC by imperial edict in official 
documents.
175
 Another possibility is that là 臘 was replaced by jiāpíng 嘉平 in a later copy of the 
document, on account of the terminological change decreed in the meantime. 
- case 18: 220 BC (J): 
This case gives precise dates for the review of the original decision, but not for the events in 
question. Still, it is clear that the events must have taken place shortly before the judicial 
proceedings which are the subject of this document. According to the case record, the judicial 
review started in the “second month of the twenty seventh year”. This must refer to the Shi 
Huangdi emperor of Qin, as the conquest of Chu 楚 which is mentioned in the text falls into his 
                                                                                                                                                         
no day bingchen 丙辰 in the fourth month of that year. 
174
 The tenth month of the first year of the Ershi emperor’s reign is given as jiaxu 甲戌 in Xu Xiqi 1997, 
1265; and, based on an actual excavated sources from Zhoujiatai and Liye, as yihai 乙亥 in Huang Yinong 
2001, 63; Zhang Peiyu 2007, 73; Li Zhonglin 2012, 66; as well as in Xu Mingqiang 2013. 
175
 see Li Xueqin 1995, 38. 
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reign; also, in the time frame in question, only his reign stretches over more than 27 years. While 
all other dates in the text accord with the available calendar reconstructions, the only problem 
concerns the last date mentioned in the text, which the editors transcribe as 廿八年九月甲午176 
“28th year, ninth month, day jiawu 甲午”. However, on both sets of published photographs,177 the 
characters before nian 年 and yue 月 are all but effaced, so that the transcription cannot be 
verified. In Qin Shihuang’s 28th year, the 9th month does not contain a day with the cyclical 
characters jiawu 甲午.178 This discrepancy probably is to be explained either as an error of 
transcription by the editors, a writing mistake either in the original document or a subsequent 
manuscript copy, or by a calculation error made when composing the original document, or a 
combination of these. The case contains a detailed account of the total time required for the 
judicial review.
179
 Adding the day count given there to the dates given for the commencement of 
review proceedings at the beginning of the case,
180
 one arrives in the tenth month of Qin 
Shihuang’s 29th year (November 219), a month which also contains a jiawu甲午 day. In any case, 
after the day count has been identified as belonging to Zouyanshu case 18, all scholars, despite 
some differences regarding specific details, are in agreement that the judicial review started in the 
second month of Qin Shihuang’s 27th year (April 220 BC) and ended either late in his 28th year 
(September/October 219 BC) or very early in his 29
th
 year (November 219 BC). 
- case 21: 247-209 BC (D): 
This case contains no calendrical information at all. The laws and official titles quoted clearly 
mark the case as belonging to the Qin/Han legal and administrative tradition. Peng Hao considers 
                                                     
176
 Zouyanshu 126. 
177
 Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Hanmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 2001 and Peng Hao et al. 2007. 
178
 Xu Xiqi 1997, 1246; Huang Yinong 2001, 63; Zhang Peiyu 2007, 73; Li Zhonglin 2012, 65; Xu 
Mingqiang 2013. 
179
 Zouyanshu 127-128. 
180
 Zouyanshu 125. 
 84 
it a Qin case, because he assumes that in the Zouyanshu the cases are arranged according to a 
chronological principle, with the pre-Han cases placed at the end roughly in descending 
chronological order (this presupposes that the Zhengli xiaozu’s transcription reflects the original 
sequence, reconstructed on the basis of the position of the bamboo slips in the tomb at the time of 
their discovery).
181
 As all other cases in the second half of the Zouyanshu (cases 17-22), in his 
opinion, are from Qin and Eastern Zhou, case 21 must be from Qin, too.
182
 Also, Peng Hao bases 
his dating on the name of Du 杜 prefecture found in the case,183 as this was renamed to Duling in 
Han. While this latter argument is not pertinent (Du 杜 prefecture was renamed Duling 杜陵 only 
in 65 BC on account of the construction of the Xun emperor’s mausoleum nearby,184 thereby not 
excluding any date prior to 65 BC), there are other important considerations which support that 
the case is set in Qin. In form and structure, the case is notably different from those Zouyanshu 
cases dating clearly to Han, which are all presented as trial documents (or their excerpts) 
following a uniform bureaucratic format. In contrast, case 21 in some structural aspects more 
resembles cases 19 and 20, which also do not record any dates and start with a presentation of 
applicable laws. More importantly, a number of the laws quoted in case 21 diverge in wording and 
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 Appendix 2 in Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Han mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 2001, 322 presents a diagram of 
the relative location of the bamboo slips to each other at the time of their discovery. An analysis of this 
diagram allows the conclusion that case 2 should be placed between cases 4 and 5, that the order of cases 19 
and 20 should be reversed, and that the order of cases 6-13 is basically plausible, but cannot confirmed with 
certainty. All of this does not affect Peng Hao’s theory, even though format, not chronology more likely was 
the primary criterion for the arrangement. It is not clear whether the slips contained any more definitive 
evidence of their order, and if so, whether such evidence is currently still preserved. Bamboo manuscripts 
discovered more recently (since ca. 2007), such as the Qin manuscripts collected at the Yuelu Academy or 
the Warring States manuscripts held at Tsinghua university, often have on their back diagonal marks or even 
slip numbers that allow, in many cases, a definite reconstruction of the original order of the slips in a 
manuscript. It is likely that many earlier discoveries, such as the Zhangjiashan slips, might have contained 
similar marks, which are unknown or may have been lost because archeologists and palaeographers, before 
ca. 2007, paid insufficient attention to the discipherment and preservation of the backside of bamboo slips.  
182
 Peng Hao 1995, 43. 
183
 Zouyanshu 183, 188. 
184
 Hanshu 28A, 1544; 8, 253; commentary to Shiji 8, 367; commentary to Shiji 129, 3281. 
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content from the 186 BC collection of the Han statutes. Aohan 𠢕悍185 is not known from the 186 
BC collection or any other extant Han legal source as an offence, while it is mentioned as such in 
Qin.
186
 The statute on jian 奸 “fornication” quoted in case 21 also differs from the relevant 
stipulations in the 186 BC statute collection. The law in case 21 is a general rule that punishes jian 
“fornication” with nai 耐 “shaving” and a less severe form of penal labour, without making 
further specifications concerning the status of the persons involved.
187
 This is congruent with 
another Qin rule that punished na jian 納奸 “supplying for fornication” with paying a redemption 
fee from the nài punishment, also without making further specifications about the status of the 
persons involved.
188
 In contrast, no rule from Han is extant that would punish jian in general, 
irrespective of marital and kin status. In particular, the Ernian lüling contains only rules 
stipulating punishments consensual jian between people in certain household or family 
relationships with each other and also stipulates more severe punishments in these cases. For 
example, for consensual jian involving a married woman, both parties are punished with the most 
severe form of penal labour.
189
 Also, legal texts from Qin are the only other sources which 
mention the procedural rule regarding the arrest of fornicators that is central to case 21.
190
 
Furthermore, Gou 㝅 as the name of the incumbent tingwei 廷尉 militates against dating the case 
to Han, as the name is not found in the Hanshu’s table of government officials, which lists five 
holders of this office by name for the years 202 to 186 BC alone.
191
 
                                                     
185
 Zouyanshu 181. 
186
 Fengzhen shi 37=RCL E 15 (using the phonologically equivalent writing 橋悍) 
187
 Zouyanshu 182. 
188
 Falü dawen 65=RCL D 52. 
189
 Ernian lüling 192. 
190
 Fengzhen shi 95=RCL E 25 and Wei yu deng zhuang 193, 198, 204, 206. On the rule see note 93 above. 
191
 Hanshu 19B, 746-753. In Qin, Gou Li 㝅禮 is found as the name of a deputy prefect of the capital 
Xianyang in the year 241 BC (Zouyanshu 227); even though it is perhaps unlikely that this is the same 
person, at least this demonstrates that Gou could be part of personal names in Qin.  
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Case 21 therefore almost certainly dates to Qin, most likely to 247-209 BC.
192
 
- case 22: 241 BC (J, S): 
This case contains the dates “sixth month, day guimao” (liu yue guimao 六月癸卯),193 without 
designation of a year and shuo-day, as well as “sixth year, eigth month beginning with day bingzi, 
day renchen (liu nian ba yue bingzi shuo renchen 六年八月丙子朔壬辰).194 According to earlier 
calendar reconstructions, which were based on the Zhuanxu calendar, no eighth month of a sixth 
year begins with a bingzi day, while in 241 BC, the sixth year of King Zheng 政 of Qin, the later 
Shi Huangdi, the second day of the eighth month is a bingzi day, so that the difference would have 
been only one day.
195
 However, more recent calendar reconstructions which take the 
palaeographic evidence into account all give bingzi as the shuo-day of the eighth month in the 
sixth year of King Zheng.
196
 Consequently, the sixth month of the same year also contains a 
                                                     
192
 Arguments against a Qin date have been advanced early on by Li Xueqin (1995, 40), first of all on the 
ground that the character zheng 正 (in case 21 found in the official title tingwei zheng 廷尉正) is, contrary 
to assumed practice in Qin sources, not replaced by a taboo character which would avoid the given name of 
King Zheng 政, the later Qin Shihuangdi. However, manuscript texts dating to 246-210 BC also do not 
avoid the character zheng 正 (廿四年正月 in Longgang 116; 正月丁卯 in Zhoujiatai Lipu 29.2; 正月 in 
Biannianji 3.2, 14.2, 25.2; 以平正賈 in Fengzhen shi 39=RCL E 15; 行正旗下 in Zouyanshu 212; in the 
Shuihudi manuscript texts alone, 133 instances of the character zheng 正 are found). Also, according to the 
chronological tables of the Shiji (16, 767, 779), zheng was only tabooed in the second year of the Ershi 
emperor, so that duan yue 端月 begins to be used instead of zheng yue 正月 only in the years 208 and 207 
BC. Furthermore, Li Xueqin also argues for a Han date on the grounds that, based on An Zuozhang 安作章 
and Xiong Tieji 熊鐵基 (Qin Han guanzhishi gao 秦漢官制史稿. Jinan: Qilu shushe 1984, pp. 148, 
154-155, 156), the official titles tingwei zheng 廷尉正 and tingwei jian 廷尉監 existed only since Han. 
However, according to the Tongdian 通典 both titles were already established in Qin (although Li Xueqin 
calls this into doubt). Finally, the Wei yu deng zhuang attests that the yan 讞-procedure for submitting 
doubtful cases, on which case 21 is based, already existed in Qin. See Lau and Lüdke 2012, 16-18. 
193
 Zouyanshu 197. 
194
 Zouyanshu 227. 
195
 Xu Xiqi 1997, 1202; Zhang Peiyu 1987, 217. 
196
 Zhang Peiyu 2007, 73; Li Zhonglin 2012, 65; Xu Mingqiang 2013. The difference of one day results 
from a slightly different distribution of dayue 大月 (30-day months) and xiaoyue 小月 (29-day months) in 
the palaeographic finds, as compared to what the earlier reconstructions had assumed. 
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guimao-day, so that the year is also consistent with the other date in the text. The non-calendrical 
evidence also strongly supports placing the text in 241 BC: The Qin capital Xianyang is 
mentioned,
197
 which was renamed Changan in the sixth year of the Gaozu emperor,
198
 so that the 
latter’s reign can be excluded. The use of dian 典 as a taboo character for zheng 正 “village 
head”199 also indicates that the case is set during King Zheng’s reign. 
Case 22 therefore can be dated to 241 BC with certainty.
200
 
These results for the remaining cases can be summarised as follows: 
- case 4: 200-197 BC, probably 197 BC (S) 
- cases 6-13: 200-195 BC (S) 
- case 16: 201 BC (E, J) 
- case 18: 220 BC (J) 
- case 21: 247-209 BC (D) 
- case 22: 241 BC (J, S) 
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 Zouyanshu 227. 
198
 Shiji 22, 1120. 
199
 Zouyanshu 197; the same taboo character is consistently used in the Shuihudi-texts for the village head 
(Qinlü shiba zhong 14=RCL A7; Qinlü zachao 32=RCL C 20; Falü dawen 98, 198=RCL D 81, D 177; 
Fengzhen shi 10, 52, 63=RCL E 3, E 19, E 21), see RCL A 7 footnote 11. The village head was called 
lizheng 里正 before (Hanfeizi 35, 253) and after (Hanshu 90, 3673) Ying Zheng’s 嬴政 reign first as King 
Zheng of Qin and then as Qin Shihuangdi. However, in case 22 the character 正 zheng is only tabooed as 
part of the village head’s title and is used in other instances (Zouyanshu 212); the same is true for the 
Shuihudi texts, where zheng also is not avoided if not part of the title. 
200
 Wei yu deng zhuang 150-170, which is very similar to case 22 in format and contents, can be dated to one 
year earlier, i. e. 242 BC, which is further evidence for the dating of Zouyanshu case 22. See Lau and Staack 
2016, 229ff. 
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The date of the compilation of each case report 
In principle, the date of the events and proceedings reported in each case does not determine the 
time when the case record itself was compiled. However, the fact that most Zouyanshu cases 
originally were judicial documents implies that these documents were drawn up exactly at the 
time when the proceedings took place. As more than one government agency is involved in many 
cases, a step-by-step compilation must be assumed, e. g.: The local prefecture authority first 
undertook its own investigation, then formulated its submission, later the responsible court 
officials added their opinion, finally the emperor’s decision was attached to the document. This 
layer-by-layer process is easily discernible and made explicit in all those cases where different 
dates are provided for the submission of the case, for the submission to a higher authority and/or 
the decision (see the notes to the dates given above). But altogether, due to their nature as 
documents, there is no chronological distance between the proceedings recorded in the texts and 
their recording in a document. This is also true for case 22, which has to be considered an actual 
document. Therefore, for all cases except 19-21, the dates given above with the sigla J, S, and D 
also refer to the time of the original compilation of the case record. 
Case 21 presents the discussions at the imperial court concerning a case submitted for decision in 
edited form. Based on the available evidence, it is not possible to decide when the editing took 
place, beyond that obvious fact that this must have happened after the compilation of the original 
documents on which the Zouyanshu case is based and before the compilation of the Zouyanshu 
itself. 
Cases 19 and 20 are not actual documents, but narratives with a strong literary and rhetorical 
character about events the historical accuracy of which cannot be determined. An analysis shows 
that both texts, though telling a Chunqiu period story, can have been written not earlier than in 
post-unification Qin, and possibly only in early Han. Firstly, the texts themselves make their great 
 89 
temporal distance explicit by referring to the time of the events they talk about as yishi 異時 “in 
the past”.201 Secondly, text 20 translates the terms supposedly used for labour convicts in Chunqiu 
period Lu into their Qin/Han equivalents.
202
 This last point in particular excludes an origin either 
outside of pre-unification Qin, or prior to Warring States Qin. Thirdly, and most importantly, the 
texts make use of a vocabulary that is not attested at all or not in the relevant sense in texts earlier 
than in post-unification Qin. This vocabulary appears both in the narrative and in quotes of legal 
stipulations which allegedly date back to Chunqiu times. Examples are 臥 in the nominal sense 
“sleeping place”,203 or the technical legal term he 劾 “to bring an ex-officio charge”.204 Most 
significantly, the introduction of the term xianguan 縣官 in the sense “government affairs, official 
business”205 can be dated precisely to the year 221 BC, based on documents found in Liye. These 
include a list of terms and designations to be replaced by new ones, including the instruction to 
substitute the new term xianguan 縣官 “government” for both the old wang shi 王室 “royal 
house” and gong shi 公室 “ruling house”.206 Other items on the same list are known from the Shiji 
account of how King Zheng, in the 26
th
 year of his rule, marked his success in unifying the realm 
by introducing new terms and designations, most importantly huangdi 皇帝 for wang 王.207 The 
composition of case 20 in its present form therefore can be placed with certainty after 221 BC. 
Most likely, the same is true for case 19. The more expanded technical term xianguan shi 縣官事 
                                                     
201
 Zouyanshu 162, 174. See note 35 
202
 Zouyanshu 175. See notes 45 and 46. 
203
 Compare Zouyanshu 167-168 with Hanshu 77, 2380. In earlier sources, the verbal sense “to sleep” is 
common. The earliest passage for nominal usage given in the Hanyu da cidian is Hanshu 70, 1872 (a 
slightly different worded parallel passage is found in Shiji 70, 2619). 
204
 The earliest use of he 劾 is found in late Warring States legal texts found at Shuihudi (Xiaolü 54, 
55=RCL B 26, 27). 
205
 Zouyanshu 175. 
206
 Liye 8-461r. See also Lau and Staack 2016, 153 note 752. 
207
 Shiji 6, 236. Substitutions listed both in Liye 8-461r and the Shiji account include zhi for ming, zhao for 
ling, as well as Taishang Huang 太上皇 for Zhuang Xiang Wang 莊襄王. 
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“government business; official business” is only known from Han sources208 and is not attested 
earlier; however, this might be due to a lack of sources. 
It would be tempting to place the composition of cases 19 and 20 in Qin, as this would neatly 
divide the Zouyanshu in a first part with cases 1-16 composed in Han and a second part with cases 
17-22 composed in Qin. However, composition of cases 19 and 20 in Qin is doubtful. Based on 
what we know about the intellectual history of Qin, it would be surprising to find both cases 
attached to the Chunqiu-personages that appear in both cases as judges and which are taken from 
the Confucian pantheon.
209
 Case 19 is a variant of a Hanfeizi story where no judge appears; why 
would a judge associated with Confucian texts be introduced for this text in Qin? In case 20, the 
ru 儒-scholar certainly is presented as all clothes and no substance and thus not in the best light. 
However, it would be too simple to interpret case 20 as pursuing a Qin agenda in demonstrating 
the superiority of Legalism over Confucianism. This would rely on too simple an understanding 
of the intellectual world in Qin and early Han, where ru-scholars cannot yet be fully associated 
with “Confucianism”, and fixed “schools” had not yet fully developed. Rather, the ru-scholar in 
case 20 should be seen as embodying a class of specialist officials, the ritual specialists, which is 
here contrasted with a representative of the separate class of judicial officials. Both the fact that 
the judge is taken from “Confucian” texts and that the Liji, where Confucius himself makes the 
point that the junzi is made not by his dress, but by the learning, shares a topos with this case,210 
                                                     
208
 A typical example is found in Ernian lüling 267: 吏有縣官事而無僕者，郵為炊；有僕者，假器 “If an 
official is on government business, but has no servants, the courier station shall cook from him; if he has 
servants, it shall lend him [kitchen] utensils.” Other examples are found in Ernian lüling 46, 48, 183, 422; 
Zouyanshu 180; Hanshu 13, 2427; 59, 2655. In most of these, xianguan shi is preceded by yi 以, as in 
Zouyanshu 175. The term xianguan on its own is very common in Han sources, but unknown in earlier ones. 
An isolated example in the military chapters of the Mozi (Mozi 71, 370) does not change this picture, as (a) 
the context is insufficient to definitively decide whether the term is used in its Qin/Han technical meaning; 
(b) the Mozi chapter itself, at least according to some scholars, might have been composed in Han (Graham 
1993, 337), a view which finds support in Liye 8-461r; and (c) in any case, Liye 8-461r offers exceptionally 
strong evidence for the exact date of the introduction of the term. 
209
 See above. 
210
 Liji 59, 1668c. 
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should warn against premature simplifications.
211
 All in all, the intellectual fluidity and 
multi-facetedness of cases 19 and 20 probably fits better into early Han than in Qin. 
The date of the compilation of the Zouyanshu case collection 
With this information, it is fairly easy to determine when the Zouyanshu was first compiled as a 
case collection. The collection must date from after 196 BC, which is the last date mentioned in 
the Zouyanshu cases, and from before 185, the terminus ante quem. With the absence of any 
material clearly dating from after 196 BC, it is likely that the Zouyanshu was put together close to 
that date, i. e. around 195 BC. This would coincide with the last year in which the tomb owner was 
in office (he left office in 194 BC);
212
 however, it has to be kept in mind that the collection of 
statutes found in his tomb dates from 186 BC, the year before or the year of his death, that is from 
the time after his relief from office.
213
 
The date of the Zouyanshu copy found in Zhangjiashan 
It is unlikely that the Zouyanshu manuscript found in Zhangjiashan is the original manuscript of 
that text. Containing cases from all over the empire which obviously served as models and 
precedents, the Zouyanshu must have been compiled at the capital and distributed to the localities. 
The manuscript found in the tomb of a relatively low- or, at best, middle-ranking person far 
removed from the capital therefore should be a copy, which must have been made after 196 BC 
(the latest date in the Zouyanshu) and not later than 186 BC (the date of the tomb). 
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 See Lüdke 2014 for detailed arguments. 
212
 Lipu 10, see above. 
213
 See pages 61ff. above. 
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The sequence of the cases 
Early on, Peng Hao has argued that the Zouyanshu cases are arranged according to a 
chronological principle, with the pre-Han cases placed at the end roughly in descending 
chronological order.
214
 In order to understand the principles according to which the Zouyanshu 
cases have been arranged, it is first necessary to re-examine to what extent the sequence of the 
cases in the Zhengli xiaozu’s transcription reflects the original sequence within the scroll 
recovered from the tomb. The only available basis to do so is the diagram of the relative location 
of the bamboo slips to each other at the time of their discovery which has been published by the 
Zhengli xiaozu.215 The conclusions derived from an analysis of this diagram can be briefly 
summarized as follows: 
- Case 2 should be placed between cases 4 and 5, as slips 17-27 (case 3) and 28-35 (case 4) are 
in the diagram located to the inside of slips 8-16 (case 2). This means that the two cases from 
Jiangling prefecture (cases 2 and 5) originally were placed beside each other, in the same way 
as the two cases from Hu prefecture (cases 3 and 4) originally were placed beside each other. 
- The order of cases 19 and 20 should be reversed, with case 19 following case 20, as slips 
162-173 (case 19) in the diagram follow slips 174-179 (case 20) in the same layer of the scroll 
in clockwise direction (the general direction of the scroll). 
-  The order of cases 6-13 is basically plausible, but cannot be confirmed with certainty, as each 
of these short cases consists of only one or two slips, and as it is difficult to determine whether 
the location of one or two single slips corresponds to the original sequence, or whether the 
slips have been dislocated by forces operating on the scroll after interment, as is the case with 
other slips. 
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 Peng Hao 1995, 43.  
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- Generally, it is likely that the slips were in the correct sequence when the scroll was placed 
into the tomb, i. e. it is unlikely that more than a few single slips, if any at all, were bound into 
the scroll in the wrong place. This conclusion is based on the fact that specific types of 
irregularities in the sequence of the slips were concentrated in specific areas of the 
wrapped-up scroll at the time of discovery. This can be better explained with forces operating 
on specific parts of the wrapped-up scroll after its deposition into the tomb. If a large number 
of slips had been incorrectly bound, their location would have been more random after 
wrapping up the scroll. As a consequence of this observeration, the situation of the scroll after 
discovery is not inconsistent with its being used during the lifetime of the tomb owner. There 
is no reason to assume that the scroll was specifically produced for burial (while sloppy 
binding might have been an indication for this). 
As a result of this analysis and of the preceding analysis of the nature of the cases, as well as of the 
following analysis of their format and structural features, the following principles for placing the 
cases in the Zouyanshu can be postulated: 
1. Primary organising principle is the format and type of the cases: 
a. Fully-documented yan-cases, submitted by prefecture-level authorities (cases 
1-5, Han). 
b. Extracts of yan-cases, submitted by commandery authorities (cases 6-13, Han). 
c. Qing-cases (requests for court approval of sentence), submitted by commandery 
authorities (cases 14-16, Han). 
d. Fu-cases (reviews), with the reviews conducted by commandery authorities (case 
17: qi ju-review; case 18: review on order of yushi dafu; both Qin). 
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 Appendix 2 in Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Han mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 2001, 322. 
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e. Historical cases involving ruler and individual judge (cases 19 and 20; situated in 
Eastern Zhou). 
f. Cases exemplifying legal argumentation in detail (case 21, a yan-case from Qin) 
and criminal investigation (case 22, a recommendation for promotion from Qin). 
2. Secondary organising principle is the locality which submitted the case originally, as 
cases submitted by the same authority are placed together. There are too few cases to 
determine whether there is a principle guiding the order of localities (e. g. from North to 
South). 
3. Within each major category, the date of each case does not seem to be a factor in 
arranging the sequence. 
4. The general chronological order (Han cases preceding Qin cases) seems to be a 
by-product of the arrangement according to format, rather than a guiding principle, as all 
cases following the same format are chronologically close together. 
A form to be filled in: The procedural model 
It is evident from mutual comparison that those Zouyanshu cases most likely based on actual 
documents not only record trials conducted according to a strict procedure, but that the records 
themselves follow a strict pattern. In fact, this pattern reflects the procedure and at the same time 
is itself part of the procedure, as the recording was an integral part of the administration of 
justice.
216
 
                                                     
216
 Case records with more or less uniformity of pattern are not unique to the field of law. Elizabeth Hsu 
(2010) has studied Western Han medical records preserved in the Shiji, which are important not only for 
understanding similarities and differences in the recording of cases in different fields of specialisation in 
early China, but also evaluating the crucial role of case narrtives in the production and development of 
knowledge. The latter theme is explored in depth by the different essays in Furth et al. 2007 (in her 
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The Zouyanshu documents can be thought of being constructed by filling in some kind of “form”. 
While this form is utilized in the Zouyanshu, in its completed case records the form is already 
filled in; this means that the form itself becomes latent. It therefore needs to be reconstructed by 
analysing the structural parallels of different cases, which become apparent when their form is 
abstracted from their specific content, and when recurrent formulae are isolated. 
While the different forms underlying Zouyanshu case records are not immediately visible as such, 
there is at least one almost contemporary extant text which contains similar procedural forms in 
an explicit way, namely the Fengzhen shi from Shuihudi. These have a slightly different 
perspective than the Zouyanshu: The Fengzhen shi exclusively concern procedural steps to be 
taken at the inquest stage of criminal trials, that is, before a finding of fact (ju 鞫) was made, while 
the Zouyanshu contains the procedure up to and including the final judgement and any review 
conducted by higher authorities. The Fengzhen shi are model records for the communication 
between different officials within a prefecture, while the Zouyanshu contains records of 
communication between prefectures and higher-level authorities. Finally, the Fengzhen shi not 
only present the naked form, but also intersperse explicit instructions to the responsible officials; 
in contrast, the Zouyanshu contains neither the blank form nor instructions, but the result of filling 
in the form, i. e. full case records. Despite these differences, the Fengzhen shi is instructive on a 
number of points: 
1. They demonstrate that the formal structure of trial records was not a mere subconscious 
side-effect of the practice of recording, but that procedural forms were consciously 
                                                                                                                                                         
introduction, Furth states that the “project of thinking with cases in China came to self-consciousness 
through the production of texts that gradually acquired a systematic and public character in the tenth 
century CE and after.” It might be asked whether the Qin and Han legal as well as the medical case records 
are not sufficient ground to assume that the process described by Furth – a self-conscious thinking with 
cases reflected in systematic and public texts – had much earlier origins than the 10th century). Giving 
support to the importance of case records throughout imperial history, Barbara Volkmar (2007) describes 
Ming period medical cases. 
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developed, prescribed and applied. 
2. Through their composition as a combination of model records and procedural instructions, 
they show that procedure and record were inseparably interlinked: Correct procedure 
implied, as an intrinsic element, records that were formally correct; and the records were 
only correct in so far they recorded correct procedure. 
3. Their original title Fengzhen shi 封診式 “Models for sealing and inspection” shows that 
there was a proper Chinese term for the “form” used in recording legal proceedings, namely 
shi 式 “model”. I will use this term henceforth for the procedural form underlying the legal 
records. 
The use of such a model served bureaucratic and judicial purposes. It allowed for efficient 
dispensation of legal matters. It served as a checklist which ensured that every necessary 
procedural step was taken. It simplified the work of the record-keeping authority, which only 
needed to fill in a given form instead of deliberating on the appropriate form for the record on a 
case-by-case basis. For the supervising authorities, it ensured that information was standardised 
and could be quickly retrieved at the position assigned to it. It made concise records possible 
which nevertheless included all relevant information. From a judicial point of view, it ensured that 
the correct procedure was adhered to so that a judgement would not become invalid for 
procedural reasons. It served as a filter which extracted from the often chaotic flow of information 
only that which was relevant to the legal issues of the case at hand. It therefore prefigured the 
judicial decision, which could only be based on the information which the model allowed. 
The analysis of this form is therefore crucial not only for the understanding of early Chinese legal 
records, but also for the understanding of the administration of justice in general. 
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Reconstruction of the procedural model for specific cases 
In the following, I will try to reconstruct the procedural model – or rather the most important of 
the different models – underlying the Zouyanshu case records. I will use, in some respects, the 
format of the Fengzhen shi models: There, the names – but not the rank – of those persons playing 
an immediate part in the formal inquest as accused, witness or person lodging a criminal 
complaint (gao 告) are (mostly) replaced with cyclical characters of the tiangan 天干 cycle (jia 
甲, yi 乙, bing 丙, ding 丁 etc., translated as “A”, “B”, “C”, “D” etc.). Most other individual 
information which refers to place, time, or the names of the investigating officials or of people not 
immediately related to the formal inquest is replaced with mou 某, translated as “X”. Some 
information, such as a specific offence or a person’s rank and official position, is retained in the 
Fengzhen shi, but replaced by expressions such as mou zui 某罪 “offence X”, mou jue 某爵 “Xth 
rank” or mou guan 某官 “holder of office X” in my reconstruction of the Zouyanshu model. 
The resulting hypothetical models of the Zouyanshu are considerably more abstract than the 
Fengzhen shi models which, true to their purpose, still contain a fair amount of specific 
information characteristic for the type of case for which they provided procedural guidance. It is 
also not known if explicit models – shi 式 – actually existed for the Zouyanshu records, i. e. 
models that are closer to my reconstruction than to the Fengzhen shi. However, the Fengzhen shi 
demonstrate that the idea of a procedural model and a form used in recording is not anachronistic. 
I will start by extrapolating the model for those cases which share a large amount of structural 
similarities, i. e. cases 1-5, 6-13, 14 and 15, and 16 respectively (cases 17-22 will in this first step 
not be used for the extrapolation of the model due to their more unique structural features; 
however, I will discuss in the following section to what extent they conform to the procedural 
model). The cases in each of these groups can be assumed to be constructed around the same 
procedural model. I will deal in the section following the reconstruction with the question of how 
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these models, or elements within them, are modified in the remaining cases. Case 16, though 
basically belonging to the same group as cases 14-15, is analysed separately because of a number 
of structural differences. 
The reconstruction of the model offered below aims to present the most evolved version of the 
form. This means that structural elements present in at least one case are reproduced even if they 
are missing in other cases. On the other hand, if a case involves several people in the same role 
(accused, witness etc.), only the elements pertaining to one of them are given; it will be 
understood that the structural elements for one person are duplicated in the resulting record if 
more than one person is involved in the same role. Pointed brackets 〈 〉 indicate optional elements. 
Horizontal slashes ( | ) indicate alternatives within a formula. Round brackets （ ） are used to 
delineate the alternatives within a formula from the rest of a sentence, i. e. to indicate where the 
first alternative begins and where the second alternative ends; round brackets are not necessary if 
the alternatives are themselves optional and thus enclosed in pointed brackets, or if the alternative 
phrase starts at a new line, or ends with a line break. Double horizontal slashes ( | | ) are used to 
delineate second-level alternatives, i. e. when one of the alternative formulae in itself already 
includes alternative formulations. 
Cases 1-5217 
Header of a prefecture-level authority’s submission of a case to the higher authority for decision 
due to doubts on matters of law: 
某年某月某某朔某某，218 
X-th year, x-th month with day xx as its first day, day xx. 
                                                     
217
 For full translation and discussion of these cases, see Lau and Lüdke 2012, 92ff. (case 1); 107ff. (case 2); 
117ff. (case 3); 128ff. (case 4); 135ff. (case 5). 
218
 Zouyanshu 1; 8; 17; 36. 
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某（縣│道）〈令〉219某、丞某敢讞之：220 
We,
221
 X, prefect of X (prefecture | marsh), and X, deputy prefect, venture to submit the following 
case for decision: 
Documentation of the formal inquest conducted at the prefecture level: 
〈迺〉某月某某，222 
<Past>
223
 x-th month, day xx, 
〈某官〉〈某爵〉甲〈告│辭〉曰：「……乙為某。」224││劾曰：……乙為罪。225││〈某
官〉〈某爵〉甲詣（男子│女子）乙告為某。226 
<Holder of official position X> A <a holder of the Xth rank> <brought the following criminal 
complaint | brought the following claim>: … B did [punishable action] X. | | Ex-officio charge: … 
B did [punishable action] X. | | <holder of official position X> A <a holder of the Xth rank> 
presented to the authorities a (man | woman) called B and brought a criminal complaint against 
him/her for doing [punishable action] X. 
                                                     
219
 The explicit designation ling 令 is not present in the introductory formula of any of the cases and here 
inserted for clarification only. 
220
 Zouyanshu 1; 8; 17; 28; 36. 
221
 The first person is used throughout the translation in order to stress the nature of these texts as actual 
documents, which requires us to assume that this formula introducing the submission was actually written 
down by the officials mentioned in it, not by a distant outsider who narrates the fact of the submission. In 
particular, the polite gan “I/we venture to…” makes only sense in a first-person statement. 
222
 Zouyanshu 1; 8; 28; 36. 
223
 Nǎi 迺 (also written 乃) “this past (specified day or month)”, when used before dates in which no year or 
neither month nor year was given, indicated that the date so marked was the one immediately preceding the 
time of speaking. In this way, “incomplete” date references consisting only of day and month, or even only 
of the day, are unambiguous as long as the time of speaking is known (Fengzhen shi 96, 17, 81=RCL E 6, 8, 
22; Zouyanshu 100, 102; Juyan 3.14, 13.6, 49.18, 311.9; 乃 nǎi Juyan 82.2, 306.12; Shiji 6, 422; Hanshu 9, 
281; 25B, 1262; 72, 3092; 81, 3359; 99B, 4159). 
224
 Zouyanshu 8-9; 36-37. 
225
 Zouyanshu 17-18. 
226
 Zouyanshu 1-2; 28. 
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〈今〉乙曰： 
「……。」（它如甲。│它如劾。）227 
<Inquest:>
228
 Statement of B: 
“……” (Everything else corresponded to A’s complaint. | Everything else corresponded to the 
ex-officio charge.) 
丙曰： 
「……。」（它如甲〈、乙〉。│它如劾。）││丙言如〈劾及〉乙。229 
Statement of C: 
“…….” (Everything else corresponded to A’s complaint <and B’s statement>. | Everything else 
corresponded to the ex-officio charge.) | | C made statements corresponding to <the ex-officio 
charge and> B’s statements. 
詰乙： 
「〈律……。〉 
……，（乙│某人）（〈實〉〈即〉│非）某事〈也〉〈已〉：（〈乙〉為某。│乙〈……，〉
當以律某章論。）││……某當也。〈乙〉為某。││（乙非當得為某也，而為某。│乙宜
為某，乃為某。）〈是〉〈即〉律某章〈也〉。││乙〈雖……〉實為某。〈是〉〈即〉
律某章〈也〉。230 
                                                     
227
 Zouyanshu 2-3; 9-10; 18-19; 28-29; 37-39, 39-40. 
228
 The primary purpose of jin 今 here is not to mark the following as occurring in the present (“now”, as 
opposed to “in the past”), but to mark the beginning of the formal inquest conducted by the prefecture 
officials, as opposed to the complaint, claim, or ex-officio charge which initiates the inquest, but is not part 
of it. 
229
 Zouyanshu 3; 10-11; 19; 29-30; 31-32; 40-41. 
230
 The clauses extrapolated here are those of Zouyanshu cases 1-5. They are given here by way of example 
to illustrate the basic structure of the confrontation. Other phrasing might be used in other cases. However, 
whatever the variation, characteristic for the content of the confrontation is the adversative structure: 
Stating the general legal status and consequent duties – contrasting this with the defendant’s actions – 
classifying, explicitly or implicitly, the defendant’s actions as punishable. In essence, the basic logical 
structure is that of a syllogism, with the statement of the legal status or duties taking the position of the 
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何解？」231 
Confrontation of B: 
“The statutes stipulate……. 
……, thus (you | person X) (<in fact> <already> had <nothing else than> | had not) legal status X: 
(Nonetheless, you did [punishable action] X. | Therefore, <……,> by law judgement is to be 
passed on you for statutory offence X.) || ……X was lawful. Nonetheless, you did [punishable 
action] Y. || (Even though by law you were not permitted to do X, you nonetheless did X. | You 
were obliged to do X but instead did Y.) <This> constitutes <nothing else than> statutory offence 
X. || <Although......,> in fact you nonetheless did X. <This> constitutes <nothing else than> 
statutory offence X. 
What defence do you offer?” 
乙曰： 
「……；毋它解。」232│「……；〈吏以為〈即〉律某章；〉存吏〈當，〉〈罪，〉毋解。」
233│「〈……；〉罪，毋解。」234 
Response of B: 
                                                                                                                                                         
major premise, the defendant’s actions that of the minor premise, and the statement of punishability the 
conclusion, against which the defendant is finally asked to defend himself (he jie 何解). This structure is 
typical for Zouyanshu cases 1-5, where the questions in dispute concern matters of law, not matters of fact. 
In cases focusing on the factual reconstruction, the basic structure would be to confront the defendant with 
his statements and contradicting evidence, see e. g. Zouyanshu cases 17 and 22. 
231
 Zouyanshu 4-5, 11-12; 19-20, 21-22; 30-31; 41-42, 44. 
232
 Zouyanshu 13; 44-45. 
233
 Zouyanshu 5; 43-44. The fact that li yi wei <ji> lü mou zhang 吏以為〈即〉律某章 is part of the 
procedural model (and not only particular to the individual case) is supported by Wei yu deng zhuang 130, 
in which records a defendant’s response to the confrontation (jie 詰) as follows: 上以識爲劫𡟰，辠（罪）
識，識毋（無）以避，毋（無）它解。辠（罪） “Only insofar as you, the authorities, regard me as having 
coerced Wan and therefore consider me liable to punishment, I have no means to avoid this, will not bring 
forth any further defence, and would be liable to punishment.” 
234
 Zouyanshu 20-21, 22; 31. 
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“……; no further defence will be brought forth.” | “……; <however, you,235 the interrogating 
officials, consider [my actions] <nothing else than> to constitute statutory offence X; and> only 
under the premises of <how> you, the interrogating officials, <apply the law>, I <would be liable 
to punishment and> would not have a valid defence. | | <……;> I am liable to punishment and 
have no valid defence. 
問： 
如辭。│乙……。〈它如辭。〉236 
Result of inquiries: 
Corresponding to the above statements. | B…… <Everything else corresponds to the above 
statements.> 
診： 
如辭。│……。〈它如辭。〉237 
Result of inspection: 
Corresponding to the above statements. | …… <Everything else corresponds to the above 
statements.> 
鞫〈之〉： 
乙……。〈得〉。〈皆〉審。238 
Finding of facts: 
B……. <He/she has been caught.>239 <All of> this has been ascertained as fact. 
                                                     
235
 li 吏, the generic term for officials or even the authorities, is here used as a second-person address for the 
specific officials conducting the interrogation. 
236
 Zouyanshu 5; 13-14; 22; 32; 45. 
237
 Zouyanshu 45. 
238
 Zouyanshu 5-6; 14-15; 22-23; 32; 45-47. 
239
 The formulaic de 得 “he/she has been caught” often (not always) concludes the finding of fact before the 
assertion that its contents have been ascertained as fact (shen 審). The most likely reason for including de 
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Submission formula, concluding the prefecture-level authority’s submission of the case for 
decision: 
疑乙罪。〈繫。〉〈它縣論。〉 
We are in doubt as to B’s liability to punishment. <He/she is held in detention.> <In all other 
matters we have passed judgement on the prefecture-level.> 
敢讞之〈，謁報〉，240署〈獄史〉某發。241 
We therefore venture to submit the case for decision <and request a reply>, [on your reply] affix 
the notation “to be opened by <judicial secretary> X”. 
Alternative options for a judicial decision, argued probably at the higher authority: 
［比］242 
[Wording of an applicable precedent] 
吏當│吏議： 
〈……，〉乙〈……，〉〈當〉〈以律某章論，〉〈某罪〉。243│〈乙……，〉不當論。
                                                                                                                                                         
probably was in order to fix the exact point in the chain of events when the accused had been caught, as in 
some cases this had a bearing on the legal evaluation and the eventual judgement, e. g. when the offender 
was caught before the punishable action had been begun or completed. This is, for example, the case in case 
3 of the Zouyanshu, where the finding of facts states wei chu guan de 未出關得 “They were caught before 
they had crossed the frontier post”, which probably precluded prosecution for the particular offense of 
crossing the border without authorization (but not for others). 
240
 Zouyanshu 6-7; 15; 23; 32-33; 47. 
241
 Zouyanshu 7; 15; 47. See also note 20 above. 
242
 Zouyanshu 23-24; the term bi 比 is not used in the Zouyanshu, but is the proper term for a precedent (see 
discussion above). 
243
 The minimal form is either Yi dang yi lü mo zhang lun 乙當以律某章論 (determining the applicable 
offence in the statutes explicitly, merely implying the consequent punishment) or Yi mou zui 乙某罪 
(specifying the punishment explicitly, merely implying the underlying offence), but the more expanded 
form Yi dang yi lü mou zhang lun, mou zui 乙當以律某章論，某罪 (specifying both the applicable offence 
and consequent punishment) is also found, see Zouyanshu 34. See Zouyanshu 188 for lü zhang 律章 as the 
proper term a specific section of the statutes, identified by the description of the punishable action, i. e. the 
offence. 
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│當為庶人。│除乙。244 
We apply the law as follows | We argue the following legal opinion: 
<……,> as for B <……,> <by law> <judgement is to be passed on him/her for statutory offence 
X,> <he/she is to be subjected to punishment X>. | <As for B,……,> by law no judgement is to be 
passed on him/her. | By law B is to be made a commoner. | B is to be exempted from punishment. 
或曰： 
〈……，〉乙〈……，〉〈當〉〈以律某章論，〉〈某罪〉。│〈乙……，〉不當論。│
當為庶人。│除乙。245 
Other opinion: 
<……,> as for B <……,> <by law> <judgement is to be passed on him/her for statutory offence 
X,> <he/she is to be subjected to punishment X>. | <As for B,……,> by law no judgement is to be 
passed on him/her. | By law B is to be made a commoner. | B is to be exempted from punishment. 
Decision made at the imperial court or by the emperor himself: 
〈某年某月某某朔某某，廷尉某謂某〈縣│道〉嗇夫： 
讞〈某官〉〈某爵〉乙，讞固有審。〉246 
< X-th year, x-th month with day xx as its first day, day xx. X, minister of trials, notifies the 
stewards of X <prefecture | marsh>: 
In regard to the case of <holder of official position X> B <a holder of the Xth rank> which you 
                                                     
244
 Zouyanshu 7, 14-16, 24-25, 33-34, 47. The possible options have been extrapolated from both the li yi 吏
當 / li dang 吏議–sections and the huo yue 或曰-sections of Zouyanshu cases 1-5, as it is assumed that that 
options found in one type of section could equally be part of the other section as well, as both give 
alternative opinions which, in principle, are interchangeable, depending on the case at hand. E. g., in 
Zouyanshu cases 1-5 we find chu Yi 除乙 only as part of a li dang section (Zouyanshu 48), but not as part of 
a huo yue-section, but it is understood that in a different case this could be the other way around. 
245
 Zouyanshu 7; 14-16; 24-25; 33-34; 47. Here, too, the possible options have been extrapolated from both 
the li yi 吏當 / li dang 吏議–sections and the huo yue 或曰-sections of Zouyanshu cases 1-5, see footnote 
above. 
246
 Zouyanshu 26. 
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have submitted for decision: You indeed have ascertained all relevant facts of the case submitted 
for decision.> 
廷報〈曰〉│廷以聞： 
〈乙〉〈當〉〈〈以〉律某章論〈之〉，〉〈某罪〉。│不當論。│當為庶人。│除乙。247 
Reply from the court | The court has brought the case to the emperor’s attention, resulting in the 
following decision: 
<As for B,> <by law> <judgement is to be passed on him/her for statutory offence X,> <he/she is 
to be subjected to punishment X >. | By law no judgement is to be passed. | By law B is to be made 
a commoner. | B is to be exempted from punishment. 
〈律白，不當讞。〉〈它如律令。〉248 
<As the statutes are explicit on this, by law the case should not have been submitted for decision.> 
< Everything else is to be ordered in correspondence with the statutes and edicts.> 
Cases 6-13249 
Header for a commandery’s submission of a case because of judicial doubts: 
                                                     
247
 Zouyanshu 7; 26-27; 34-35; 47-48. In Zouyanshu cases 1-5, we find either the form dang mou zui 乙某
罪 (specifying the punishment) (Zouyanshu 7, 27, 48) or lü mou zhang lun zhi 律某章論之 (specifying the 
punishable action as reference to the appropriate section of the statutes) (Zouyanshu 35), but not both 
combined. However, based on a comparison with the li yi 吏當 / li dang 吏議 and huo yue 或曰-sections (in 
essence proposed judgements), where the combined form appears once (Zouyanshu 34), the use of the 
combined form should should have been possible in a decision. Bu dang lun 不當論 and dang wei shuren 
當為庶人 are both not found in imperial decisions in Zouyanshu cases 1-5; however, the use of these 
options in the li yi 吏當 / li dang 吏議 and huo yue 或曰-sections implies that, in other cases, these also 
would have been possible outcomes. 
248
 Zouyanshu 27, 35. In Zouyanshu cases 1-5, ta ru lüling 它如律令 is used only once after an imperial 
decision (Zouyanshu 27), the same is true for lü bai, bu dang yan 律白，不當讞 (Zouyanshu 35). In these 
cases, both are not found combined, and three of the five cases contain neither. 
249
 For full translation and discussion of these cases, see Lau and Lüdke 2012, 145ff. (case 6); 152ff. (case 
7); 158ff. (case 8); 161ff. (case 9); 164ff. (case 10); 168ff. (case 11); 173ff. (case 12); 177ff. (case 13). 
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某郡守讞：250 
As governor of commandery X, I
251
 submit for decision: 
Summary (i. e. finding of fact) of the formal inquest, which probably had been conducted at 
prefecture level: 
〈……〉〈某官〉〈某爵〉甲為某〈……〉。252 
<……> <Holder of official position X> A <a holder of the Xth rank> did [punishable action] X 
<……>. 
Submission formula, concluding the commandery’s submission: 
疑罪。253 
We are in doubt as to the liability to punishment. 
Decision of the imperial court: 
廷報： 
甲律某章也。│甲當以律某章論。│甲當某罪。254 
                                                     
250
 Zouyanshu 49; 51; 53; 54; 56; 58; 60; 61. 
251
 Cases 6-13 are summaries of documents, not the full documentation of the cases. This is, for example 
evidenced by the fact that these cases lack the polite formulae of address. The most plausible conjecture is 
that these summaries were prepared at the imperial court as an abstract of the much fuller records archived 
there. The first person is still used in translation, based on the assumption that actual documents form the 
basis for these cases. 
252
 Zouyanshu 49-50; 51-52; 53; 54; 56; 58-59; 60; 61-62. In Zouyanshu 53, the accused is not the 
grammatical subject of the sentence (though the offence for which he is held liable is clearly indicated). 
This variation is not recorded separately in the reconstructed form. 
253
 Zouyanshu 50; 52; 53; 54; 57; 59; 60; 62. 
254
 Zouyanshu 50 (?); 52; 53; 54-55; 57; 59; 60; 62. In Zouyanshu 50, the court replies cuo gao dang zhi 錯
告當治, with cuo gao 錯告 possibly writing chou gao 酬告 “criminal complaint made in reaction” (see Lau 
and Lüdke 2012, 151 note 800). Cuo gao 錯告 is not known at all from extant sources, chou gao 酬告 only 
from Falü dawen (100=RCL D 84, written zhou gao 州告). Therefore, it is not clear whether cuo/zhou/chou 
gao refers to any statutory offence, or is an interpretative/explanatory term. As Zouyanshu case 6 concerns 
an untypical situation which, on the basis of the available source material, is not fully understood, the 
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Reply from the court: 
The statutory offence committed by A is X. | By law judgement is to be passed on A for statutory 
offence X. | By law A is to be subjected to punishment X. 
Cases 14-15255 
Documentation of the formal inquest, submitted by the commandery authorities to the imperial 
court: 
某年某月某某，256 
X-th year, x-th month, day xx. 
某（縣│道）丞某劾│言：257 
X, as deputy prefect of X (prefecture | marsh), brought the following ex-officio charge | reported 
the following: 
〈某官〉〈某爵〉甲為某〈……〉。258 
<Holder of official position X> A <a holder of the Xth rank> did [punishable action] X <……>. 
甲曰： 
「誠為某……。罪。」它如劾│它如書。259 
Statement of A: “It is true that I did X……. I am liable to punishment.” (Everything else 
corresponded to the ex-officio charge. | Everything else corresponded to the documents.) 
                                                                                                                                                         
decision in this case is not used for reconstructing the procedural model, and dang zhi “by law, this is to be 
tried”, in particular, is not included as one of the options. 
255
 For full translation and discussion of these cases, see Lau and Lüdke 2012, 181ff. (case 14); 191ff. (case 
15). 
256
 Zouyanshu 63; 69. 
257
 Zouyanshu 63; 69. 
258
 Zouyanshu 63; 69. 
259
 Zouyanshu 63-64; 69-71. 
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乙言如甲。260 
B made a statement which corresponded to that of A. 
問： 
甲……。它如辭。261 
Result of inquiries: 
B……. Everything else corresponds to the above statements. 
鞫： 
甲……。審。262 
Finding of facts: 
A…… This has been ascertained as fact. 
The commandery authority’s proposal for a judgement, attached to the submission:: 
當： 
甲某罪。263 
We apply the law as follows: 
A is to be subjected to punishment X. 
〈律：……。〉令〈曰〉：……。264 
<The statutes stipulate: …….> The edicts stipulate: ……. 
以此當甲。265 
                                                     
260
 Zouyanshu 64; 71. 
261
 Zouyanshu Zouyanshu 64; 71. 
262
 Zouyanshu 64-65; 71-72. 
263
 Zouyanshu 65; 72. 
264
 Zouyanshu 65-67; 72-73. 
265
 Zouyanshu 67; 73. 
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In accordance with this, we have applied the law to A. 
Identification of the responsible officials: 
某郡守某、守丞某、卒史某治。266 
Tried by X, governor of commandery X, X, deputy governor, and X, secretary-in-chief. 
Submission formula, concluding the commandery authority’s submission of the case for imperial 
approval: 
〈某年某月某某朔某某，某郡守某敢言之。上奏某數牒，謁以聞。乙縣論。敢言之。〉267 
<X-th year, x-th month with day xx as its first day, day xx. As governor of commandery X, I 
venture to report the above. I submit X bamboo slips for the emperor and request that these be 
brought to his attention. Judgement on B has been passed on prefecture-level. I venture to report 
this.> 
Case 16268 
Ex-officio charge brought by the commandery governor, including an account of the antecedent 
events: 
某郡守行縣掾某縣獄：269 
As governor of commandery X, on a tour of inspection through the prefectures, I examined the 
following criminal case of prefecture X: 
某月某某，某縣〈令〉270甲爰書：271 
                                                     
266
 Zouyanshu 67; 74. 
267
 Zouyanshu 68. 
268
 For full translation and discussion of this case, see Lau and Lüdke 2012, 217ff. 
269
 Zouyanshu 75. 
270
 ling 令, which is missing in this place in case 16, is added for clarity. 
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Official record, dated to x-th month, day xx, made by A, prefect of X prefecture: 
……。272 
[Contents of the record:] ……. 
……。273 
[Further facts raising suspicion.]  
某月某某，某郡守某劾曰：……。274 
On day xx of the x-th month, I therefore brought the following ex-officio charge: ……. 
Documentation of the formal inquest, probably conducted by commander officials: 
復之﹕275 
Review of the case: 
……。276 
…… 
乙曰：「……。」它如劾。277 
Statement of B: “…….” Everything else corresponded to the ex-officio charge. 
甲曰：「……。」它如乙。278 
Statement of A: “…….” Everything else corresponded to B’s statement. 
                                                                                                                                                         
271
 Zouyanshu 75-76. 
272
 Zouyanshu 76. 
273
 Zouyanshu 76. 
274
 Zouyanshu 77-78. 
275
 Zouyanshu 78. 
276
 Zouyanshu 78-79. 
277
 Zouyanshu 80-81. 
278
 Zouyanshu 82-84. 
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丙、丁曰：「……。」它如乙。279 
Statements of C and D: “…….” Everything else corresponded to B’s statement. 
詰丙、丁、甲：「甲……，為某；丙、丁……，為某。皆何解？」280 
Confrontation of C, D, and A: “A, you……, neverless you did [punishable action] X; C and D, 
you……, nevertheless you did [punishable action] X. What defence does each of you offer?” 
丙等皆曰：罪，毋解。281 
Reply of each of C etc.: “I am liable to punishment and have no valid defence.” 
……。282 
……. 
診問：乙、甲、丙、丁……。它如辭。283 
Result of inspection and inquiries: B, A, C, and D……. Everything else corresponds to the above 
statements. 
鞫之：乙……；甲……；丙、丁……。審。284 
Finding of facts: B……; A……; C and D…… This has been ascertained as fact. 
Proposal for judgement, probably made at commandery level, attached to the record: 
律：……。以此當乙。285 
The statutes stipulate: …… In accordance with this, the law is to be applied to B. 
                                                     
279
 Zouyanshu 85. 
280
 Zouyanshu 85-87. 
281
 Zouyanshu 87. 
282
 Zouyanshu 87. 
283
 Zouyanshu 88-90. 
284
 Zouyanshu 90-91. 
285
 Zouyanshu 93. 
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律：……。以此當甲。286 
The statutes stipulate: …… In accordance with this, the law is to be applied to A. 
律：……。以此當丙、丁。287 
The statutes stipulate: …… In accordance with this, the law is to be applied to C and D. 
當之：甲、乙、丙、丁皆當某罪。繫。288 
We apply the law as follows: A, B, C, and D by law all are to be subjected to punishment X. They 
are held in detention. 
某縣〈令〉289某、丞某、獄史某治。290 
Tried by X, prefect of prefecture X, X, deputy prefect, and X, judicial secretary. 
Submission of the case to the imperial court for approval, probably by the commandery 
authorities: 
敢言之。甲、乙為某；丙、丁為某；……。291 
                                                     
286
 Zouyanshu 94. 
287
 Zouyanshu 95. 
288
 Zouyanshu 96. 
289
 ling 令, though not present in place in case 16, is again added for clarity. 
290
 Zouyanshu 97. 
291
 Zouyanshu 92. This strip, which in Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Han mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 2001 is 
placed between strips 91 and 93, is here tentatively placed between strips 97 and 98, as in Lau and Lüdke 
2012, 216 (see note 1059 on p. 216 and appendix IV on p. 359). Strip 92 should be part of the same 
submission formula as strip 98, which both starts and ends with gan yan zhi 敢言之, almost identical to case 
14 (see Zouyanshu 68). Also, with the proposed arrangement of slip 92 between slips 97 and 98, the facts 
contained in slip 92 are stated by the commandery authorities. In contrast, the solution proposed by the 
Zhengli xiaozu would result in the same facts restated twice by the prefecture officials listed in slip 97. 
Instead, in the proposed new arrangement, the commandery authorities, in the course of attaching their 
submission formula, confirm the prefecture’s findings, which makes much more sense in explaining why 
the same facts are stated twice. Also, with this new arrangement of strip 92, the structure of the case would 
much better correspond to that of cases 14 (Zouyanshu 65-68; same submission formula) and 18 
(Zouyanshu 157-161; same structure of the proposed judgement); both cases present additional information 
like that in Zouyanshu 92 at the very end of the record. Finally, in the drawing depicting the original 
location of the slips at the time of excavation given in Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Hanmu zhujian zhengli 
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We venture to report this case. A and B did [punishable action] X; C and D did [punishable action] 
X; ……. 
為奏當某數牒。上，謁請，謁報。敢言之。292 
We have prepared X bamboo slips with a [proposed] application of the law for submission to the 
emperor. We submit this his majesty, requesting approval of the judgement and requesting a reply. 
We venture to report this. 
Variations of the model: Mechanisms of procedure and 
recording 
In the previous section I have identified, by comparing structurally equivalent cases and 
extrapolating their shared formal features, the procedural model in its most basic form. I will now 
proceed to employ this model as an instrument for further analysis. In the following sections, I 
will show, on the one hand, that the different procedural models underlying the different cases can 
be understood as variations of one and the same basic model, and on the other hand, that the 
                                                                                                                                                         
xiaozu 2001, 322, slip 92 follows slips 96 and 97, though the three slips are reversed in direction 
(anti-clockwise rather than clockwise as most of the scroll) and removed from the neighbouring slips. The 
fact that these slips are in the vicinity of slips 115 to 119 in the next layer, which also have been dislocated 
and reversed in direction, could be an indication that both segments (96-97-92 and 115 to 119) in both 
layers had been subjected to the same physical process after interment. This would be consistent with the 
slip order 96-97-92 being the original one. However, as the processes operating on the scroll after interment 
are hardly understood, these arguments are very tentative. A different solution would be to place Zouyanshu 
slip 97 after slip 91 and before slips 92 and 93 (leaving slip 92 at the place suggested by the Zhengli xiaozu), 
i. e. before the “application of the law”, with the result that the judgement would have been proposed by the 
commandery. This would also, similar as the option discussed above, avoid the the same authority asserting 
the same fact twice. However, cases 14, 15, and 18 do not provide structural parallels for this. Furthermore, 
it depends on the understanding of slip 97 whether such a placement (between slips 91 and 92) would 
violate the principle found in all other Zouyanshu cases that the authority which conducts the core inquest 
also provides an evaluation, either in form of a judgement (lun), an application of the law (dang), or a 
statement of legal doubt (yi zui) (if the system had provided the possibility to pass the records of an inquest 
on to the higher authority without a legal evaluation by the lower authority, the edict of 200 BC instituting 
the yan-procedure would not have been necessary). See note 304 below. 
292
 Zouyanshu 98. 
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different ways in which the model is employed in each case signals different procedural options 
appropriate for different judicial situations. In the course of this analysis, I will group the 
Zouyanshu cases into a number of categories on the basis of how the procedural model is 
employed. 
In a concluding section, I will show how the increasingly sophisticated administration of justice 
reflected in the Zouyanshu cases was an element that facilitated the government of a state 
expanding in territory and the transition to the imperial model of the Chinese body politic. 
The yi shi-category: Cases 19 and 20 from early Han narrating Chunqiu law 
cases 
As discussed above, these two texts probably originate in early Han and narrate stories with legal 
content which are set in the Chunqiu period, with a famous judge as the main protagonist in each 
of the two cases. Their most characteristic feature is that they insert a considerable temporal 
distance between their narration and the events they narrate by using the introduction yi shi 異時 
“in different times”. They do not follow the strict formal pattern to which the other texts adhere 
and are clearly not actual administrative documents. The judge fulfils his role not by virtue of any 
position in an administrative organisation, as far as is visible. The communication that takes place 
is not inter-agency, but a very personal one between judge and sovereign. The only formal respect 
in which they correspond to the other texts is that the relevant legal norm is quoted in the 
beginning, before the actual legal deliberations. These two cases form their own category within 
the Zouyanshu. With their possible Han (or Qin) origin, they are of limited value for a 
reconstruction of the procedural model or its development. We cannot deduce from them more 
than this: At the time of their composition, probably in early Han, it was considered a plausible 
scenario that Chunqiu period criminal cases were delegated by the sovereign to a judge of his 
choice, who conducted an investigation for which hardly any formal procedure applied, and 
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suggested a judgement to the sovereign who then approved it or not. The Zouyanshu provides no 
basis to judge the accuracy of such assumptions. 
The lun-category: Cases 17 and 22 from pre-imperial Qin 
Case 17 dates to 246 BC, case 22 to 241 BC; both cases thus are from to around the same time in 
the pre-imperial era of Qin and are the earliest in the Zouyanshu that clearly are actual documents. 
Case 17 records the re-investigation of the case of an already convicted suspect who turns out to 
be the victim of a judicial error, while case 22 basically is a request to promote a judicial official 
who has distinguished himself during the prosecution of a crime that had been particularly 
difficult to solve. Both cases are significant because they are the only ones within the Zouyanshu 
which document a full criminal proceeding at the prefecture-level from the initial criminal 
complaint up to the sentencing, thus presenting the normal case of criminal procedure and the 
procedural model in its most basic form. Their most characteristic feature, when compared to the 
other cases, is that they contain a final judgement (lun 論) at prefecture level. 
Case 17: The original trial conducted at prefecture level 
In case 17, the record of the original prefecture trial is enclosed within the documentation of the 
re-investigation, as the first step there is to go back to the record of the original proceedings. This 
original record, from a structural point of view, has the following characteristics: 
a) Proceedings are initiated by a criminal complaint (gao 告) of punishable action made to the 
authorities. 
b) After this, the case already employs, in its most basic form, the standard procedural model that 
forms the core of all later cases in the Zouyanshu, namely a formal inquest which (1) consists 
of an interrogation (xun 訊), starting with initial statements (ci 辭) of the accused and witnesses, 
followed by confrontations (jie 詰) (posed by the interrogator) on unclear points and the 
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interrogated person’s statements in defence (jieci 解辭), and (2) a finding of fact (ju 鞫) which 
concludes the core inquest. 
The record of prefecture proceedings does neither note inspection (zhen 診) nor inquiries (wen 
問); however, the retrial in case 17 as well as case 18 demonstrate that inquiries and inspection, 
if called for, were already a part of these early cases; during the original prefecture proceedings 
in case 17, there was simply no need to resort to them. This is consistent with the later records, 
which also document inquiry and inspection only if these had been actually conducted. 
c) This core inquest is followed by a judgement (lun 論). The record notes the content of the 
judgement, its date and the officials passing it. 
Case 22: Standard trial conducted at prefecture level 
Case 22 is, within the Zouyanshu, the closest to the original trial of case 17 in terms of the 
procedural model. Case 22 is also initiated by a criminal complaint (gao); after this, the core 
inquest follows with the interrogation (xun), including confrontations (jie), and the finding of fact 
(ju); the case concluded by a judgement (lun, although here not explicitly introduced as such) 
after the finding of fact. However, the record modifies the basic model in two respects: 
a) In between the interrogation, a description of all investigative steps taken is interspersed in 
chronological order. This is due to the document’s purpose of recommending the lead 
investigator for a promotion as a reward for his deft work. A consequence of this is that the 
inspection undertaken is narrated at the point in the chronological sequence where it actually 
took place and not summarised before the finding of fact. The date of the judgement and the 
names of the officials responsible are irrelevant for the purpose at hand and left out. Even 
though supplemented by additional information, the basic structure of the procedure remains 
intact in the account. 
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b) The commendation of the lead investigator’s work and his recommendation for higher office is 
an additional layer of administrative communication which has no bearing on the judicial 
procedure that deals with a robbery and therefore is not taken into account within this 
discussion.T he request for promotion is submitted by the deputy prefect of Xianyang 
(Xianyang cheng 咸陽丞), a prefecture-level position. This indicates that the prefecture-level 
authorities were responsible both for the actual investigation and the request for promotion. 
Case 17: The petition for a new finding of facts 
The proceedings triggered by a convict’s petition for a new finding of facts in case 17 adhere to 
the same basic model, but modify it on some points that are, in terms of structure, more significant 
than the insertion of additional information in case 22: 
a) At the place of the criminal complaint, the case quotes the convict’s “petition for a new finding 
of facts” (qi ju 乞鞫); i. e. the formula 
甲告曰：「……乙為某。」 “A brought the following criminal complaint: ‘….. B did [punishable 
action] X.’” 
is replaced with 
甲乞鞫曰：……不為某，某縣以甲為為某，論甲某罪。 “A petitions for a new finding of facts 
by stating: ‘……I did not do [punishable action] X. However, the authorities of prefecture X 
held that I did [punishable action] X and passed the judgement to subject me to punishment 
X.’” 
b) After the wording of the petition, the beginning of the re-investigation is marked in the record 
by the expression fu 覆 “review”. Between this and the record of new investigations, inspection, 
and inquiries, the record of the original trial is inserted. The point of insertion is marked by the 
formula shi qi gu yu 視其故獄 “rexamination of the original trial”, after which the record of the 
original trial follows. The end of the insertion is marked by jin 今 “during the review”; after 
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this, the record of the new interrogation, inspection, and inquiries follows. 
c) At least in Zouyanshu case 17, the result of inspections (zhen 診) conducted during the 
re-investigation is not noted as a summary before the finding of facts (ju 鞫), but immediately 
after related interrogation statements. The reason for this probably is that the inspections in this 
case not only served to immediately verify the interrogation statements, but also to inform the 
further investigation and thus were required to understand the progression of investigative 
steps. 
d) At the place of the judgement (lun), we find instead a record of the minister of trials (tingwei 廷
尉) communication to the authorities of the prefecture where the convict was held. This 
included the result of the re-investigation, i. e. the new finding of facts, and instructions about 
the steps required by it. 
In terms of the procedural model, case 17 provides on the one hand some additional detail (result 
of inspections, review of previous records), but also additional choices for the initial step of the 
proecdure (petition for new finding of facts instead of criminal complaint) as well as for the final 
step (information about the result of the re-investigation and accompanying instructions conveyed 
by the minister of trials, instead of judgement passed by the local authorities). 
The dang-category: Case 18 from imperial Qin and cases 14-16 from the 
first years of Han 
Cases 14-16 and 18 are all later than the two lun-cases and earlier than the yan-cases collected in 
the Zouyanshu. Case 18, from 220 BC, dates to the imperial period of Qin, while cases 14-16, 
from 201-199 BC, date to the very first years of the Han empire. They present some significant 
modifications to the basic procedural model. Their most characteristic feature is that instead of a 
judgement (lun 論), they all contain an “application of the law” (dang 當), essentially a proposed 
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sentence which is submitted to the higher authorities for approval. It is not entirely clear why in 
these cases only an “application of the law”, awaiting confirmation, was made. The Ernian lüling 
required that all death-penalty cases as well as all cases involving killing another person by 
accident (guoshi sha ren 過失殺人) or during a game (xi er sha ren 戲而殺人), i. e. all cases that 
either already had resulted in the death of another person or might result in the death of the 
defendant, were to be submitted to the commandery for review.
293
 This rule would obviously have 
been applicable in the death penalty case 16, but not in cases 14, 15, and 18; also, case 16 is 
further submitted to the imperial court, which is not required by the Ernian lüling. We know from 
other sources that certain more severe sentences against certain groups of privileged people 
required imperial approval. The Hanshu records one such rule: 
春，令郎中有罪耐以上，請之．294 
In the spring [of 200 BC, the seventh year of his reign, the Gaozu emperor] stipulated by 
edict that imperial approval was to be requested if Gentlemen of the Interior (langzhong) 
had become liable to the punishment of ‘shaving’ or a more severe punishment. 
It is likely that similar, non-extant, stipulations, were in force for other groups of people. In each 
of the cases 15, 16 and and 18, the defendant holds the office of prefect (xian ling 縣令);295 since 
prefects were appointed by the central government, it is highly probable that a sentence against 
them, resulting in their removal from office, required approval by the imperial court. On the other 
hand, case 14 concerns a judicial secretary (yushi 獄史);296 for this office, it is not clear to what 
extent the central government was involved in their appointment.
297
 In case 16, approval is sought 
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 Ernian lüling 396-397. 
294
 Hanshu 1B, 63. 
295
 Zouyanshu 69, 86, 143. 
296
 Zouyanshu 63. 
297
 Ernian lüling 482 could be read to indicate that all types of shi 史 in the prefectures and marches were 
appointed by the taishi ling 太史令 at the imperial court, but the exact mechanisms for the appointment and 
promotion of local officials would have to be further investigated. 
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for sentences against other people with no or even lower official positions,
298
 while sentences 
against other people involved are not submitted.
299
 However, all people (including the prefects in 
cases 15 and 16) for whom approval was sought held the ninth jue 爵-rank (wu dafu 五大夫) or 
higher
300
 and were given a proposed sentence involving shaving (nai 耐) or a more severe 
punishment.
301
 It is therefore possible to conclude that imperial approval was required for 
sentences at least involving shaving against persons holding the ninth rank or higher.
302
 
Case 18 
Case 18, an investigation of a prefect’s conduct in office, records, like case 17, full judicial 
proceedings, which in this case, however, are carried out not by prefecture officials, but by 
officials from the next higher level of administration, the commandery. Case 18 modifies the 
basic model in the following respects: 
a) In the place of the criminal complaint, we find the account of the dates when a document 
originating with the chief prosecutor (yushi dafu 御史大夫) and ordering the investigation 
arrived at the commandery. This is followed by an exact account of the time spent for 
investigating the case, for investigation-related travelling, and for recovering from illness. The 
investigation seems to have been originally triggered by an ex-officio charge (he 劾) brought 
by the governor of the commandery (Cangwu 蒼梧) to which the prefecture in question was 
subordinated.
303
 This ex-officio charge first resulted in investigations conducted by local 
                                                     
298
 Zouyanshu 92-98. 
299
 Zouyanshu 90. The reason for this, in the first place, certainly was that two lower-ranking people were 
dead and absconded respectively. As Ernian lüling 396-397 did not require imperial approval for 
death-penalty cases in general, it still is most likely that the submission to the emperor was triggered by the 
rank and severity of the punishments in question. 
300
 Zouyanshu 64, 69, 92. 
301
 Zouyanshu 65, 72, 96. 
302
 For a detailed tabulation of the ranks, positions, and punishments involved in the relevant cases see Lau 
and Lüdke 2012, 46. 
303
 Zouyanshu 134, 154. See Lau and Lüdke 2012, 248f. note 1225. 
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prefecture officials; then, on the chief prosecutors (yushi dafu 御史大夫) order, in a review of 
the case conducted by judicial officials from a neighbouring commandery (Nanjun 南郡), i. e. 
by a higher-level authority which was not directly superordinated (and therefore independent). 
As an ex-officio charge already had been brought in this case, the chief prosecutor’s main 
action consisted in re-assigning the case to the neighbouring province, which most likely did 
not constitute a second ex-officio charge. The record of the formal inquest follows after the 
above-mentioned account concerning the receipt of the chief prosecutor’s document and the 
time required for investigation, travelling, and illness. This record follows the standard 
procedural model and is introduced by jin fu zhi 今復之 “[Record of] the review”, with jin not 
marking the time as the present, but delineating the review record from the introductory 
statements. 
b) Case 18 records an extensive inquiry (wen 問) after the interrogation and before the finding of 
facts (ju), mainly consisting of a report by the commandery officials conducting the review 
which goes beyond the already recorded interrogation statements. 
c) Significantly, case 18 introduces, after the finding of facts, the procedural element 
characteristic for this category of cases: In the place of the judgement (lun), we find an 
“application of the law” (dang), which has the effect of proposing a sentence, as well as a legal 
reasoning supporting it. The reasoning is in the form of an explicit subsumption and employs 
the following pattern: First, statutes and edicts are quoted; after this, the formula yi ci dang jia 
以此當甲 “in accordance to this, the law is to be applied to A” follows; finally, the proposed 
judgement is introduced by dang zhi 當之 “we thus apply the law as follows”. The responsible 
officials are not identified at this stage, and no date is given, as this information is already 
provided in the beginning of the document. The document is concluded with an account of the 
number of persons interrogated. No submission formula is included, maybe because it was 
evident that the commandery investigators had to report back their findings to the imperial 
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prosecutor (yushi) who had ordered the investigation, or because any segments recording the 
submission to another authority were not included in the Zouyanshu for this document. 
Case 16 
A problem in case 16 is that not all procedural segments can clearly be assigned to a specific 
government authority, due to the nature of the case, the unusual use of placeholders instead of 
actual names in the segment identifying the responsible officials, and questions as to the correct 
arrangement of the bamboo slips 92-97.
304
 The most likely interpretation is that all relevant 
                                                     
304
 The problems are as follows: (1) Nature of the case: Ordinarily, such a case would have been handled at 
prefecture level, with the inquest conducted mostly by a judicial secretary (yushi), and the decision made by 
prefect, deputy prefect, and responsible judicial secretary. However, in this case the only judicial secretary 
who is mentioned in the case had been killed, and the prefect turned out to be responsible for his death (and 
almost certainly would not have participated in the investigation from the beginning, as the commandery 
governor’s ex-officio charge (he) strongly implied local government collusion). Probably, no deputy prefect 
was appointed at the time, as none is mentioned by name. Therefore, all relevant officials had either been 
killed, come under suspicion, or their position was vacant. (2) Use of placeholders: Zouyanshu 97 lists, with 
placeholders instead of names, “prefect A of Xinqi, deputy prefect B, and judicial secretary C” as having 
dealt with/tried the case (新郪甲、└丞乙、獄史丙治). Zhi 治 usually refers to all aspects of a criminal case, 
including interrogation, inquiries, and the final decision (or submission). If new officials had been 
appointed for the vacant positions at some stage during the investigation, it is not clear why their names 
were not noted. This case also replaces the name of the qiudao 求盜, a witness, with 甲, and of the 
xiaozhang 校長, one of the accused, with 丙 (assuming that these are placeholders, too, and not real names). 
Since these latter two clearly are real people, this would make it at least plausible that the three new officials 
by placeholders are also real participants and not fictive ones waiting to be appointed (contrary to 
Barbieri-Low and Yates 2016, 1304 note 47, see below). However, it is not clear why, unlike in all other 
Zouyanshu cases, no real names are given for investigating officials (Zouyanshu case 21 also uses 
placeholders for some of the parties involved, but gives real names for the judicial officials). Even more 
perplexing is that in case 16, the same placeholders are used for different people: 甲 both for the qiudao and 
the new prefect; and 丙 both for a death-penalty defendant and the new judicial secretary (it can be safely 
excluded that both are the same person). (3) Arrangement of the slips: Unlike almost all other Zouyanshu 
slips, the slips Zouyanshu 92-98 each contain only one, complete sentence. As the sentences do not run 
across slip boundaries, there is no internal evidence from the text which would support, or exclude, a 
particular arrangement. In the absence of any information about other marks that might originally have 
been available (such as markings on the back of the slips, which were not observed, or not paid attention to, 
after excavation), the correct order of slips 92-98 must be inferred from a structural comparison with similar 
cases (in particular cases 14, 15, and 16). See also footnote 291 above. There are the following options to 
resolve this: (1) A new prefect, deputy prefect, and judicial secretary were appointed immediately at the 
beginning of the investigation, immediately after the commander governor had brought the ex-officio 
charge which implicated the previous prefecture officials. The new officials thus would have conducted at 
least the investigation and made the finding of facts, and, possibly, could also have proposed the judgement 
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(dang “application of the law”). An argument for this is that the zhi 治 used in Zouyanshu 97(新郪甲、└
丞乙、獄史丙治 “prefect A of Xinqi, deputy prefect B, and judicial secretary C [zhi:] have dealt with/tried 
the case”) usually refers to all aspects of a criminal case, including interrogation, inquiries, and the final 
decision (or submission). However, there is no record that the old prefect was relieved immediately, and 
that a new prefect, and/or judicial secretary, and/or deputy prefect had been appointed so quickly (there 
might not have been sufficient legal basis for this at this early stage, and new appointments might have 
required some time); also, if the latter had been the case, their names should have been given, rather than 
replaced by placeholders in Zouyanshu 97. Also, the use of fu zhi 復之 in Zouyanshu 78 implies, as it does 
in cases 17 (Zouyanshu 99: fu 覆) and 18 (Zouyanshu 129: jin fu zhi 今復之), that the investigation is 
conducted by the higher authority, i. e. commandery officials in this case. This is also supported by the fact 
that the formula […] xian lun 縣論 [on the other defendants] the prefecture has passed/will pass 
judgement” is found as part of the wen 問 “(inter-agency) inquiries”, indicating that the inquiries were 
conducted by an authority different from the prefecture (but by 縣論 also indicating some kind of previous 
or future prefecture involvement). (2) The new prefecture officials were appointed at a later stage (i. e. after 
the previous prefect’s involvement had been established) and did not conduct the investigation (and 
probably did not make the finding of facts), but made the application of the law (dang). This would solve 
most of the problems of option (1) (zhi could maybe be used even if only a judgement was proposed), but 
still does not explain why the actual names of the new officials were not given. (3) No new prefecture 
officials had been appointed. This would require to understand Zouyanshu 97 as a formulaic placeholder for 
officials to be appointed in the future, in the sense: “the new prefect A, new deputy prefect B, and new 
judicial secretary C will/are to deal with the case” (i. e. after they have been appointed). This option is 
preferred by Barbieri-Low and Yates 2016, 1297 and 1304 note 47. However, no other list of judicial 
officials responsible for a a case found in the Zouyanshu (Zouyanshu 67, 74, 106) points to future, rather 
than completed involvement; also, it is not quite clear what future work would be left for the new prefecture 
officials, as all investigative and judicial work already seems to have been done (by the commandery 
officials, in this option). The best way to make sense of this option therefore would be to place slip 97 after 
the finding of facts between slips 91 and 92 and read it as connecting to xian lun 縣論 in slip 91 (which does, 
in fact, point to the involvement of prefecture officials), as follows: …縣論…新郪甲、丞乙、獄史丙治 
“[on the other defendants] the prefecture will pass judgement…prefect A, deputy prefect B, and judicial 
secretary C, after having been appointed, will try these” (however, as Barbieri-Low and Yates 2016 
interpret xian lun as xuan lun 懸論 “judgement has been suspended”, in their version in fact not much 
would remain for the prefecture officials to do). (4) Taking Zouyanshu 97 as a notional placeholder required 
for procedural reasons, but not indicating any present or future actual involvement of prefecture officials. 
Ernian lüling 396 requires that in death penalty cases like the present one, a review by the commandery is 
conducted after the prefecture has concluded its investigation (yu yi ju 獄已具); if this is understood as a 
procedural prerequisite for a commandery-level review, it could not have been fulfilled if the judicial 
personnel at the prefecture had either been killed or implicated, so that a notional list of (non-existing) 
officials would have been required. However, there is no evidence whatsoever for such legal fictions in 
early Chinese law. On the other hand, the stipulation 二千石官、二千石官丞謹掾、當、論，乃告縣道
官以從事 (“the two-thousand bushel official or or the deputoy of the two-thousand bushel official 
conscientiously examines [the results of the review conducted by subordinate commandery-level officals], 
applies the law, and passes judgement [in the case to be reviewed] and then notifies the officials at the 
prefecture or march to settle matters accordingly”) in Ernian lüling 396-397 might imply that the 
“application of the law” (dang) was made by commandery officials, not prefecture officials in case 16. This 
would exclude options (1) and (2) above and make option (3) the most plausible one. 
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procedural steps were conducted by the commandery, and that only lesser punishments within the 
system of collective liability were dealt with by the prefecture authorities.
305
 The case is initiated 
by the commandery governor, the review of the case with the inquest, resulting in a finding of 
facts, most likely is also conducted by commandery officials, who probably were also responsible 
for the “application of the law” (dang 當), resulting in the proposal of a sentence.306 In this case, 
we find the following modifications of the basic procedural model: 
a) In case 16, an ex-officio charge (he 劾) takes the place of the criminal complaint; in this 
instance, the ex-officio charge is brought by the responsible commandery governor. The 
ex-officio charge is preceded by an account of the circumstances which precipitated it; while 
these provide important background and clues for the investigation, they probably have no 
legal bearing on the judicial proceedings as such. 
b) The inquest proper, with interrogation (xun), confrontation (jie) and finding of fact (ju), closely 
follows the basic model. Before the finding of fact, the results of an exhaustive inquiry (wen 問) 
are recorded, much as in case 18. The exhaustive inquiries might have been characteristic for 
these review (fu 復)-type cases conducted by a higher authority, one of whose primary 
responsibilities was to make enquiries with other agencies, especially the lower-level ones, 
concerning steps already taken.
307
 Before wen “[result] of inquiries”, we also find the single 
character zhen 診 “[result of] inspection”. Rather than a binomial expression, the form to be 
filled in might here become visible on the surface level, i. e. zhen might head an item in the 
form which is left blank. If this is the case, we would need to read: 
                                                     
305
 Zouyanshu 90: 布、餘及它當𡊎（坐）者縣論. As Bu 布 had died and Yu 餘 absconded, this most likely 
referred to punishments within the system of collective liability. 
306
 In view of Ernian lüling 396-397, see footnote 304 above. 
307
 The correct reading of a passage in Ernian lüling 396 might be 二千石官令毋害都吏復案問 “the 
two-thousand bushel official orders impeccable commandery investigators to subject the case to review 
investigations and review inquiries” (i. e. not reading 聞 for 問), thereby stressing inquiries as a crucial 
element of review proceedings. See also Fengzhen shi 7, 14, 41, 44 for fu wen “review inquiries”. 
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診：─。    Result of inspection: [not applicable]. 
問：某某‧‧‧。 Result of and inquiries: Such-and-such… 
c) As in case 18, the inquest is concluded after the finding of fact with an “application of the law” 
(dang); the pattern of legal reasoning (explicit subsumption) is exactly the same as in case 18. 
This “application of the law”, like the whole inquest, probably has to be located at the 
commandery level.
308
 
d) The “application of the law” (dang 當) is either preceded or followed (depending on the 
placement of slip 92 in the reconstruction of the slip order) by an introductory formula for the 
commandery’s submission of the case to the imperial court, immediately followed by an 
affirmation of the finding of facts and a more precise re-statement of the result of inquiries. 
e) The document concludes with the main submission formula, the central expression of which is 
the request for approval of the sentence (ye qing 謁請). From the text, it is not entirely clear 
which official makes the submission. The commandery governor who introduces himself in the 
first sentence of the document is the most likely candidate by far. In effect, the bracket that has 
been opened with the first-person record of the governor’s actions in the beginning is closed 
with the first-person submission formula. 
Cases 14 and 15 
Cases 14 and 15 are in their content and with the very visible involvement of the commandery 
very close to cases 18 and 16 discussed above. Cases 14 and 15, like 18 and 16, record 
proceedings against prefecture officials who also hold a relatively high-rank. As in case 18 and 
                                                     
308
 Ernian lüling 396-397 provides evidence for this, see note 304 above, even though it is not clear that 
case 16 at this stage is a commander review case because of the capital offences involved (making Ernian 
lüling 396-397 applicable), or because of the governor’s ex-officio charge (which would leave the 
applicability of Ernian lüling 396-397 in doubt). 
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probably case 16, in the two cases the investigation is conducted and judgement is proposed by 
the commandery to which the respective prefecture is subordinated. Case 14, like case 16, is 
explicitly submitted to the higher authorities. It probably should be assumed that case 15 (as case 
18) is an example of the same type of submission, although the concluding submission formula is 
not included. Both cases modify the basic procedural model in the following ways: 
a) In case 14, proceedings are initiated by the ex-officio charge (he, noted at the place of the 
criminal complaint gao) brought by a deputy prefect against a judicial secretary, who almost 
certainly was the deputy prefect’s immediate subordinate.309 The report triggering proceedings 
in case 15 is made by a prefect, alleging theft on the part of the prefect heading another 
prefecture in the same commandery; the report containing the allegation is introduced by yan 
言 “makes a report”, not he “brings an ex-officio charge”, although the allegation is made by 
an official. The reason for this might be that the prefect is not an superior of his colleague, who 
was situated on the same level of the administrative hierarchy. It is possible that ex-officio 
charges (he) could only be brought by officials who were superiors of the accused person, or in 
whose area of responsibility an offence had been committed. The legal force of the yan 言
-report seems to have been the same in this case as that of a he. 
b) No confrontation (jie) is recorded as part of the core inquest, almost certainly because the 
defendants in both cases had already admitted criminal liability (zui 罪) in their initial 
statements (ci), making a confrontation unncessary. Both case records note the results of 
inquiries (wen) immediately before the finding of fact (ju). Almost certainly, the core inquest 
was conducted not on the prefecture level, but by commandery officials. This is indicated by 
the use of zhi 治 “tried by…” at the end of the record after a list of commandery officials. 
Generally, zhi after the names of officials involved in a case, indicates that these officials not 
                                                     
309
 Zouyanshu 63 and 64, see Lau and Lüdke 2012, 181ff., especially notes 897, 898, and 906. 
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only were responsible for the judgement (lun) or “application of the law” (dang), but also for 
the investigation which formed the basis for the latter. 
c) After the finding of facts (ju), an “application of the law” (dang) is recorded, as in cases 18 and 
16. However, the pattern of legal reasoning (i. e. explicit subsumption) is changed to following 
order: “We apply the law as follows” – Quote of statutes and edicts – “In accordance with this, 
the law has been applied to X”. That is, the sequence is reversed: The application of the law is 
stated upfront and only then substantiated, while in the earlier cases the application of the law 
is developed from the subsumption. 
d) This is followed by the formula moumou zhi 某某治 “tried by XX”, which identies the 
responsible commandery officials (governor, shou 守; deputy governor, shoucheng 守丞; and 
secretaries-in chief, zushi 卒史), which not only indicates that the “application of the law” had 
been made by these officials, but also, as argued above, that the whole inquest had been 
conducted on commandery level. 
e) In case 14, but not in case 15, the application of the law is followed by a submission formula, 
which requests that the case be brought to the emperor’s attention (ye yi wen 謁以聞), making 
clear that his approval for the sentence was necessary. The formula includes the date of the 
submission and identifies the commandery governor as the submitting official. Also included 
is the additional information that a judgement was passed by the prefecture on the the other 
person implicated in the case. 
The yi zui-category: Cases 1-13 and 21 from ca. 197-196 BC 
Cases 1-13 and 21 all date from around 197-195 BC. Their common characteristic feature is that 
they all are yan 讞-submissions, i. e. they were submitted to a higher authority with the explicit 
request for a decision due to legal doubts (yi zui 疑罪) that could not be resolved at the prefecture 
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as the lowest level of the administration of justice. The procededure for this had been, on the basis 
of Qin models, re-established by the Gaozu emperor’s edict of 200 BC. While these yan-cases 
either explicitly utilise the basic procedural model or clearly are based on it, they also modify and 
extend the form to take account of the involvement of different levels of the government. 
Cases 1-5 
Cases 1-5 all can be dated to 197 and 196 BC and as fully documented yan 讞-cases form the core 
of the Zouyanshu. All these cases were first tried at prefecture level and then submitted for 
decision to the higher authorities according to the yan-procedure described in the edict of 200 BC. 
In terms of content, most of these 5 cases concern the question whether the accused has liable to 
punishment at all in view of the arguments he or she has brought in his or her defence.
310
 In terms 
of formal organisation, they introduce the following modifications to the basic procedural model: 
a) The case is introduced by variations of the formula mou xian mou, cheng mou gan yan zhi 某
縣某、丞某敢讞之 “We, X, prefect of X prefecture, and X, deputy prefect, venture to submit 
the following case for decision”; this is usually preceded by the date of the submission. This 
introductory formula already signals the eventual submission of the case and forms with the 
submission formula which follows the statement of legal doubt (see d) a bracket around the 
part of the document that originates with the prefecture-level authorities. 
b) The legal act triggering the proceedings and the core inquest follow the established model: 
Proceedings are initiated in all cases by either a criminal complaint (gao) or ex-officio charge 
(he).311 The core inquest is conducted according to the established pattern: Initial statements (ci) 
                                                     
310
 In Zouyanshu case 3, the question is whether the accused has committed only the lesser or also the more 
severe of two offences in question. The option of acquittal does not seem to be an option. 
311
 The ci 辭 “claim” in case 2 (Zouyanshu 8) introduces what is eventually interpreted as a criminal 
complaint, although originally it most likely was intended as a civil action in order to clarify the property 
status of the slave woman, possibly in order to avoid the risk of prosecution for gao bu shen 告不審 “a 
criminal complaint not true to the facts” if the claim turned out to be unfounded). 
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of the accused and possible witnesses are followed by a (if necessary repeated) confrontation 
(jie) and the accused’s reply; if inspections (zhen) and/or inquiries (wen) are required, their 
results are noted before the finding of fact (ju), which in turn concludes the core inquest. 
c) Cases 1-5 present a third option for the slot of the judicial evaluation which comes after the 
finding of fact: Instead of a judgement (lun) or application of the law (dang), we find here the 
formula expressing “doubts as to the liability to punishment” of the accused (yi jia zui 疑甲罪). 
The context makes clear that these doubts either can either relate to the question of whether the 
accused is criminally liable at all (Zouyanshu cases 1-2, 4-5) or of the extent to which he/she is 
criminally liable (Zouyanshu case 3). To this, in most of the cases statements are added 
indicating that the accused is kept under detention (xi 繫) and that judgement on other related 
matters or other people implicated in the case has been passed by the prefecture (ta xian lun 它
縣論). Together, these statements define the precise extent to which a higher-level decision is 
required, i. e. which matters are doubtful, and on which the prefecture authorities are able to 
decide themselves. 
d) The prefecture’s submission is concluded by a submission formula, consisting of the core 
expression gan yan zhi 敢讞之 which is distinctive for this type of document, often followed 
by an explicit request for a reply (ye bao 謁報) and the name of the judicial secretary to which 
the reply should be addressed (shu yushi mou fa 署獄史某發). This latter piece of information 
at the same time defines which judicial official is responsible for the case and specifies a return 
address for the higher authority’s decision, ensuring the prompt delivery to the at the prefecture. 
The introductory gan yan zhi 敢讞之-formula (see a above), together with the concluding gan 
yan zhi 敢讞之 formula, together form a bracket clearly delineating the prefecture’s 
contribution to the document. 
e) With no judicial decision yet being included, the form is still incomplete. After the submission 
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formula, all of cases 1-5 present a judicial argument, either introduced by li dang 吏當 “we, as 
the responsible officials, apply the law as follows” or li yi 吏議 “we, as the responsible officials, 
argue the following legal opinion”; both of these formulae introduce what in essence is a 
proposal for a judgement. In four of the five cases, this in turn is followed by a 
counter-argument, introduced by huo yue 或曰 “other opinion”, which proposes an alternative 
judgement. These make explicit the alternative options for the decision of the case, the 
existence of which is the reason for the submission as doubtful, as the existence of these 
alternatives in the case at hand implies that none of the can be prima facie excluded. These 
adversarial arguments are preceded in one case (Zouyanshu case 3) by the quotation of a 
precedent; the first opinion is then based on the similarity of the case at hand to this 
precedent.
312
 In another case (Zouyanshu case 4) explicit reasons are given for both the 
argument and the counter-argument.
313
 The simple designation li 吏 “the responsible officials” 
or even “the responsible authorities” leaves open which officials exactly make these arguments. 
The prefecture officials are unlikely, as the prefecture’s submission has already been 
concluded before the arguments are added. Also, according to the edict of 200 BC regarding 
the yan-procedure, it was the responsibility of the higher authorities (commandery-level or 
tingwei) to assess the legal issues at stake by preparing “an application of the law” (dang) for 
the case,
314
 the same term (dang) which often introduces the legal arguments following the 
yan-submissions in the Zouyanshu. In contrast, the edict requires of the prefectures and 
marches simply to “submit doubtful cases for decision”; any additional requirement for the 
prefectures to attach legal arguments presumably would have run counter to the edict’s stated 
purpose to speed up the dispensation of justice.
315
 If prefecture officials most likely are not the 
                                                     
312
 Zouyanshu 23-25. 
313
 Zouyanshu 33-34. 
314
 See note 75 for arguments why dang should be understood in the sense “to apply the law to a case” in the 
edict of 200 BC (Hanshu 23, 1106), and not as an auxiliary verb. 
315
 Nonetheless, some scholars have argued that the prefecture-level authority should be identified as 
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authors of the li dang/li yi – huo yue opinions, this would leave either officials at the 
commandery or the imperial court (i. e. at the agency of the tingwei), as, according to the edict 
of 200 BC, a yan-submission was passed on by the prefecture to the relevant 
commandery-level authority and then, if necessary, to the minister of trials (who in turn could 
memorialise it to the emperor). An argument for the origin of the judicial opinions at 
commandery level is that otherwise no trace of the commanderies’ involvement would be 
found in these cases, while involvement of the imperial court is explicit in almost all of them 
(except case 2, which breaks off before a final decision is communicated). The Zouyanshu 
offers no clear evidence for locating the li dang/li yi – huo yue opinions either at the 
commandery or the imperial court: While it could be argued that case 21 demonstrates that 
controversial discussions were held at the tingwei’s agency, there is no reason to think that 
similar arguments could not also be made by commandery officials (Zheng Xuan, in his 2
nd
 c. 
AD commentary to the Zhouli, mentions that Han commanderies and feudal domains regularly 
sent their offials to present to the tingwei their yi 議 “legal opinions”).316 Similarly, it could be 
                                                                                                                                                         
making the arguments (Ikeda 2002, 142-143; Gao Heng 2008, 347; see also Lau and Lüdke 2012, 58f. for a 
brief overview of the discussion). Lau and Staack (2016, 26; 111 note 571), following Zhu Hanmin and 
Chen Songchang (2013, 102 note 42) now see Wei yu deng zhuang 24 as confirming this view, as in that 
yan-case from the Yuelu manuscripts, the commandery’s final decision seems to diverge from both options 
presented in the li yi/huo yue-section. This is seen as evidence that the two alternative proposals for a 
judgement must be attributed to the prefecture officials. However, it is, first of all, not entirely clear to what 
extent the final decision really diverges from the li yi/huo yue-section, as the latter is incomplete, and not all 
of the relevant rules are extant. More importantly, it seems entirely possible that the final decision made at 
the commandery authority diverges from the initial evaluation made by officials at the same authority, 
either because the discussion had in the meantime evolved (Zouyanshu case 21 would provide an example 
for this possibility), or because an important official, such as the commander governor, had not been 
involved in the initial legal evaluation and disagreed with both options presented by his judicial staff (in the 
same way as the emperor could disagree with the options presented to him; Zouyanshu case 4 could be seen 
as an example for this). For Wei yu deng zhuang case I.1, therefore it is more likely that the li yi/huo 
yue-opinions in Wei yu deng zhuang 24 were prepared by zushi 卒史 at the commandery, and that the 
governor, in his final evaluation (Wei yu deng zhuang 28-30) disagreed with both opinions (to the extent 
that disagreement can be verified). See below. 
316
 Zhouli 35, 877b: 如今郡國亦時遣主者吏詣廷尉議者. Zheng Xuan, in this passage, compares the 
submission of difficult legal cases at the Zhou royal court with the Han procedures. 
 132 
argued that the attachment of a precedent in Zouyanshu case 3 might point to the tingwei’s 
agency, as the edict of 200 BC only requires the tingwei to attach the applicable laws and 
precedents (bi 比). However, Zouyanshu cases 14 and 15 are unambiguous in that commandery 
officials also might inclue the wording of applicable laws; even if these are not yan-cases, there 
is no reason to assume that these would have been handled differently. However, the strong 
document character of Zouyanshu cases 1-5 means that it would be even more unlikely than a 
prefecture adding material outside the gan yan zhi 敢讞之-bracket (see points a and d above), 
that a government authority not mentioned at all in the document should have added material 
without identifying itself in the documents. All Qin and Han administrative documents take 
great care to identify the different government agencies involved. If the li dang/li yi – huo yue 
opinions would have been attached by an agency other than those already mentioned in the 
document, this would have been clearly indicated. Therefore, it is most plausible to assume that 
the li dang/li yi – huo yue opinions were added by officials at the agency which is then 
identified as the one making the decision in the case. These opinions probably were intended in 
order to make the legal issues explicit, establish decision alternatives, and thereby facilitate an 
efficient decision-making process. While the decision in yan- and other cases itself involved 
the head or deputy head of the decision-making agency (the commandery governor, the tingwei, 
or the emperor himself),
317
 the opinions probably were added by his subordinates. This also 
explains why in some cases, the final decision diverges from the opinions.
318
 If Zheng Xuan’s 
commentary quoted above
319
 is correct in asserting that in Han, commandery officials were 
sent to argue their cases in person at the tingwei’s agency, it is even possible that the li dang/li 
                                                     
317
 This is discernible as a general principle in all Zouyanshu cases which list the officials involved in the 
decision. Ernian lüling 102-106 makes clear that on the prefecture-level, only the prefecture head and his 
regular deputy were allowed to decide legal cases and submit them for decision. 
318
 Notably in Zouyanshu 35 (case 4) where the final decision states that the case should not have been 
submitted, something not indicated in the opinions. This presumably also applies for Wei yu deng zhuang 
28-30, see note 315 above. 
319
 See note 316 above. 
 133 
yi – huo yue opinions reflect arguments made in such a setting. But given the strict 
documentary format in Qin and Han, it seems highly unlikely that these opinions were made at, 
or sent up, by another agency than the one recorded as making the decision. For Zouyanshu 
cases 1, 3, 4, and 5, which identify the imperial court as the agency where the decision was 
made, this means that the opinions probably were formulated by officials at the tingwei’s 
agency (for case 2, neither decision nor decision-making authority are available). In cases 
where the decision was made by the commandery governor, the opinions would have been 
formulated by commandery officials.
320
 
f) The li dang/li yi – huo yue opinions are followed by the final decision made, in these 
Zouyanshu cases, at the imperial court, except in case 2 which seems incomplete in this 
respect. The decision states the appropriate punishment or an exemption from punishment. 
The decision is noted in the following ways: Cases 1 and 4 note simply ting bao 廷報 “reply 
from the court”, which leaves open whether the decision was made or approved of by 
emperor or made by the minister of trials on his own authority; however, the title Zouyanshu 
of the whole case collection still suggests the direct involvement of the emperor, as zou 奏 
specifically refers to submissions to the throne. Case 5 introduces the final decision by ting 
yi wen 廷以聞 “the court has brought the [the case] to [the emperor’s] attention”, thus 
designating the decision as the emperor’s. Case 3, similar to case 17, is concluded by a more 
detailed record in which the official carrying out the duties of the minister of trials informs 
the prefecture about the emperor’s decision, which again is introduced by ting yi wen 廷以
聞. Sometimes the court adds to this a comment on the prefecture’s submission, either 
approvingly (case 3)
321
 or with criticism (case 4).
322
 
                                                     
320
 As in Wei yu deng zhuang 24. 
321
 Zouyanshu 26. See note 123 above. 
322
 Zouyanshu 35. 
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Cases 6-13 
Cases 6-13, like cases 1-5, all record yan-submissions which request from the higher authorities a 
decision for a doubtful case. Unlike cases 1-5, they are all submitted by a commandery governor 
instead of the prefecture head, contain no dates, are highly abbreviated, and concern the question 
what offence has been committed, not whether an offence has been committed at all. With their 
lack of polite formulae, they are best considered as abstracts of full trial records. It is likely that 
the abstract was prepared at the court for the purpose of inclusion in the Zouyanshu, as the full 
proceedings and the accused’s arguments had no bearing on the more technical question what 
offence had been committed (in contrast to the question of whether an offence has been 
committed, where the accused’s arguments in his defence are essential). In terms of structure, we 
find the following abbreviations of the standard model: 
a) The cases are simply introduced by the short statement mou jun shou yan 某郡守讞 “as 
governor of commandery X, I submit for decision”; the polite gan 敢 “I venture” is missing. 
b) The core inquest is not documented, but its result concisely stated in factual terms; this 
summary of the inquest almost certainly is to be identified with the finding of fact (ju) of the 
original inquest. 
c) After this, the legal doubt is expressed simply by yi zui 疑罪 “we are in doubt as to the liability 
to punishment”, rather than by the fuller formulae of cases 1-5. This forms a bracket with the 
initial submission statement, much like the introductory and concluding submission statements 
of gan yan zhi 敢讞之 in cases 1-5. 
d) The expression of judicial doubt is immediately followed, without alternative legal opinions 
being recorded, by the decision of the court, introduced by ting bao 廷報. Due to the particular 
legal issues at stake in these cases, the decision states the applicable statutory offence (except 
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in cases 8 and 13), rather than the punishment as in all other Zouyanshu cases. 
Case 21 
It has been argued above that case 21 is not a legal record in the strict sense, but a re-arranged and 
edited account of the judicial arguments in one particularly interesting case. As such, it is not 
bound by the procedural model. However, the impact of the procedural model is still 
recognisable: 
a) The case at issue is summarised by a short factual statement323 which most likely is to be 
identified with the finding of fact (ju) in the original case records. 
b) The account of the case is concluded with the formula yi jia zui 疑甲罪.324 In this, the echo of 
the formulaic language of the original document is recognizable. The formula clearly marks 
the case as one that has been submitted for decision using the yan-procedure. 
c) The standard form of an “application of the law” (dang) by way of explicit subsumption is 
recognisable: First, the applicable statutes are quoted; then the applicability is not simply stated 
(as in yi ci dang jia 以此當甲), but extensively discussed; the resulting (preliminary) decision 
finally is introduced by dang zhi 當之 “we apply the law as follows to the case”.325 
d) Opposing judicial arguments are made, corresponding to the li yi/li dang – huo yue section in 
the case records. These are, again, much more extensive than the arguments in the other 
Zouyanshu yan-cases which contain little, if any, reasoning, but simply state a position. In 
comparison with case 21, the arguments in the actual case records seem abbreviated. It is 
conceivable that many cases which reached the tingwei were discussed in similar detail as in 
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case 21, even though though the discussion likely was not as rhetorically polished and 
structurally elaborated as the edited version in case 21, and even though all that remained of 
these discussion in the standard records of cases 1-5 mostly were the mere decision alternatives, 
as required by the model. 
e) In case 21, the order to inform Du prefecture about the decision reached326 corresponds to the 
ting bao formula introducing the decision in the case records of Zouyanshu cases 1 and 3-5. 
Result: The full procedural model 
Looking at all of the Qin and Han cases together, we can summarise the findings as described 
below. I will, according to the criteria developed above, identify different segments in the 
procedural model and determine which elements are mandatory, which optional, and for which 
several alternatives exist. 
1) The initiation of proceedings. This segment is mandatory, and there are several alternative 
elements for it, i. e. criminal proceedings can be initiated by 
a) a criminal complaint (gao 告), brought by a private person or a lower-ranking official (often 
with police duties, such as a ting zhang 亭長); sometimes, a (property-related) claim (ci 辭), 
could take the place and have the same legal force as a gao if the claim implied criminal 
wrongdoing on the part of the other party, as seen in Zouyanshu case 2; 
b) an ex-officio charge (he 劾), brought by an official with jurisdiction against a person in his 
jurisdiction; sometimes, a (high-ranking) official made a report (yan 言) containing an 
allegation of criminal wrongdoing instead, if he had no jurisdiction over the person accused 
of wrongdoing, as seen in Zouyanshu case 14; 
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c) a petition for a new finding of facts (qi ju 乞鞫), made by a person convicted for an offence. 
2) The core inquest, also mandatory. The core inquest consists of the following elements, some 
of which are optional, but none of which can replaced by an alternative element: 
a) Initial statement(s) (ci 辭) of the accused and possible witnesses. This element is mandatory. 
b) Confrontation (jie 詰) of the interrogated person(s). Optional: It was not necessary if a 
witness’s account did not contain any contradictions or if an accused had already admitted 
criminal liability (zui 罪) in his/her initial statement. If there was a confrontation, the 
accused’s reply (jieci 解辭) is mandatory. If necessary, the confrontation is repeated until 
the accused’s reply contains an (at least conditional) admission of criminal liability. 
c) The result of inspections (zhen 診). Optional: Only noted if inspections were necessitated by 
the case. 
d) The result of the inquiries (wen 問). Optional: Only noted if inquiries were necessitated by 
the case. 
e) Finding of facts (ju 鞫). Absolutely mandatory, being the basis for the judgement. This is the 
only element of the core inquest which is included in the highly abbreviated case records 
6-13. 
3) The judicial evaluation, made by the agency which conducted the core inquest. This segment 
is mandatory. There are three alternative elements for this segment, i. e. the authority making 
the finding of facts can then evaluate the case by: 
a) A judgement (lun 論), simply stating the appropriate sentence. This was usually final, 
except in cases where a petition for a new finding of facts (qi ju乞鞫) was made, which 
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might result in the overturning of the judgement.
327
 
b) An application of the law (dang 當) to the case, in effect making a proposal for a judgement, 
which for its validity required approval by a higher authority. The application of the law is 
either preceded or followed by a quote of the relevant statutes and edicts as well as by the 
formula yi ci dang jia 以此當甲 “in accordance with this, the law is to be applied to A”, 
which explicitly states the relevance of the quoted stipulation to the case at hand. A mere 
“application of the law” (dang), as opposed to a full judgement (lun 論), implies that the 
case is submitted to the higher authorities (i. e. the imperial court in all relevant Zouyanshu 
cases). Therefore, a submission formula is usually required. This would include the phrase 
gan yan zhi 敢言之 (“We venture to report this”), and a request for approval (expressed by 
the phrase(s) ye qing 謁請 “we request approval”, and/or ye bao 謁報 “we request a reply”, 
and/or ye yi wen 謁以聞 “we request that it be brought to the emperor’s attention [i. e. in 
order to obtain his approval]”). Additional information for the higher authorities can also be 
inserted, such as abouthe ongoing detention of the accused or an assurance that all related 
issues have been/will be adjudicated at the local level. 
c) A statement of legal doubt, using the formula yi jia zui 疑甲罪 “we are in doubt as to A’s 
liability to punishment”. A statement of legal doubt implies that the case is submitted to the 
higher authorities for decision (yan 讞). Therefore, a submission formula is usually required, 
which would include at least the phrase gan yan zhi 敢讞之 “we venture to submit this case 
for decision” and often also an explicit request for a reply (ye bao 謁報 “we request a reply”). 
Additional information for the higher authorities might also be inserted, such as about the 
ongoing detention of the accused or an assurance that all related issues have been/will be 
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 Wei yu deng zhuang 14 shows that under certain circumstances, a new judgement (geng lun 更論) 
supplanting the earlier one could be passed under certain circumstances. In Wei yu deng zhuang 14, this is 
required by an ex-offico charge brought by an yushi 御史. See Lau and Staack 2016, 101f. 
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adjudicated at the local level. 
4) Legal opinions. Only required for cases submitted as doubtful. The opinions probably were 
attached by judicial officials within the agency making the final decision. Two opposing 
opinions are juxtaposed, introduced by the formulaic li dang/li yi 吏當/議 – huo yue 或曰 “we 
apply the law as follows/we argue the following legal opinion” – “other opinion”. 
5) Decision of the higher authorities. Mandatory in the case of a submission for decision. The 
decision (stating the appropriate sentence, or the applicable statutory offence, or an exemption 
from punishment) is either introduced by ting bao 廷報 “reply from the court”, ting yi wen 廷
以聞 “the court has brought the case to the emperor’s attention” (implying that the following 
decision has been made by the emperor personally), or a fuller record about the conveying of 
the court’s decision.328 
Facilitating imperial rule: The role of judicial procedure 
The sophisticated division of judicial labour reflected in the procedural model helped to facilitate 
the rule of an expanding imperial polity. The procedures developed for the administration of law 
to which the Zouyanshu testifies can be seen as answers for the exigencies of the efficient 
administration of an expanding territory and population. These required division of judicial 
labour among, and meaningful judicial interaction between, government agencies at different 
levels, making full use of the possibilities offered by a multi-tiered system of territorial 
administration. 
A three-tiered territorial government (prefectures, commanderies, royal court) forms the 
background to all Qin and Han cases in the Zouyanshu, from those dating to pre-unification Qin in 
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 Wei yu deng zhuang 25 shows that a decision made not at the court, but by a commandery governor 
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the middle of the third century BC to those from the early Han years in the early second century 
BC. The fact that in all of these cases, the same procedural model is employed by judicial 
authorities on different government tiers demonstrates how well established it already was in 
pre-imperial Qin, and that it was so ingrained in judicial practice that it was carried over into Han 
without modification. 
In some of the cases, judicial proceedings are conducted at only one tier of government, with no 
judicial interaction between authorities on different levels. In case 17, the prefecture passes a final 
judgement; when the convict petitions for a new finding of facts (qi ju), the re-investigation is 
conducted by the higher authority, without involvement of the prefecture;329 when the final 
decision (which overturned the original verdict) is communicated to the prefecture authorities, 
these play only an executive role, without influencing the outcome. Case 22 is conclusively tried 
by the prefecture and submitted to the higher authorities only for the purpose of recommending a 
promotion, an issue unrelated to the legal decision.  
Cases 14-18 demonstrate real judicial interaction between different tiers of government: In cases 
14 and 15, charges are brought by prefecture officials, the inquest is conducted by the 
commandery, and the proposed judgements are submitted to the imperial court for approval. In 16, 
the charge is brought by the commandery governor, the inquest is (probably) conducted by 
commandery officials, and the case again is submitted to the imperial court for approval. In case 
18, charges are originally brought by the commandery against the head of a subordinated 
prefecture, but, on orders of the imperial court, a review wit a full inquest is conducted by officials 
from a neighbouring commandery, who in turn propose a judgement for approval by the imperial 
court. 
In all of these Zouyanshu cases (17, 22, 14-18), the assignment of judicial responsibilities to 
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different government tiers was a static one, with the type of investigation determining which 
agency would conduct it. 
In contrast, the cases involving yan-submissions (1-13, 21) demonstrate a dynamic delegation of 
judicial labour: Only those cases were to be submitted for decision in which legal doubts existed, 
with the result that higher authorities would become involved only when necessary. Their 
involvement was not determined at the outset of the inquest by the type of case, but only after the 
conclusion of the inquest when, after all questions of fact had been resolved, matters of law still 
remained in doubt. This dynamic distribution of judicial work was an important element in the 
effective administration of an expanding territory and population: It ensured, on the one hand, that 
the higher levels of government would not be overburdened with routine issues, while 
guaranteeing, on the other hand, that the central government retained its prerogative for setting 
precedents and insisting on a uniform application of the law throughout the empire. Only those 
cases would reach the central government which were not clearly covered by existing laws, 
exposing situations for which the law needed to be developed further by issuing binding 
interpretations for these situations. Thereby, the central government ensured that it was the only 
authority entitled to make law by issuing precedents. The Zouyanshu demonstrates that it also 
took care to make these new precedents known throughout the empire. 
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Mediated legal evidence: Testimony in early 
Chinese legal texts
1
 
Testimony: First-person voices in the trial records 
One of the most striking and immediate impressions from reading the Zouyanshu is the great 
importance of testimony, which is reflected in the high proportion of the text recording 
first-person statements. This is significant because the Zouyanshu, in its direct quotes of slaves 
and servants, conscripts and convicts, is one of the very few texts that ostensibly preserve the 
voice of common people of early China. But a question at least equally important is which role 
testimony plays in judicial proceedings, and which relevance is accorded to the statements of an 
accused or witness, as this is an important factor for evaluating a legal system. 
Not only is the importance of testimony evident in the Zouyanshu. Equally striking is the sense of 
uniformity imposed on the testimony by its placement within a coherent schema of recording 
judicial procedure. This sense of uniformity is, to a large extent, evoked by the way testimony is 
written down. In addition to the question of the role of testimony as such, a second question 
therefore must be what rules govern the recording of testimony in the written documents, and 
what consequences these rules have for the testimony itself. This latter question concerns the 
mediation of testimony, which is crucial not only for a critical reading of the trial records as 
historical sources, but also because the written record, far from serving merely archival purposes, 
was the basis for, and thus determined, all judicial decisions in early China. 
This chapter therefore is concerned with two basic issues: The mechanics of testimony, and the 
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mechanics of writing testimony down. 
The first-person testimony of the Zouyanshu and other early legal sources contrasts with the 
first-person voices audible in the early philosophical and historical literature. It has long been 
recognised that the requirements of a specific philosophical and political agenda shaped the 
statements presented, and that these statements were further refined by the requirements of 
committing the philosophical and political discourse to the written medium, such as the striving 
for literary effectiveness.
2
 This chapter will attempt a similar analysis for the first-person voices 
present within the early legal sources, which are not primarily governed by a philosophical or 
political agenda (even though the cases of the Zouyanshu were almost certainly collected with a 
certain purpose in mind, this is not the case for the individual case records which contain 
testimony in the first place), but by the imperatives of bringing a criminal case to a resolution. 
This chapter attempts to identify the determinants in early Chinese law and legal practice that 
shaped not only the way in which testimony was given, but also the way in which it was written 
down – that is, the forces that were responsible for the specific effects of the mediation process. 
The role of testimony within criminal procedure 
Facts: Testimony in early Chinese trials 
The blueprint 
In order to understand the function of testimony in early Chinese criminal procedure, it is 
important to understand its context, that is: the basic structure of criminal procedure. This 
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structure can be understood as the blueprint that assigns testimony its crucial role: 
All formal criminal proceedings in Qin and Han China were initiated by either a criminal 
complaint (gao 告), which was made to the authorities by private persons, or an ex-officio charge 
(he 劾), which was brought by officials specifically charged with the administration of justice. 
Such a criminal complaint or charge triggered for the responsible officials the duty to summon 
and, where necessary, to arrest the accused and potential witnesses and to conduct a formal 
inquest. The aim of the inquest was to arrive at a finding of fact (ju 鞫), which, very much like in 
the modern American system, arrived at a conclusion about the relevant facts, but did not contain 
any judgement about the legal questions at stake. The finding of fact in turn formed the basis for 
the concluding judgement (lun 論), which was the result of the legal deliberations and which 
pronounced either the punishment (zui 罪) for the accused or his acquittal. In certain cases, the 
judgement was replaced by a submission of the case to a higher-level authority (yan 讞 or qing 
請), either because there were questions of law about which the local judicial authority was in 
doubt (yi zui 疑罪; the submission was then called yan 讞), or because the case involved issues 
which required higher-level approval (the submission was then called qing 請). In these cases, the 
final decision was made by the higher authorities, which issued a reply (bao 報), thereby 
instructing the local authorities about the appropriate judgement. 
During the inquest proper, which was initiated by the initial criminal complaint or charge and 
concluded with the finding of fact, the evidence was gathered, and it is here that testimony comes 
into play. 
In Qin and Han China, three methods of gathering evidence were used during the inquest: 
1) interrogation (xun 訊) of the accused or of witnesses, that is: the eliciting of testimony; 
2) physical inspection (zhen 診), i. e. the forensic examination of physical evidence such as 
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implements used in the crime, a dead body or a crime scene; 
3) inquiries (wen 問) with other government agencies about relevant information held there, such 
as information from the tax and household registers. 
This means that early Chinese law knew, in addition to the interrogation that aims at testimony, 
proto-scientific (zhen) and bureaucratic (wen) methods of evidence-gathering. 
However, the sources and in particular the Zouyanshu strongly suggest that the central, crucial 
method was interrogation, i. e. the eliciting of testimony, and that the other two methods of 
interrogation merely played a supporting role. This is not only indicated by the relative small 
space inspection and inquiry take up in the case records, compared with the large proportion 
assigned to testimony,
3
 but also by more substantial observations: 
Inspection and inquiry sometimes produced information which was important for the technical 
calculation of punishment. For example, a rank (jue 爵), which had to be confirmed with the 
office keeping the household registers, in many cases entitled to a reduction of the sentence.
4
 But 
mostly inspection and inquiry had the ancillary function of providing the material with which the 
interrogated person was confronted. In other words, the main purpose of inspection and inquiries 
was to help elicit a more complete and truthful testimony. 
Of still greater consequence is the fact that a trial could only be finished when no inconsistencies 
in the testimony remained, i. e. when the accused either had confessed or the investigating 
officials had been convinced that the testimony in which the accused maintained his innocence 
was truthful. In no surviving Qin or Han case a conviction was based on physical evidence or 
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bureaucratic information alone, without testimony of the accused confirming his guilt.
5
 
A case-in-point is case 22 of the Zouyanshu, which presents the judicial officials with the 
following situation: An unknown attacker has stabbed a woman from behind, taken her money 
and run away. Neither the victim nor anybody else has caught a glimpse of the attacker, but the 
knife is retrieved from the woman’s back. A thorough investigation eventually turns up a suspect 
about whom not much more is known than that he used to wear a knife at his belt, but does not do 
so any more; the suspect vehemently denies any involvement in the robbery. Finally, a man comes 
forward who produces a knife scabbard which he confirms to have been given to him by the 
suspect. Close inspection (zhen) of the knife from the crime scene and the scabbard provided to 
the authorities by the man reveals a characteristic, matching defect and colour pigments from the 
knife clinging to the scabbard, thereby clearly implicating the suspect in the offence. However – 
and this is the important point – the judicial officials do not contemplate a conviction based on 
this evidence, but insist on a confession, for which they even resort to the threat of torture. This 
finally leads to a confession, and only then a prompt conviction is possible.
6
 
An important consequence of this insistence on a confession is that in early Chinese law, there is 
not, and cannot be, something like a right to silence. If a confession is indispensable for 
conviction, granting the suspect a right to silence would thwart any prosecution. A right to silence 
can only be conceded if there is sufficient confidence that other evidence can ensure, in principle, 
a conviction – a condition which in early China obviously was not met. 
The agenda 
The observations made so far suggest the place of testimony within the structure of criminal 
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investigation, that is, within the blueprint which assigns testimony its central role. However, this 
context does not fully explain the crucial role of testimony. A necessary further step is the analysis 
of the purpose and aims of testimony, in other words, it will be relevant to understand the agenda 
operating on testimony. 
The purpose of any criminal procedure is to determine if an accused should be convicted or 
acquitted. If testimony is crucial for this, then this has two consequences: 
1) Eventual conviction or acquittal must already be reflected within the testimony itself. In Qin 
and Han China, this was framed in the following way: The testimony either had to contain a 
“valid defence” (jie 解) of the allegations contained in the charge, or an admission on the part 
of the accused that he had “no valid defence” (wu jie 無解) and therefore was liable to 
punishment. 
2) It absolutely had to be assured that the testimony containing a “valid defence”, or admission of 
a lack of such, was accurate and reliable, as the outcome of the trial depended on this. 
The agenda of interrogation, the agenda operating on testimony, is therefore to either obtain a 
reliable confession or a valid defence. 
For achieving this aim, the Qin and Han legal specialists used a technique of alternately giving the 
accused or witness room to present his statement (ci 辭) and then confronting (jie 詰) him with 
any remaining inconsistencies or other contradicting evidence. This technique is well 
documented both in the excavated trial records and legal manuals, as the following instructions in 
a legal manual of the third century BC demonstrates: 
訊獄  凡訊獄，必先盡聽其言而書之，各展其辭，雖智（知）其訑，勿庸輒詰。
其辭已盡書而毋（無）解，乃以詰者詰之。詰之有（又）盡聽書其解辭，有（又）
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視其它毋（無）解者以復詰之。7 
(How to conduct) interrogation in a criminal case – As a general rule for conducting 
interrogations in criminal cases, you have to first hear [the accused person(s) and any 
witnesses] fully out and record their oral statements in writing, with each [accused or 
witness] separately presenting his own statement uninterrupted. Even if you know that 
someone lies, there is no need to confront him immediately [with other evidence or 
inconsistencies]. Once someone’s statement has been completely recorded in writing, 
and he/she has no valid defence, confront him with those matters which require 
confrontation. When confronting him, again hear him fully out and record the statements 
he offers in defence. Then again look at further matters for which he has no valid defence 
and again confront him on these matters. 
This source describes a back-and-forth process in which the interrogator achieves the eliciting of 
the most accurate testimony by consciously alternating between the role of passive listener and 
very active questioner. This shows a keen awareness that 
1) all testimony will be coloured by the questions asked and the expectations implicit in them; 
2) testimony, on the other hand, must be brought “to the point” at some stage, i. e. the agenda must 
be pressed. 
These early instructions attempt to reconcile these two often contradictory aims by giving the 
accused or witness first room to develop his statement and then – and only then – insisting on a 
resolution of discrepancies. 
A crucial element in these instructions is the continuous recording by writing all testimony down, 
a point which will be discussed more in depth later. 
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The options 
Any agenda determines options that are available for a response. It is already obvious that an 
agenda which consists in resolving a criminal case either with a confession or a valid defence 
implies the following two basic options: 
1) Offering a valid defence, thereby attempting to refute the charge and to ensure acquittal. If an 
accused takes this option, this is signalled in the records by the formula wu ta jie 無它解 “no 
further defence will be brought forth”.8 However, the interrogating officials had to agree that 
the defence was at least potentially sufficient to achieve exoneration. That is, in the officials’ 
view at least all matters of fact had to be cleared up. If a suspect had admitted to culpable 
behaviour, but insisted that his behaviour was justified on legal grounds – the situation in 
Zouyanshu cases 1 to 5 –, the investigators either had to agree with this assessment, or, if they 
were in doubt, at least to consider the validity of the justification possible. In this latter 
situation, matters of law being at stake, the officials had to submit the case to the higher 
authorities for decision (yan 讞). In either case, the testimony of the accused was concluded 
with the formula wu ta jie 無它解. Otherwise, i. e. if not all matters of fact had been resolved 
and there was no potentially valid legal justification, wu ta jie would not have been added; 
instead, the interrogation would have continued, possibly under torture if the interrogators saw 
no other means to come to a resolution. 
2) Admitting to criminal liability, in effect offering a confession. This means that the accused 
agrees that he has committed a culpable action and also does not have a legal justification for it. 
This is signalled in the records by the formula zui, wu jie 罪，無解 “I am liable to punishment 
and cannot offer a valid defence”.9 
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There was at least one additional option when matters of law were concerned, i. e. matters where 
the question is “how is a given action to be evaluated in terms of the law?”, as opposed to matters 
of fact where the question is “has he done it or not?”. This additional option in matters of law is 
the following: 
3) Admitting to criminal liability only under the condition that the official’s legal interpretation 
proves correct. This is signalled in the case records by the formula cun li dang: zui, wu jie 存
吏當罪無解 (where dang and zui can be left out) “only under the premise of how you, the 
interrogating officials, apply the law, I would be liable to punishment and could not offer a 
valid defence”.10 This implies that the accused and his interrogators agree on the factual 
account, i. e. all matters of fact are settled and the accused admits to some action that is 
punishable in principle. However, disagreement exists on the legal evaluation of the accused’s 
action. The accused thinks that a valid justification exists, while the officials maintain the 
opposite. This option differs from the “valid defence” (option 1) in that it actually contains an 
admission of criminal liability, albeit a conditional one, which necessitates the end of the 
interrogation, unlike the “valid defence”, which causes an end to the interrogation only if the 
officials agree that, at least potentially, it provides exoneration. This option also differs from 
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20, 1983). The use of cun li dang: zui, wu jie 存吏當罪無解 (Zouyanshu 43-44) or simply cun li: zui, wu jie 
存吏罪無解 (Zouyanshu 5) expresses a legal proviso, i. e. an acceptance of criminal liability only under the 
condition that the legal interpretation of authorities is correct, triggering a judicial review of the matters of 
law which are at stake in the case by way of a yan 讞-submission to the higher authorities. Therefore, “only 
under the premises of what you consider lawful” is an appropriate translation of cun li dang in a technical 
legal context. 
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the unconditional admission of criminal liability (option 2) in that the accused in effect 
demands a review of the legal issues at stake, which might ensure his acquittal or a more 
lenient punishment. In the Zouyanshu, cases in which the accused ends his testimony with cun 
li dang: zui, wu jie are always marked as doubtful and submitted to the higher authorities for 
decision (yan 讞). 
In the Zouyanshu, examples for all of these options are found: 
Case 22 offers an example for a simple confession. To illustrate the techniques used to elicit the 
confession, the full interrogation will be quoted: 
When the suspect is first apprehended and is told that a witness has seen him wearing a belt with 
a scabbard and knife which are now missing, he responds in his initial statement with flat-out 
denial: 
「為走士，未嘗偑（佩）鞞刀、盜傷人，毋𡊎（坐）也。」11 
“I have been a soldier running errands.
12
 I have never worn a knife in a sheath
13
 as a 
pendant on my belt or injured another person for the purpose of stealing. I have not been 
held liable [for any offence].” 
Even when he later is told that another witness called Pu in the meantime has testified that he was 
                                                     
11
 Zouyanshu 214. 
12
 Zoushi 走士 seems to be some kind of title or function and also appears in Qin inscriptions (Qin fengni 
1070-1071; see Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Hanmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 2006, 112 note 29. The Ernian 
lüling lists the official titles daxing zoushi [ling] 大行走士［令］ “[Director of] zoushi in the office of the 
Minister of Feudal Relations” and Weiyang zoushi [ling] 未央走士［令］ “[Director of] zoushì in the 
Weiyang palace”, both with a salary rank of 600 shí 石 (equivalent to a prefecture head) (Ernian lüling 
460-461). These were relatively high-ranking officials at the imperial court which were in charge of some 
kind of runners, possibly message runners. For a lack of further context, the translation attempts to render 
the literal sense. 
13
 See Sun Ji 1991, 135 and 133 illustration 34-20, as well as Hayashi Minao 1996, illustration 2-164 for 
depictions of a leather sheath for a belt knife. 
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given a scabbard by the suspect, the latter insists on his denial: 
「未嘗予僕鞞，不智（知）云故。」14 
“I have never given a scabbard to Pu. I do not know why he would have said that.” 
At this stage, the knife used in the stabbing and the scabbard turned in by Pu are inspected (zhen) 
and found to have unique matching characeristics. As a result, the scabbard is positively identified 
as belonging to the weapon used in the crime. The suspect modifies his statement when 
confronted with this evidence: 
「得鞞予僕。前忘，即曰『弗予』。」15 
“I have found the scabbard, then I gave it to Pu. Earlier I had forgotten about this, 
therefore I said: ‘I did not give it to him.’” 
With the suspect still denying the possession of the knife, the suspect’s wife and daughter are 
questioned, who confirm that the suspect earlier had possessed a knife and scabbard which they 
now miss. Confronted (jie) with this statement, the suspect is forced to admit the possession of the 
knife, but still denies the robbery: 
「買鞞刀不智（知）何人所，偑（佩）之市，人盜紬（抽）刀，即以鞞予僕。前
曰『得鞞及未嘗偑（佩）』，䜢（謾）。」16 
“I bought the sheath and the knife from an unknown person.
17
 When, wearing them as a 
belt pendant, I went to the market, somebody pulled out the knife to steal it. Thereupon I 
gave the sheath to Pu. I have lied when I said earlier ‘I have found the sheath, but I have 
never worn it as a belt pendant’” 
                                                     
14
 Zouyanshu 216. 
15
 Zouyanshu 217. 
16
 Zouyanshu 218-219. 
17
 In the phrase mǎi bǐng dāo bù zhī hé rén suǒ 買鞞刀不智（知）何人所, suǒ 所 marks the indirect object, 
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The conflicting statements and the incriminating evidence required the interrogators to insist with 
the questioning and would have justified the use of torture, according to early Chinese 
instructions for investigations.
18
 The interrogators in our case therefore confront (jie) the accused 
with the discrepancies between his various statements, for which he is unable to offer a valid 
defence (wu jie 無解). When furthermore threatened with torture, the suspect finally confesses 
and reveals his full plan. The record of his statement is concluded with zui “I am liable to 
punishment”, signalling the nature of the final statement as a full confession: 
「貧急毋作業。恆游（遊）旗下，數見賈人券言（焉）。雅欲�（剽）盜，詳（佯）
為券，操。視可盜，盜置券其旁，令吏求賈市者，毋言孔。見一女子操簦但（簞）
錢，其時吏悉令黔首之田救螽，邑中少人。孔自以為利，足刺殺女子奪錢，即從
到巷中，左右瞻毋人，以刀刺奪錢去走。前匿弗言。罪。」19 
“I am very poor and have no work. I regularly went to the marketplace, where
20
 I have 
frequently seen the tallies of the traders. As I always wanted to carry out a robbery,
21
 I 
informed myself how to make a tally and carried it with me. I also looked whom I could 
rob. During the robbery I would place the tally at this person’s side in order to induce the 
authorities to search for a trader, while I would not be suspected. Then I saw a woman 
holding an umbrella in her hand, [carrying] cash in a covered basket. At that time the 
authorities had ordered the general populace in total to the fields to fight the locusts. 
Therefore, few people were in town. I thought that this was a good opportunity, sufficient 
to kill the woman with a stab and to take away her money. I followed her into the lane, 
                                                                                                                                                         
as elsewhere in the Zouyanshu. 
18
 Fengzhen shi 3-5=RCL E 2, see below for translation and discussion. 
19
 Zouyanshu 220-224. 
20
 Yan 言 is here understood as writing the pronominal substitute yān 焉. Yán 言 in the sense “…and then he 
said that” would be unlikely within direct speech introduced by yuē 曰. 
21
 Piao 剽 implies the use of illegal force (Shiji 58, 2089=Hanshu 47, 2213; Shiji 122, 3144), but is not 
known as a technical legal term. 
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and when I did not catch sight of anybody left and right, I stabbed her with my knife, 
took away her money, and ran away. Up to now I have concealed and not admitted this. I 
am liable to punishment.” 
Zouyanshu case 5 offers an example both for (a) what turns out to be a valid defence, and (b) an 
admission to criminal liability only under the condition that the official’s legal interpretation 
proves correct. This case involves a former slave called Wu, against whom, despite now being 
officially registered as a free man, his former owner had brought a criminal complaint for 
absconding, as well as a constable (qiudao 求盜) called Shi who arrested the alleged absconder 
based on the criminal complaint, but without knowing his true status. The alleged slave resisted 
his arrest, and in the ensuing fight both Wu and Shi injured each other, raising the question 
whether any, or both, of them had committed an offence. The situation is summed up in the 
following statement made by Shi’s superior, a station head called Tuo: 
「士五（伍）軍告池曰：『大奴武亡，見池亭西，西行。』└池以告與求盜視追捕
武。武挌（格）鬭，以劍傷視；視亦以劍傷武。」22 
“Jun, rank and file, lodged the following criminal complaint with me: ‘The adult slave 
Wu has absconded, but has been seen to the west of your station, travelling westwards.’ 
Pursuant to this criminal complaint, together with Constable Shi I pursued and arrested 
Wu. Wu in resistance put up a fight and with his sword injured Shi; Shi, for his part, also 
injured Wu with his sword.” 
During interrogation, the supposed slave Wu in his initial statement (ci 辭) admits causing the 
injury, but insists that he should not have been arrested in the first place, implying that he is not 
legally responsible for the consequences: 
                                                     
22
 Zouyanshu 36-37. 
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「故軍奴。楚時去亡，降漢，書名數為民。不當為軍奴。└視捕武，誠挌（格）
鬭、以劍擊傷視。」它如池。23 
“Originally I was Jun’s slave, but during the [reign of Xiang Yu in] Chu I absconded, 
submitted to Han, and got myself entered into the household register; [as a consequence,] 
I became a free man. Therefore, by law I am not to be made Jun’s slave. It is true that, 
when Shi came to arrest me, I put up a fight in resistance and with my sword attacked and 
injured Shi.” Everything else corresponded to Tuo’s [statement]. 
In their confrontation (jie 詰) of Wu the interrogators, however, assert that the criminal 
complaint lodged by Wu’s former owner Jun, though erroneous, provided a legally valid basis 
for the arrest and that it would have reasonable for Wu to allow the arrest as he always would 
have had the opportunity to clear up the matter afterwards. Wu, in his response, offers a 
conditional confession: He accepts criminal liability only under the condition that this legal 
interpretation proves correct. 
•詰武：「武雖不當受軍弩（奴），└視以告捕武。武宜聽視而後與吏辯是不當狀，
乃挌（格）鬭，以劍擊傷視。是賊傷人也。何解？」 
•武曰：「自以非軍亡奴，毋罪。視捕武，心恚，誠以劍擊傷視。吏以為即賊傷人，
存吏當，罪，毋解。」24 
 Confrontation of Wu: “Even though by law you were not to endure enslavement by Jun, 
Shi came to arrest you pursuant to a criminal complaint. Therefore, you were obliged to 
obey Shi and only afterwards argue with us that this [i. e. the record of the criminal 
complaint] was an unlawful charging statement.
25
 But instead, you put up a fight in 
                                                     
23
 Zouyanshu 37-39. 
24
 Zouyanshu 41-44. 
25
 In bian shi bu dang zhuang 辯是不當狀, shi is understood as a demonstrative modifying zhuang and 
referring back to the gao 告 “report” in the preceding sentence, bu dang as “not corresponding to the law” 
as elsewhere in legal usage, and zhuang as the technical term for a charging statement (i. e. the written 
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resistance and with your sword attacked and injured Shi. This constitutes [the statutory 
offence of] injuring another person with malice. What defence do you offer?” 
 Wu: “Since I am of the opinion that I am not Jun’s absconded slave, I am not liable to 
punishment. When Shi came to arrest me, I got infuriated, and it is true that I then 
attacked and injured Shi with my sword. But you are of the opinion that this constitutes 
nothing else than [the statutory offence of] injuring another person with malice’,
26
 and 
only under the premise of how you apply the law I would be liable to punishment
27
 and 
not have a valid defence.” 
Wu’s interrogation is complemented by that of constable Shi, who maintains in his initial 
statement that the resort to force, which resulted in Wu’s injuries, was both necessary and 
justified: 
「以軍告與池追捕武。武以劍挌（格）鬭，擊傷視。視恐弗勝，誠以劍刺傷武而
捕之。」它如武。28 
“Pursuant to Jun’s criminal complaint, together with Tuo I pursued and arrested Wu. Wu 
                                                                                                                                                         
record, made by the authorities, of the former slave owner’s gao). Alternatively, shi could be understood in 
the sense “right, correct”, and zhuang as “behaviour”, resulting in the translation “…argue with us whether 
the behaviour was correct or not lawful”. However, as antonym of shi in the everyday sense “right, correct” 
one would expect fei 非 instead of the more technical bu dang. As the former slave Wu explicitly rejects the 
claims about his status made in his former owner’s gao, it seems most appropriate to understand zhuang in 
its technical legal meaning. Also, understanding zhuang as “behaviour” requires clarification whose 
behaviour is referred to. It can hardly refer to Wu’s behaviour, as he does not question the lawfulness of his 
actions. The other option is that it refers to the arrest, but zhuang referring to an official action would seem 
unusual. From the perspective of the legal officials, it makes more sense to question the charging statement 
(which was in fact unlawful) than the arrest (which, under the law, was not unlawful as long as it was 
undertaken pursuant to a report, even if the repot itself was inaccurate, see Ernian lüling 152). 
26
 An additional complexity in this case is the fact that since Qin, injuries caused in resistance to a lawful 
arrest was treated as zei 賊 “malicious”, though technically only qualifying as the less severe dou 鬥 
“during a fight” (Falü dawen 66=RCL D 53; compare the incompletely preserved provision starting with 
Ernian lüling 152). However, this is taken for granted in the case and not a problem. 
27
 →Zuì 罪. 28 Zouyanshu 39-40. 
28
 Zouyanshu 39-40. 
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put up a fight in resistance with his sword, and attacked and injured me. I feared I would 
not prevail, and it is true that I arrested Wu after having stabbed and injured him with my 
sword.” Everything else corresponded to Wu’s [statement]. 
Following this, the interrogators now confront constable Shi. They are doing this using exactly 
the argument Wu has made on his behalf, as if assuming the role of Wu’s attorney (there was no 
legal representation in early China). That is, in confronting Shi, the constable, the judicial 
officials are inverting the perspective and employ the opposite argument they had used against 
Wu: 
•詰視：「└武非罪人也，└視捕、以劍傷武。何解?」 
└視曰：「軍告武亡奴。亡奴罪，當捕，以告捕武。武挌（格）鬭傷視。視恐弗勝，
誠以劍刺傷捕武。毋它解。」29 
 Confrontation of Shi: “Although Wu was not a person liable to punishment, you still 
injured him with your sword when you arrested him. What defence do you offer?” 
Shi: “Jun brought a criminal complaint against Wu for being an absconded slave. An 
absconded slave is liable to punishment and thus by law has to be arrested. I [went to] 
arrest Wu pursuant to the criminal complaint,
30
 but Wu put up a fight in resistance and 
injured me. I feared that I would not prevail over him. It is true that I arrested Wu after 
stabbing and injuring him with my sword. No further defence will be brought forth.” 
Shi insists on his earlier argument that using force in making the arrest was legitimate and 
necessary. As a result, both defendants make the mutually exclusive assertion that there respective 
actions were justified: Shi has advanced a defence that is accepted by the officials as potentially 
                                                     
29
 Zouyanshu 44-45. 
30
 This statement refers to the statutes, which, on the condition that the arrest was based on a complaint or an 
ex-officio charge, mandated that exemption from punishment be granted to those who injured or killed a 
person resisting his/her arrest, even if the person to be arrested was not liable to punishment (Ernian lüling 
152). 
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exonerating, so that they do not insist on a confession. Wu also in effect insists on his arguments, 
but his conditional confession opens the way for concluding the stage of the proceedings 
conducted at the lower level of the prefecture, and for the case to be submitted to the emperor as 
the highest judicial authority, who finds Wu guilty and acquits Shi,
31
 an outcome which in no way 
was predetermined beforehand. 
The problem of torture 
One important, but very problematic issue closely connected with the crucial role of testimony for 
determining guilt and innocence is torture. This follows from the insistence that, as long as 
matters of fact are concerned, the accused’s testimony either contains a confession or a “valid 
defence” that is accepted by the investigating officials as such. As there is no other option, there is 
not, and cannot be, a conviction without a confession. This, however, causes a quandary: It is the 
judicial officials who decide if a defence is considered sufficient to exonerate the accused from a 
charge, while it is the accused who decides if he confesses or not. This means that even in cases 
where the judicial officials had good reason to believe that the accused’s defence was not 
satisfactory, the accused still could avoid conviction by refusing a confession. 
It is clear from the sources that the main purpose of torture, which usually was executed by means 
of caning and seems to have been rather commonly used, was to break this quandary by extracting 
a confession and not primarily to gain information. In particular, there is no indication in the 
available sources that torture would have served to extract factual evidence which then could be 
used to independently verify the criminal charge and the confession. The Qin period manual 
quoted below
32
 states the extraction of a confession of the only purpose of torture. It presupposes 
that the confrontation of the accused with all other evidence has been exhausted before torture is 
                                                     
31
 Zouyanshu 47-48. 
32
 Fengzhen shi 3-5=RCL E 2. 
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applied, and it does not mention any further verification of the confession. The case records show 
the same: In Zouyanshu case 22, the guilt of the accused has already been established quite clearly 
by independent means, and only a confession is missing, which is then gained by threat of torture. 
After this, no further investigative steps are mentioned. The original trial documented in 
Zouyanshu case 17 also concludes with the accused’s confession, after which no further 
investigation is conducted. Had there been any further investigation, it already would have 
become clear in the original trial that the confession cannot be reconciled with independent facts – 
this is only established by the higher-level review of the case conducted on the convict’s request. 
Together with the alternating unguided statements and confrontations mentioned before, torture 
therefore, from the viewpoint of the interrogators, belonged to the early Chinese “truth arsenal”, i. 
e. to those techniques which were deemed conducive to ensure accurate testimony. 
This is reflected in the legal manual of the third century BC mentioned above; the passage about 
interrogation techniques already quoted continues: 
詰之極而數訑，更言不服，其律當治（笞）諒（掠）者，乃治（笞）諒（掠）。治（笞）
諒（掠）之必書曰：爰書：以某數更言，毋（無）解辭，治（笞）訊某。33 
When he has been confronted to the utmost and still repeatedly lies, changes his statements 
and does not confess, then subject him to torture by caning if according to the statutes 
applicable for the case he has to be tortured by caning. If you torture him by caning, it is 
mandatory to make the following entry: “Protocol: ‘Because X repeatedly has changed his 
words and has not offered a statement which would provide a valid defence, I interrogated X 
with the application of the cane’”. 
These instructions make clear that the purpose of torture was to extract a confession, and that its 
use was mandatory if the interrogating officials were not satisfied with the suspect’s defence. The 
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source also makes clear that it was up to the subjective judgement of the officials if they deemed a 
suspect’s statements to be lies or not. A favourable reading of the above source would suggest that 
torture was only allowed if the suspect’s statements were either contradicted by other evidence or 
were demonstrably inconsistent. But even if this reading is correct, there is no evidence 
whatsoever that there were any objective safeguards to check if these conditions were met. 
However, there clearly was awareness in early China that the use of torture poses terrible 
dilemmas. There was always the danger that a suspect, guilty or not, would die from torture.
34
 
Moreover, torture risks defeating its own purpose. While it aims to ensure truthful testimony, 
there is always the possibility that the accused will confess even to the untruth under threat of 
physical coercion. Famous is the example of the influential Qin chancellor Li Si 李斯, who, after 
the death of the First Emperor, in 208 BC was accused of rebellion at the instigation of Zhao Gao 
趙高 and wrongly confessed to this most serious of all capital crimes “because he could not 
withstand the pain”: 
趙高治斯，榜掠千餘，不勝痛，自誣服．35 
“When Zhao Gao tried [Li] Si, he had him tortured with the cane, dealing him more than 
thousand blows. Because [Li Si] could not withstand the pain, he made a confession, thereby 
falsely incriminating himself.” 
The danger of false confessions was recognised by the early Chinese, as seen in the stipulation 
quoted above, where torture is an ultima ratio, and in the following, related, stipulation found in 
the same source: 
治獄  治獄，能以書從迹其言，毋治（笞）諒（掠）而得人請（情）為上；治（笞）
                                                                                                                                                         
33
 Fengzhen shi 3-5=RCL E 2. 
34
 Hanshu 17, 641; Hanshu 77, 3262 together with Hanshu 77, 3257. 
35
 Shiji 87, 2561; other examples of wrong confessions: Hanshu 76, 3214; Zouyanshu 109. 
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諒（掠）為下─有恐為敗。36 
[How to] try criminal cases – When trying criminal cases, it is best to be able to obtain the 
truth concerning a person by means of tracing [the interrogated person’s] statements through 
written record, without resort to torture with the cane; it is only the second-best option to 
resort to torture with the cane, as it is to be feared that things will end in failure. 
The Zouyanshu case records both show that torture and the threat of torture were routinely used37 
and in fact resulted in miscarriages of justice,
38
 but also that there were remedies in the latter case. 
Case 17 concerns a man who is incriminated by the actual thief as a participant in the theft of a 
head of cattle, confesses and consequently is convicted to mutilation and penal labour.39 However, 
after the punishment has been carried out, the convict exercises his statutory right
40
 to “petition 
for a new finding of facts” (qi ju 乞鞫), claiming to have been wrongfully convicted.41 The 
investigation reveals that both the allegation made by the actual thief
42
 as well as the convict’s 
confession
43
 were extracted under torture, while not enough attention was paid to contradicting 
evidence. As a result, the convict is immediately released and given the status of yinguan 隱官, a 
status which probably implied some form of government employment to secure a means of living 
for a mutilated ex-convict who otherwise would not have had many options. Also the convict is 
given compensation for all of his property lost as a result of the conviction, and the state buys 
back his wife and children who had been sold into slavery.
44
 At the same time, the officials 
                                                     
36
 Fengzhen shi 1=RCL E 1 
37
 Zouyanshu 106-121, 220. 
38
 Zouyanshu 120-121. 
39
 Zouyanshu 99-106. 
40
 See Ernian lüling 114-115 for the early Han statutes governing this right; the institution of qi ju 乞鞫 is 
known since predynastic Qin, see Falü dawen 115=RCL D 95. 
41
 Zouyanshu 99. 
42
 Zouyanshu 118. 
43
 Zouyanshu 109. 
44
 Zouyanshu 121-123. 
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responsible for his interrogation and conviction, even though having acted without intent, were 
almost certainly punished with a heavy fine.
45
 We know from other sources that officials who 
knew that a confession was wrong and therefore acted with intent were even given the same 
punishment as the victim of the miscarriage of justice.
46
 The inclusion of case 17 in the 
Zouyanshu, a collection of model cases that most probably was distributed throughout the empire, 
suggests that it was intended as a warning against excessive reliance on judicial torture, 
particularly when combined with sloppy investigation.
47
 
Even though the instructions to interrogators cautioned about the dangers of torture, even though 
there were punishments for officials who used torture to extract false confessions and based 
wrong judgements on these, and even though there were mechanisms in place to correct wrongful 
convictions resulting from torture, these problems remained acute, were repeatedly criticised and 
led to some reforms. An example is found in a memorial submitted by Lu Wenshu 路溫舒, then a 
secretary to the minister of trials (tingwei shi 廷尉) in the central government, to the emperor in 
74 or 67 BC, almost 200 years after the Qin sources quoted above, which deals with serious 
shortcomings in the Han administration of justice. The memorial charges that remand prisoners, 
in fear of death, frequently make wrong statements under torture because they cannot bear the 
pain. “Under the cane”, Lu Wenshu claimed, “anything can be extracted” (Chui chu zhixia, he qiu 
er bu de? 棰楚之下，何求而不得？).48 As a result, the Xuandi emperor decreed in 66 BC that the 
commanderies and nominal feudal domains had to report to the emperor all cases where a remand 
                                                     
45
 Ernian lüling 95-98 stipulates that for unintentional errors of justice (fei gu er shi 非故也而失), the 
responsible officials had to pay the redemption (shu 贖) fee corresponding to the wrong punishment; for the 
actual amounts see Ernian lüling 119. Equivalent rules most likely applied in Qin, for which we know that 
both intentional and unintentional errors of justice resulted in punishment of the responsible officials (Falü 
dawen 33-36=RCL D 27, 28. 
46
 Ernian lüling 93-98, with the exception that a wrong death sentence was punished with mutilation and 
penal labour; again, the existence of an equivalent rule in Qin is most likely. 
47
 Zouyanshu 99-123. 
48
 Hanshu 51, 2370. 
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prisoner had died during detention either as a result of torture or of deprivation.
49
 In spite of these 
reforms, there is no evidence that the basic contradiction of risking the untruth when forcing 
somebody to the truth was ever satisfactorily resolved in traditional China. 
Analysis: The crucial role of testimony – reasons and 
functions 
Testimony of witnesses and of the suspect is at the centre of early Chinese criminal procedure. It 
was crucial for the decision about guilt or innocence of the accused. The options taken by the 
accused within his testimony determined the outcome of the trial. Even the availability of torture 
as an interrogation method, with the aim to force further, complete and non-contradictory 
testimony, is evidence of the indispensability of testimony for a judgement. 
These points raise, on a more analytical level, the question of the reasons for and the functions of 
this crucial and indispensable role of testimony and, in particular, of the confession requirement. 
Why is it that within the framework of early Chinese criminal procedure, no conviction was 
properly possible without an admission of criminal liability on the part of the accused?
50
 
I will argue that three aspects, taken together, can explain this: The relative higher importance 
early Chinese culture assigned to testimony versus forensic-scientific or bureaucratic methods of 
proof; the notion that a confession is the definite proof; and the affirmation of the current order 
                                                     
49
 Hanshu 8, 253. 
50
 The qi ju 乞鞫-case Wei yu deng zhuang 189-207 indicates that, while a confession certainly was required 
in the original trial, it was admissible for the reviewers in qi ju proceedings to uphold the original verdict 
even if the accused had retracted his confession after the original judgement and insisted on his innocence 
during the qi ju proceedings. That is, the confession requirement did not apply to qi ju proceedings, as long 
the accused had confessed during his original trial. This case also indicates that a confession given, during 
the original trial, without the use of torture created a presumption in the qi ju proceedings that it was correct. 
In contrast, in Zouyanshu case 17 (Zouyanshu 99-123) the demonstrable use of severe torture clearly placed 
the original confession under doubt. 
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and eventually of the legitimacy of the state that the giving of testimony and of a confession 
implies. 
The relative trustworthiness of testimony 
The decisive role of testimony indicates that early Chinese culture assigned a higher degree of 
trustworthiness to testimony, compared to forensic-scientific or bureaucratic methods of 
establishing proof. This point would merit a separate treatment which also takes into account 
cultural spheres other than law; for the moment, it must remain a hypothesis. In our modern 
cultures we know that both models are powerful. For example, somebody who intends to 
advertise a new product can either use scientifically accurate comparative tests, or the 
testimonials of happy customers. Often, even in our science-dominated world, the second option 
is considered the more effective. The power of testimony is also attested by the extremely 
important role which pop, film and sports stars play in advertising. Every advertisement with a 
prominent face can be understood as testimony in favour of a product. However, in contrast to 
early China, modern cultures tend to place a high degree of trust in scientific evidence in many 
areas of life, and this is particularly true in the area of forensics where fingerprints or a DNA 
analysis can shatter any testimony. In early China, this is not the case, despite the fact that the 
early Chinese were on a comparatively high level in terms of (proto-) scientific techniques and 
forensic expertise. The early sources contain, for example, instructions on the criteria that needed 
to be fulfilled to determine a death as suicide; these display a high degree of medical knowledge.51 
But there is no indication that such forensic evidence ever could obviate testimony of witnesses 
and the confession of the accused. 
While this to some extent explains the significance of testimony in general, further aspects need to 
be considered to account for the importance that is accorded particularly to the testimony of the 
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accused and his admission of criminal liability in a confession.  
Confessions as ultimate evidence 
A confession by the accused conceptually is the piece of evidence that cannot be disproved. It is 
the “ultimate evidence, the piece of evidence which made further investigation unnecessary”, to 
phrase it in the words of Michel Foucault who finds this same preoccupation with a confession in 
17
th
/18
th
 century France.
52
 In essence, with his confession, the accused becomes the principal 
witness against himself, delivering testimony that cannot be contradicted because the prosecuted 
and the witness for the prosecution are one and the same person. Because of this, the requirement 
to obtain a confession works as a safeguard against wrongful conviction: Only when the accused 
is a witness against himself, conviction is justified. If even the accused testifies his guilt, then a 
miscarriage of justice should be impossible. The reliance on such a safeguard is attractive in a 
system that has no fully evolved set of procedural safeguards. It requires a high degree of trust in 
the state’s ability to extract a confession of an offender even if the latter knows that with a 
confession, he ensures his own punishment. However, when the state, as in early China, does not 
fully trust in its own ability to facilitate a confession by interrogation alone and allows torture to 
be used to achieve this result, the confession requirement looses its efficiency as a safeguard to the 
degree that torture is used against non-confessing suspects. 
Affirmation of the state’s legitimacy 
With his providing testimony and, eventually, a confession, the accused affirms the legitimacy of 
the state which prosecutes him. The state needs to make sure that the accused provides testimony 
and makes a confession because his very co-operation in his own conviction will be the ultimate 
affirmation that the order created by the state is the only legitimate one. At the same time, the 
co-operation of the accused acknowledges that the interest in a well-ordered society transcends 
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even his own interest in self-preservation. Because of this, it was the intrinsic interest of the state 
to obtain a confession. The state insisted on a confession, because this very confession affirmed 
its legitimacy. Vis-à-vis the accused, the interrogator represents the legitimate authority of the 
state. Allowing the accused to insist on an – from the interrogator’s view – implausible denial 
would represent a defeat of this legitimate authority. 
Mediating testimony by writing it down 
The blueprint that assigned testimony its place in early Chinese criminal proceedings, the agenda 
that governed judicial testimony, and the way in which these determined the options when giving 
testimony have been the focus of the analysis above. 
An important aspect remains to be discussed: The recording of testimony. The Qin period 
interrogation instructions already quoted require the full and immediate recording of any 
statements made. Only when an oral statement had been completely recorded in writing (qi ci yi 
jin shu 其辭已盡書) was it permissible (jie 詰) to confront the accused or witness with remaining 
inconsistencies.
53
 This was to be followed through for any further statements. It is evident from 
the trial records contained in the Zouyanshu and similar sources that great care was taken to 
implement these instructions in actual judicial practice.  
Therefore, I will now shift the focus to the process of writing down testimony, that is: to the 
question of how testimony was mediated in the trial records. 
I will argue that 
(1) only the writing down of testimony, the mediation, granted it its significance; and 
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(2) the blueprint, agenda and options, which are described above, actually were only put into full 
effect in the process of making testimony part of a written trial record. 
Facts: How is testimony mediated? 
The following immediate observations on the surface of the record can be made about the way in 
which testimony is written down in the early Chinese trial records: 
Use of direct speech 
Direct speech is used. This is evident from the fact that testimony is almost always introduced by 
yue 曰,54 the standard marker of direct speech in classical Chinese. In contrast, wei 謂, a marker of 
indirect speech which sometimes is found within a statement55 if the speaker reports what a third 
person has said, never introduces a statement. In particular, the use of the third person to refer to 
the speakers themselves in the Chinese original is standard practice within direct speech and 
therefore needs to be consistently translated as “I”. 
Omission of most of the interrogators’ questions 
All questions, apart from the formal confrontation statements that served to challenge the 
interrogated person, are left out from the record. It is, for example, obvious that the initial 
statement of the interrogated person was the answer to questions put to him or her by the 
interrogator. However, these questions are not recorded. 
Abbreviation and elimination of redundancy 
In the written record, testimony is heavily abbreviated. It is extremely unlikely that during 
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interrogation people made the very economical statements recorded in the trial documents. In the 
written record, the rambling flow of oral speech is condensed to the shortest possible form. In 
particular, it can be observed that the written record 
a) only contains information relevant to the case at hand, and  
b) hardly contains any redundant or repetitive information. 
This implies that the written record is highly selective in that it leaves out from the original oral 
statements all information that is either considered irrelevant or redundant. This abbreviation of 
the oral testimony for the written record is made explicit in the documents. When information has 
already been presented in an earlier statement of the same or another person or in a record that has 
been introduced earlier, it is left out and the case records simply use the formulae ta ru mou 它如
某 “everything else corresponded to [the statement of] person X”;56 ta ru he 它如劾 “everything 
else corresponded to [the contents of] the ex-officio charge”;57 ta ru shu 它如書 “everything else 
corresponded to [the contents of] the documents”;58 ta ru ci 它如辭 “everything else 
corresponded to the statements made”;59 ta ru qian 它如前 “everything else corresponded to [this 
person’s] earlier [statements]”;60 or ta ru [gu] yu 它如[故]獄 “everything else corresponded to 
[the findings of] the original trial”.61 These formulae indicate that at this place, information 
considered identical in content to some earlier information is not recorded again in the 
documents. 
In contrast, it cannot be observed in the case records that testimony is expanded or extended 
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during the mediation process in the sense that additional information is introduced. Clearly, 
during the recording, testimony often was reformulated, using formal legal language;
62
 this 
probably led in some cases to a more explicit or more complex wording compared to the original 
oral statements. But there is no indication that any information is introduced to the record by the 
legal officials that was not part of the interrogated person’s statement. 
More than the other two points – direct speech, suppression of questions – the process of 
abbreviation and elimination of redundancy determines how testimony is presented in the early 
Chinese trial records. The abbreviation required great skill from the record keeper. On the one 
hand, the record had to be selective insofar as it only should select the relevant information from 
the oral statements. On the other hand, it could not be selective insofar as all contradictions, 
unclear points etc. were to be preserved, even if there was a need of – and precisely for the 
purpose of – clearing them up later. 
It is to a large part through this abbreviation and selection that the agenda is brought to effect, 
because the agenda provides the criterion for selection: Which pieces of information serve the 
purpose of providing a valid defence, or of supporting an admission of criminal liability? This is 
made explicit by the fact that the formulaic expressions with which the record-keeper replaces the 
everyday speech of the testimony are an integral part of the abbreviation process and at the same 
time are exactly the vehicle that signals which of the possible options open for testimony is 
chosen by the person interrogated. As a consequence, the process works in two steps: 
1) The agenda determines the questions which in turn influence the answers. 
2) Of the answers, only those parts that conform to the agenda are preserved. 
The process of abbreviation of redundancy has an inherent relationship with the fact that the legal 
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officials use technical language when recording a case: The statements of the interrogated persons 
are reduced to their essence by recording them in technical language; technical formulae signal 
where information is eliminated as redundant. However, it would be misleading to say that oral 
statements are abbreviated and redundant information eliminated because they are recorded in 
legal language. Rather, the abbreviation is necessitated by the requirements of judicial procedure: 
to select the information relevant for the legal issues at hand, and to distinguish between 
information that is substantially new and thus needs to be taken into account separately in the 
judicial deliberation on the one hand, and information that is basically repetitive and does not 
need to be deliberated separately on the other hand. Technical legal language provides the means 
for the selection and differentiation, but is not in itself the cause for it.  
Analysis: The effects of the mediation process 
Direct speech, suppression of all questions other than those used for formal confrontation (jie 詰), 
and selection are three important mechanisms at work in the recording of testimony in early China. 
The functions and effects of this mediation process are important for the following reason: In 
contrast to both the modern continental European and Anglo-Saxon systems of criminal law, for 
which oral pleadings in front of a full court are essential, the decision of any criminal case in early 
China was, as far as we can tell from the available sources, based on the written record alone, i. e. 
there was no open court trial. The accused and witnesses had no opportunity to directly address 
the judges, other than through their recorded testimony. The Zouyanshu provides evidence for this: 
On the local level of the prefecture (xian 縣), verdicts were arrived at by a panel consisting of the 
prefect (ling 令), the deputy prefect (cheng 丞), and judicial secretaries (yushi 獄史).63 The 
prefect and deputy prefect were both appointed by the central government and were responsible 
for all prefecture affairs, while the judicial secretaries were locally appointed officials to whom 
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law-enforcement and important tasks in the administration of justice were delegated. The judicial 
secretaries actually conducted the interrogations and therefore had direct contact with the 
witnesses and accused. On the other hand, the prefect and deputy prefect, who would have had the 
final word if disagreements arose, did not routinely have any direct contact with those whose 
testimony they read and on whom they had to pass judgement.
64
 Also, according to Han 
regulations, people were not to be arrested and transferred for interrogation to the investigating 
authority if only smaller offences
65
 were at issue.
66
 The same was probably true in most civil law 
suits.
67
 Instead, defendants and witnesses made a deposition in front of an official of the nearest 
sub-prefecture (xiang 鄉 “township”) authority, which committed it to writing and passed it on to 
the authority adjudicating the case.
68
 Finally, if a case was submitted to a higher authority for 
approval of the judgement or for decision in the case of doubtful legal matters, only the written 
record was submitted and thus formed the sole basis for the eventual judicial decision. Only in 
very limited circumstances – in capital cases and cases involving the killing of another person,69 
as well as in petitions for a new finding of facts (qi ju 乞鞫) submitted by the accused70 – the 
higher level authorities conducted an independent investigation, including a fresh interrogation of 
witnesses and the defendant. 
For these reasons, it was testimony in its mediated form that mattered. As a consequence, it is 
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necessary to analyse the meditation process and its effects and functions, as these had an 
immediate impact on the judicial decision. Certainly, practical exigencies played a role in 
determining the way in which testimony was recorded: An understaffed imperial administration 
required conciseness in administrative communication, and with the relatively unwieldy writing 
media of bamboo slips and wooden tablets, drawn-out discussions would have quickly translated 
into manuscripts of a weight and volume difficult to handle. However, I will argue that the way in 
which testimony is mediated is motivated by more than these practical requirements, such as an 
awareness that testimony had to be edited in a certain way to be effective, and that even if the 
original motivation of the editing process could be traced back to practical exigencies, the 
mechanisms at work in the mediation process have consequences that cannot be reduced to mere 
practical necessities. 
Standardisation 
One of the most visible effects of the mediation process is the standardisation of all testimony 
both in its context and content. All testimony seems to be filled in into one identical form. In fact, 
as has been shown above, the judicial officials had so-called “models” (shi 式) which instructed 
them on the standard way of recording a law case, including the testimony given. 
The standardisation served bureaucratic and judicial purposes. It served bureaucratic purposes 
because it ensured that all officials throughout the empire used the same format, guaranteeing that 
all required information was present (in essence, the model record worked as a checklist), and that 
the responsible officials on all levels immediately could find the relevant situation at the place 
where they expected it, making the records effective and avoiding ambiguity in regard to what 
piece of information belonged into which category of evidence. Standardisation also served 
judicial purposes because it ensured that all cases were comparable and could be evaluated 
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according to the same unified criteria, with the result that the same abstract laws could be applied 
to them. This means that the judicial evaluation of the case is already prepared by its recording. In 
other words: The recording is a necessary prerequisite for the actual legal work which applies 
techniques such as subsumption. 
As regards the question of political power, the standardisation of testimony throughout the empire, 
which is particularly evident in the Zouyanshu case records that originate in different regions, 
means that the unified central state has asserted itself and its agenda. The standardisation is 
mandated by procedural models that the central authority has declared binding. A consistent 
failure to adhere to these models would question the central authority, while adherence means an 
affirmation of its power. 
Loss of control of the testifier over his testimony 
By writing the testimony down, abbreviating and rephrasing it, the judicial officials who did the 
recording took control of the testimony, and with them the state that they represented. This is very 
different from an open court situation where the testifier presents his testimony orally to the judge 
and jury and thus has full control over what, and how, testimony is given. Relying on testimony in 
its mediated form during the decision-making process requires a high degree of trust in the 
abilities of the people who are responsible for the mediation. 
This is reinforced by the fact that, according to our knowledge, there was no equivalent to the 
signing of one’s statement, a process by which people interrogated by the police in many modern 
jurisdictions retain some control over their testimony. There is also no indication that, prior to the 
judgement, people had an opportunity to read the record of their testimony or that it was read out 
to them. There is evidence that after the judgement, at least the finding of fact and the sentence 
was read out to the convicted person. This is implied in the institution of qi ju 乞鞫 “petition for a 
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new finding of fact”, already found in pre-dynastic Qin,71 since to petition for a “new finding of 
fact” pre-supposes that the convict is aware of the original finding of fact, as is clearly attested in 
the Zouyanshu.72 Zheng Zhong (5 BC – 83 AD) mentions the practice of du ju 讀鞫 “reading out 
the finding of fact”.73 Furthermore, Jin Zhuo 晉灼 of the 3rd century AD, commenting on the Shiji, 
explicitly states: “When a criminal case has been concluded, the wording of the finding of fact 
and the document containing the punishment are read out to the remand prisoner; in cases where 
the remand prisoner calls these incorrect (cheng kuang 稱狂) and thus wishes to petition for a new 
finding of fact, this is to be granted.”74 However, these sources only indicate that the finding of 
fact and the sentence, but not the testimony, was read out, and that this was done only after the 
judgement had been passed. 
For the testifier, the mediation of his testimony represented a trade-off: On the one hand, the loss 
of control entailed the risk that his testimony was misrepresented or presented in a way 
disadvantageous to the testifier. On the other hand, the mediation had three effects that potentially 
worked to his advantage: The preservation of immediacy and authenticity, the granting of 
efficiency and significance, and the imbuing of his testimony with a confidence and knowledge in 
legal matters on par with that of the record-keepers. 
Immediacy and authenticity 
The recording of testimony had the effect to preserve its immediacy and thereby grant it 
authenticity. This is particularly important because the accused and the witnesses addressed their 
judges mainly through the written record. In this situation, the amount of immediacy retained in 
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the record determines to what extent testimony retains its authenticity and power. The effect of 
immediacy is achieved by the use of direct speech and by the suppression of any unnecessary 
questions preceding or interrupting the testimony, but also by the abbreviation of the original oral 
statements. This is due to a paradoxical effect: Oral statements need a certain degree of 
redundancy and inconsistency to come across as authentic; otherwise they appear memorised or 
read from a manuscript. The opposite is true for a written statement: Undue redundancy and 
grammatical inconsistencies would in the reader only draw the attention to the fact of their nature 
as being recorded statements. Only a certain amount of editing and smoothing imbues an oral 
statement with the kind of unemphatic air that draws attention to its content instead to the fact of 
its being written down. 
Efficiency and significance 
The recording of testimony also ensured that the voice of the accused or witness was significant 
and efficient in the judicial process. This involves a second paradox: Exactly because the 
statement, in the mediation process, is alienated from its originator, it gains efficiency and 
significance in the judicial process. This is because the selection and abbreviation ensured that the 
testimony was coherent and to the point, and that no important point would get lost among a large 
amount of unrelated information. The contrast between the testimony presented orally and the 
testimony presented in the medium of the written record therefore also is one between the 
unfiltered, but ineffectual testimony originally presented orally, and the filtered, but effective 
testimony that becomes relevant in judicial proceedings. 
Apparent confidence and knowledge in legal matters 
The judicial officials, by the very writing down of testimony, invested the interrogated people 
with the same amount of legal knowledge and self-confidence they possessed themselves. The 
editing of the testifiers’ statements according to the criteria of the judicial officials means that in 
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the record, the testifiers speak through the mouth, or rather the brush, of the record-keeping 
officials. It is little surprising that the accused judicial secretary in Zouyanshu case 3 gets into 
legal arguments with his peers who interrogate him:  
•詰闌：「闌非當得取（娶）南為妻也，而取（娶）以為妻，與偕歸臨菑（淄）。
是闌來誘。。。」 
└闌曰：「來送南而取（娶）為妻，非來誘也。。。」75 
 Confrontation of Lan: “Even though76 by law you were not permitted to take Nan as 
your wife, you nonetheless took her as your wife and wanted to return home to Linzi 
together with her. This [means that] you [committed the statutory offences of] coming 
[from the feudal lords] in order to lure [somebody to their territory]…” 
Lan: „I only came here in order to accompany Nan, in the course of which I took her as 
my wife. This does not constitute [the statutory offence of] coming [from the feudal lords] 
in order to lure [somebody to their territory]...” 
Even the slave woman in Zouyanshu case 2 gets into the same kind of legal arguments with her 
interrogators, and in the written record she insists with the same self-confidence on her point of 
view and does so with even more perseverance: 
•媚曰：「故點婢。楚時去亡，降為漢，不書名數。點得媚，占數復婢媚，賣祿所。
自當不當復受婢，即去亡。」。。。 
•詰媚：「媚故點婢。雖楚時去亡，降為漢，不書名數。點得，占數媚，媚復為婢，
賣媚當也。去亡，何解？」 
•媚曰：「楚時亡。點乃以為漢，復婢，賣媚。自當不當復為婢，即去亡。毋它解。」
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77
 
 Mei: “Originally I had been Dian’s slave woman, but during the [reign of Xiang Yu in] 
Chu. I had absconded and submitted to become a Han [subject]. I had not got myself 
entered into the household register. Dian caught me, and, by having me entered into the 
register [as his slave woman], enslaved me again. Then he sold me to
78
 Lu. But I myself 
considered lawful that I was not, by law,
79
 to endure enslavement again. Therefore, I 
absconded.”… 
 Confrontation of Mei: “You originally were Dian’s slave woman. Even though you 
absconded during [the reign of Xiang Yu in] Chu and submitted to become a Han 
[subject], you did not get yourself entered into the household register. When Dian caught 
you and had you entered into the register, you therefore again had become a slave 
woman. It thus was lawful that he sold you. However, you still absconded. What defence 
do you offer?” 
 Mei: “During the [reign of Xiang Yu in] Chu I had absconded. Dian therefore had to 
consider me a Han subject. Instead, he again enslaved and then sold me. Since I myself 
considered lawful that I was not, by law, to be made a slave woman again, I absconded. 
No further defence will be brought forth.” 
In reality, slave woman Mei might well have been uneducated, frightened and intimidated by the 
proceedings against her. But the important point is that the mechanics of mediating testimony by 
recording it in writing require that in the written protocol she very much appears an equal to her 
legally trained interrogators. Therefore, even in the face of a confrontation with serious legal 
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arguments against her, she insists that her renewed enslavement was illegal and that she was 
entitled to abscond. This can even be observed in the terminology: When the slave woman, called 
Mei, says: “I myself considered lawful that I was not, by law, to endure enslavement again” (zi 
dang bu dang fu shou bi 自當不當復受婢), she uses the same term dang 當 that refers to a legal 
opinion delivered by judicial officials at the end of a trial. 
A third paradoxical effect of the mediation of testimony therefore is that this process, in a way, 
empowers the testifiers: it gives their statements the same kind of legal confidence that their 
interrogators possess. 
The open court model of judicial proceedings where the witnesses, and in particular the accused, 
directly and immediately address judge and jury, requires the presence of attorneys who translate 
the statements made before the court into legal language and evaluate these statements for their 
legal consequences. In Qin and Han China, where we have no evidence whatsoever of attorneys, 
this role is fulfilled to some extent by the record-keeping officials. It is their responsibility to 
record the statements in a way that ensures that they are related to the legal questions at stake, and 
that their legal implications are immediately clear. 
The mediation process fulfilled this function regardless of the degree of legal knowledge which a 
defendant or witness commanded. The Zouyanshu, among other sources, demonstrates that in Qin 
and Han China, even ordinary people had a surprisingly good knowledge about the legal 
institutions surrounding them. An example is the commoner Jiang 講 of Zouyanshu case 17, who 
is aware of his statutory right to petition for a new finding of fact in his case.
80
 In case 2, the slave 
woman Mei 媚 knew that, by submitting as a Chu subject to the Han during the civil war, she 
would become a free person. Less clear is why she did not register: She might not have known 
about this additional requirement, or she might have consciously avoided registration in order to 
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avoid tax and service obligations. In any case, the confident way and the technical language by 
which she maintains her innocence in the record must be ascribed, to a large degree, to the editing 
of her statements by a judicial official. The amount of necessary translation into legal language 
certainly decreased proportionally to the legal knowledge of the witness or the defendant (in the 
extreme case, the testifier was a jurist himself, as in Zouyanshu case 3). However, even if this was 
the case, the mediation process had the potential to fill any remaining gap in legal certainty. 
Conclusions 
Testimony played a crucial role in early Chinese judicial procedure, which relied on testimony for 
finding the truth and determining guilt. In the early Chinese documents, we find the strong 
conception that first-hand testimony constitutes a privileged form to gain access to the truth, as 
opposed to other forms of inquiry and proof-seeking that do not involve the narration of personal 
experiences. This caused testimony to be placed in the centre of all judicial proceedings and to 
become the primary means both for determining what really happened, and whether an action 
constituted a punishable offence or not. One important consequence is that a confession was 
required from the accused in order to pronounce him guilty. The confession requirement served, 
in principle, as a safeguard against wrongful conviction and at the same time implied an 
affirmation of the legitimacy of the state that punished the offender. The confession requirement 
also had the consequence that the state resorted to judicial torture when evidence indicated the 
guilt of a suspect who otherwise would not confess. 
The importance accorded to testimony in turn caused a strong concern for the reliability and 
accuracy of testimony. In the documents, we clearly perceive an awareness that these depended to 
a large degree on the way in which the judicial officials asked and listened during testimony. This 
awareness is reflected in rules for asking and listening, in the techniques prescribed for 
interrogation, and in the legal provisions regarding testimony. In particular, the evolving rules 
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about the use of torture reflect a growing awareness that the use of judicial torture had the 
potential to jeopardise the aim of obtaining reliable and accurate testimony. 
The testimony gained by these interrogative techniques and under these legal provisions was only 
significant as part of the judicial procedure insofar as it was recorded in writing, as judicial 
decisions primarily were based on the written record. This had important consequences: The 
listeners have an invisible, but heavy presence in the recorded testimony, since the records reflect 
what the listeners understood and perceived as important. The recording of statements gave the 
judicial officials even more control over the testimony than their role as questioners and listeners. 
The mechanisms at work in the transfer from oral testimony to a written record not only led to a 
standardisation of recorded testimony that reflects the needs of a imperial bureaucracy, but also 
had the paradoxical effects of, on the one hand, taking away control of his testimony from the 
testifier, and on the other hand granting his testimony significance and authenticity, and elevating 
it to a level of judicial knowledge and confidence identical with that of the judicial officials who 
did the recording, thus empowering the testifier. 
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The role of law in early China1 
Law vs. ritual and religion as the dominant paradigm 
There is an influential school in the literature on China which holds that the paradigms by which 
early (and indeed all of traditional) China is best understood are ritual and religion. Proponents of 
this school tend to understand other spheres like law only as a function of ritual and religion. Four 
examples – three China specialists, one founding father of sociology – shall suffice: 
(1) Léon Vandermeersch, in a 1985 article on “the Chinese conception of the law”2 contrasts what 
he calls the “juridical order” with the “ritual order”: The juridical order is based on the concept of 
individual rights and the correlating concept of personal liberty, while the ritual order emphasises 
spontaneity (ziran 自然) and dispenses completely with any idea of rights or of liberty.3 Thus 
China never knew law in the proper sense. The Chinese, says Vandermeersch, have instead 
always upheld as their model “the administrator who never intervenes”, while those who are 
administered “[act] under the influence of his virtue, in spontaneous conformity with the norms of 
the social order”.4 Phenomena that might look like law in China are explained by the fact that 
“ritualism has always felt the need for mechanisms of a juridical type”.5 These mechanisms were 
provided by the Legalists, who, however only provided a “pseudo-law”, because “it had nothing 
to do with the idea of right[s]”, but “was formulated purely and simply as an instrument of 
government” and found its realisation in the “extraordinary penal apparatus built up in Qin” 
which “was designed and operated to force all social activity into channels which served the ends 
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 2000. 
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 Vandermeersch 1985. 
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 Vandermeersch 1985. 13. 
4
 Vandermeersch 1985, 13-14. 
5
 Vandermeersch, 1985, 14. 
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chosen by those in power, by which the state was to increase its wealth and expand its empire”.6 
This intolerable regime was, according to Vandermeersch, the primary reason why Qin was 
overthrown by the Han, who abolished the Qin system and henceforth used what was left of the 
“pseudo-law” “solely for the repression of wrong-doing”, while the “principles of ritualism were 
to govern all other aspects of social organisation”.7 
(2) Robin Yates in a 1995 article on the “state control of bureaucrats under the Qin”8 feels obliged 
to first stress that “in early China bureaucratic procedure was closely linked to the cosmological 
or to the divine”.9 A large part of the article is then devoted to an attempt at substantiating this 
claim, which rests (a) on a very strong interpretation of the often-mentioned requirement for 
judicial officials to be pure, which Yates does not interpret, as might be expected, to refer to 
incorruptibility, but to a “discourse of purity and pollution” with cosmological implications;10 (b) 
the observation that, according to xingming 刑名 theory, any activity of a bureaucrat is the logical 
counterpart to the inactivity of the Dao and the ruler who is at one with it;
11
 (c) the fact that, along 
with the legal texts, hemerological manuals were found in the same tomb in Shuihudi, which, 
even if nothing is known about the daily routine of the bureaucrats, must have been “an integral 
part of administrative praxis in the Qin” according to Yates.12 The following detailed and very 
insightful account of the techniques and procedures used by the state to control its bureaucrats, 
which is based on the legal texts of Shuihudi, is kept very factual. This maybe makes sense, since 
the principles of administration and law have already be found in the “cosmological” and the 
“divine” and it would therefore not be promising to attempt to find different principles in the 
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sphere of law itself. Interestingly, though, this whole factual account manages without taking 
further recourse to the “cosmological” and the “divine”, with one exception: When Yates comes 
to the rule that a wife was not legally liable for theft committed by her husband unless she 
consumed wine and meat with him, he relates this to the custom of Western Zhou and Shang times 
when the kings “bound their supporters to themselves by presenting to them the wine and meat of 
sacrifice, thus incorporating them into the sacrificial process of communion with the ancestral 
gods of the ruling lineage”.13 
(3) Mark Edward Lewis, in his 1999 book on “writing and authority in early China”,14 puts 
forward the thesis that writing was “employed in state and society to generate and exercise 
power”.15 The earlier theocratic states were organised around the ancestral cult and used writing 
to communicate with the dead. During the Warring States transition these religiously potent forms 
of writing were used to lend authority to institutional innovations, with the effect that “even in the 
developed bureaucracy the palpable religious origins of many practices, the overlap of the forms 
of cult and administration, and the incorporation of new state practices into the imagined realm of 
the dead blurred any separation between politics and religion”.16 Lewis therefore dismisses as 
misleading the contemporary discourse in which the “law” (fa 法) of the Legalists and the “ritual” 
(li 禮) of the Confucianists are sharply opposed, as “actual archaeological materials” show that 
Warring States law and legal practice is based in Zhou religious ritual.
17
 One specific example 
which serves to support this thesis is the observation, originally made by Donald Harper, that jie 
詰, in the legal texts a technical term for interrogation, is also used as a term in exorcist ritual. 
Lewis concludes from this that law derives its function from religious ritual: “In both spheres 
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order is maintained through the identification of malefactors [i. e. demons in religious ritual, 
offenders in legal practice; M. L.] and the application of graded responses sufficient to counteract 
the threat imposed or damage inflicted.”18 
(4) Closely related to these conceptions are those which maintain that in traditional China, 
administration was a matter for literati-officials with a generalist outlook who had been schooled 
in the classics, but beyond this were, at most, only distinguished as wen 文 “literary” versus wu 武 
“military” officials with no further specialisation. Even though – or probably exactly because – he 
was not a sinologist, Max Weber is a particularly influential proponent of this view. He is also a 
very instructive one, as in his work the relationship between conceptions of the organisation of the 
traditional Chinese polity and of the role of religion in society is particularly transparent. Weber 
writes: 
Under the old regime in China a thin stratum of so-called officials, the mandarins, 
existed above the unbroken power of the clans and commercial and industrial guilds. The 
mandarin is primarily a humanistically educated literatus in the possession of a benefice 
but not in the least degree trained for administration; he knows no jurisprudence but is a 
fine writer, can make verses, knows the age-old literature of the Chinese and can 
interpret it.
19
 
In order to understand why this has grave implications for Weber, the context of his 
argument needs to be kept in mind. Weber’s fundamental concern is explaining the 
uniqueness of modern Western economic, political, and legal institutions. On the economic 
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 Weber 1961, 249. Fort he German original, see Weber 2011, 299 (also reprinted in Weber 1990, 815): “Im 
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front, the unique and most important Western phenomenon is capitalism and its institutions; in 
political and legal terms, the unique phenomenon is what Weber calls the rational-legal state.
20
 
By asserting that officials in traditional China were schooled in verse and literature, but had no 
training in administration and law, that China therefore lacked a Fachbeamtentum, Weber intends 
to demonstrate that traditional China does not conform to the specifically modern Western 
structural type of rational-legal authority, but to the structural type of traditional (or ‘patrimonial’) 
authority.
21
 The reason why China did not develop rational-legal forms of government is to be 
found in the specific attitude of the Confucian literati officials towards religion. Although 
Confucianism is basically rational in nature, it left the power of religion untouched, because it had 
to rely on it to legitimate the traditional order: 
A patrimonial officialdom, finding itself in a position of absolute power and 
monopolizing both the official and priestly functions, could indeed have none but a 
traditionalist mentality regarding literature. The sanctity of literature alone guaranteed 
the legitimacy of the order which supported the position officialdom. […] For these […] 
reasons Confucianism has not made the slightest attempt ethically to rationalize the 
existing religious beliefs. It presupposed as an element of the given secular order the 
official cult which which was managed by the emperor and the officials, and the ancestor 
cult of the housefather.
22
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 Weber xxviii ff. For the German original, see Weber 1963, 1ff. 
21
 Weber 1978, 1047ff. For the German original, see Weber 1990, 608ff. 
22
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As a consequence of the unbroken power of religious magic, any attempt to initiate a 
transformation towards rational-legal models of administration was bound to fail: 
The Chinese state changed over to administration through trained officials in the place of 
humanistically cultured persons as early as the 7th and 11th centuries but the change 
could be only temporarily maintained; then the usual eclipse of the moon arrived and 
arrangements were transformed in reverse order. It cannot be seriously asserted, however, 
that the spirit of the Chinese people could not tolerate an administration of specialists. Its 
development, and that of the rational state, was rather prevented by the persistence of 
reliance upon magic.
23
 
To sum up, for the very tangible reason of preserving power and the traditional rationale for its 
exercise, the paramount role of ritual and religion cannot be touched; but because of this powerful 
role, ‘rational’ institutions such as law cannot play any significant part in the exercise of authority, 
and as a consequence the administration remains in the hands of generalists educated in literature, 
not specialists trained in law. 
I will contest these conceptions and argue 
1) that law, at least from Warring States China onwards, was a separate and distinct conceptual 
field which was different from either ritual or religion, and that this is discernible, for example, 
from the fact that there were legal specialists who shared a distinct knowledge and terminology 
as well as distinct techniques; 
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 Weber 1961, 250. Fort he German original, see Weber 2011, 300 (also reprinted in Weber 1990, 815): 
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2) that, even if administration in Qin and Han China did not correspond to the Prussian model of 
the Fachbeamtentum, these legal specialists were influential because both low and high 
officials, in particular those with judicial responsibilities, were drafted from among them, and 
because officials with no specialist background relied on their legal knowledge; and 
3) that law had its own distinct historical contribution, which is found in its role in establishing, 
organising and maintaining the state, and in its role in legitimising political power. 
Law as a distinct field of knowledge and practice 
For the present purposes, I would suggest the following criteria to distinguish a field of 
knowledge and professional practice:
24
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 There is a large body of literature on the sociology and history of professionalism, which for a long time 
has been oriented on the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century ideal of the traditional or “status” professions (e. g. law 
and medicine) of England and the United States (see Abbott 1988, 3-4; Abbott 2001, 12166). Typical is 
Talcott Parsons’ statement that “the development and increasing strategic importance of the professions 
probably constitute the most important change that has occurred in the occupational system of modern 
societies” (Parsons 1968, 536). Parsons’ emphasis on the modern Western, particularly American, 
university system (Parsons 1968, 539-545; six of the ten pages of Parsons’ influential 1968 encyclopaedia 
article deal with the interrelationship of professions and the universities) is also characteristic for this 
approach. 
Since the first systematic analysis of ‘the professions’ was published in 1933 by Alexander Carr-Saunders 
and Paul Wilson (The Professions. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1933. Quoted in Abbott 1988, 4 and 
Abbott 2001, 12166), sociologists have attempted to define traits that would allow to distinguish 
professions from non-professional occupations. Widely quoted is Millerson’s comprehensive survey which 
lists as the six most frequently mentioned characteristics: possession of a skill based on theoretical 
knowledge; provision of training and education; testing of competence of members; organisation; 
adherence to a code of conduct; and altruistic service (Geoffrey Millerson: The Qualifying Associations. A 
Study in Professionalization. London: Routledge & Paul; New York: Humanities Press 1964. Quoted in 
Waddington 1996, 677; see also Abbott 1988, 4). 
This “traits-approach”, common until the 1960s, has been widely criticised within sociology for leading to 
static results and “strangl[ing] inquiry” (Abbott 2001, 12166). Since the late 1960s, it has been replaced 
with more sceptical interpretations, first the “power-approach”. While the earlier Parsons conceptualised 
professions as rationalist, universalist, and exercising functionally specific authority (Parsons 1954; 
compare Abbott 2001, 12167), power theorists viewed professionalisation as a process of asserting power 
and control in society. In this latter perspective, the professions’ claims of specialised knowledge, altruistic 
behaviour and adherence to ethical standards are seen as rhetoric employed to obtain special privileges 
from the state (see Waddington 1996, 677). Even more recent approaches view professionalism as 
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a) The presence of a community of specialists, recognisable by some kind of specialised training 
and experience, who 
b) share a body of knowledge which 
c) is transmitted through a corpus of expert literature and about which they 
d) communicate in technical language. 
A traditional account of the evolution of legal specialists, legal knowledge and legal literature is 
                                                                                                                                                         
characterised neither by specific traits nor specific social structures, but by an inherent and ongoing 
competition with other professions and occupational groups over jurisdiction of work, so that “a profession 
[is] anything that compete[s] like one”(Abbott 2001, 12167f.; the main reference for this approach is 
Abbott 1988). 
All these approaches are geared towards the historically particular phenomenon of the modern 
Anglo-American (and to a lesser extent, Western Continental European) professions and thus are of limited 
value for the study of early China. It is, for example, extremely unlikely that the ‘professional’ jurists I am 
concerned with were organised in anything like a professional organisation; importantly, they are also 
distinct from the typical professionals of traditional sociological literature in that they worked for the state 
in a bureaucratic setting, rather than in free practice. 
The particularity of these approaches, however, has also been recognised by sociologists who see a need to 
broaden their historical and geographic perspective and to take into account more recent developments. 
These sociologists, for example, find that the Anglo-American model of largely self-regulating professions 
which have carved out independence from the state ill fits the French and German situation where 
traditionally a high number of professionals have worked in state settings and even have enjoyed more 
prestige than their peers in independent practice (Abbott 2001, 12167f.; Siegrist 2001, 12156). On the other 
hand, recent tendencies for professionals to increasingly work in or for large-scale organisations such as 
globalised private service firms, as well as within state agencies, has led to a new appraisal in which 
“bureaucracy”/“organisation” and “professionalism” are not any longer thought of as inherently 
antagonistic (Hinings 2001). As a result, sociologists of professions have noted: “If the pattern of 
associational professionalism that gave rise to the field itself is either dead or transformed, then the field 
must retheorise its objects of scrutiny. Abbott’s test – a profession is an occupation that competes by 
retheorising others’ work – presupposes fixed and organised occupations of a kind that simply may not exist 
under modern conditions of employment.” (Abbott 2001, 12168). Within Western sociology, the question 
of professionalism thus is being redefined in broader and more inclusive terms as the question of “how 
expertise is organised in a society” (Abbott 2001, 12168). It is in this latter sense - role and organisation of 
institutionalised expert knowledge within a society – in which I would like to adopt the terms 
“professional” and “professionalism” for China. My own criteria for a professional field then are to be 
understood neither as an attempt to equate early Chinese legal experts with the historically specific 
European and North American phenomenon of the ‘professions’, nor as an (methodologically outdated) 
attempt to define universal criteria applicable to all forms of professionalism in every kind of social and 
historical settings. Rather, the criteria given are intended as a heuristic device for the purpose of evaluating 
whether legal modes of thought and action were historically significant in early China, and if yes, what 
significance they possessed vis-à-vis other modes of social practice. 
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provided by Cheng Shude in the introduction to the “Lüjia kao” 律家考 chapter of his Hanlü kao 
漢律考:25 Legal studies (lüxue 律學) thrived for the first time in the Warring States period with 
the Fajing 法經, attributed to the Wei chancellor Li Kui 李悝,26 and the legalist treatises of Shang 
Yang 商鞅, Shen Buhai 申不害, Shen Dao 慎到, Hanfei 韓非, and others, all mentioned in the 
bibliographical treatise (“Yiwen zhi” 藝文志) of the Hanshu.27 The burning of the books of the 
‘hundred schools’ during the Qin is significant because from then on law became the prerogative 
of officials. According to Cui Zusi 崔祖思 of the Southern Qi (479-501), since the Han there 
existed legal experts who for generation after generation passed on their profession to their 
descendants and who assembled up to several hundred students whom they taught law.
28
 In regard 
to legal literature, the Jinshu states that in the Han, the laws’ complexity and lack of consistency 
led to controversies and in the consequence to a rich legal literature, including a body of zhangju 
章句-commentaries which was increasingly voluminous and increasingly difficult to master; the 
Confucian scholars Shusun Xuan 叔孫宣, Guo Lingqing 郭令卿, Ma Rong 馬融 and Zheng 
Xuan 鄭玄 contributed substantially to the staggering amount of the more than 7,732,200 words 
to which the zhangju-commentaries grew.29 The importance of legal studies in Han is underlined 
by the fact that when Wen Weng 文翁, as Governor (shou 守) of Shu 蜀, in order to advance this 
backward border commandery selected about ten talented junior officials for training in the 
capital, he explicitly instructed some of them to study law.
30
 At the end of the Eastern Han, with 
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the instability ensuing after the Dong Zhuo 董桌 rebellion and the fall of the dynasty, legal studies 
fell into decline. In this situation, Wei Ji 衛覬 in Wei 魏 requested in a memorial to establish the 
post of Academician for the Statutes (lü boshi 律博士) in order to institutionalise legal teaching, 
arguing that even village heads (baili zhangli 百里長吏) should understand the law.31 This office 
persisted throughout the following dynasties and was only abolished in the Yuan period. 
Cheng Shude relies in this sketch entirely on received sources, some of which are much later than 
Qin and Han and difficult to substantiate. In the following, I will supplement Cheng Shude’s 
overview with an analysis of available information on legal specialists and their technical 
knowledge, literature and language, drawing both on the biographical detail of the traditional 
histories and on the rich mine of the newly excavated sources which allow for substantial new 
insights. For example, while Cheng Shude had to rely on the legalist philosophical literature for 
the history of pre-Qin legal studies, it is now obvious that legal specialists and technical legal 
literature existed well before the Han – the legalist literature certainly indicates that even before 
the Qin unification, an eminent concern existed in early China regarding questions connected 
with law and its role in government, but it does not display the level of sophisticated practical 
knowledge that is evident in the palaeographic material. 
Career jurists 
The advent of the career jurist in China falls into the Warring States period, at the latest.
32
 While a 
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 Evidence for earlier periods is either inconclusive or would require further analysis. For an example see 
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story remains to be told about how a legal profession evolved as a result of the administrative and 
legal reforms of the late Chunqiu and Warring States periods, I will here concentrate on the result 
of that process in the Qin and Han. 
Typical for a professional field is the presence of an employment sector for specialists who are 
defined by their specific responsibilities in relation to other professions and who are perceived as 
a distinct group by people who do not share in their trade, and by the availability of training that 
confers the qualification necessary for employment as a professional. 
The sources show that there were substantial employment opportunities for legal specialists, who 
also had distinct responsibilities within the bureaucracy. The few posts in the central 
administration which specifically were responsible for judicial issues are well known, namely the 
minister of trials (tingwei 廷尉)33 and his staff, as well as the chief prosecutor (yushi dafu 御史大
夫) and his staff. But to fully appraise the pre-eminent role of legal experts within the 
administration, it is even more important to look at the local level. We know from the Zouyanshu 
and other sources that most law enforcement and judicial tasks in the prefectures were delegated 
to judicial secretaries (yushi 獄史),34 in contrast to the prefect (ling 令) and deputy-prefect (cheng 
丞), who together had the overall responsibility for the administration of the prefecture. The 
Yinwan strips show that each prefecture had, corresponding to its size, one to three judicial 
secretaries.
35
 While the Yinwan strips date from late Western Han, these numbers are consistent 
with other sources like the Zouyanshu, which mentions at least one yushi in a number of cases,36 
                                                     
33
 The English rendering of official titles follows mostly Giele 2001; for a general description of the various 
officials’ responsibilities see Hucker 1985. 
34
 Zouyanshu 61, 75, 97, 130, 197, 203, 227. 
35
 Yinwan 2a-2b. 
36
 Zouyanshu 61, 75, 97, 130. 
 192 
and even five different ones in the prefecture responsible for the Qin capital of Xianyang 咸陽.37 
The responsibilities of the judicial secretaries covered the whole spectrum of the enforcement and 
administration of law. They had to supervise police work within the prefecture; while most tasks 
of day-to-day policing were delegated to specialised personnel, such as constables (qiudao 求盜) 
and generally the staff posted at local stations (ting 亭), the co-ordination of all law enforcement 
activities rested with the judicial secretaries.
38
 They initiated and supervised legal proceedings 
when criminal offences were reported to the authorities; they conducted investigations and the 
formal inquest into the offence, including the interrogation. In contrast, up to the actual passing of 
a judgement, the prefect and deputy prefect most likely did not get involved in a case; their role 
was limited to receiving reports and assigning a particular judicial secretary to a particular case.
39
 
Already during the stage of the investigation, a thorough knowledge of the law was important, as 
not only matters of fact were investigated during the inquest, but also matters of law addressed. 
Specialised legal knowledge was even more crucial during the actual adjudication of a case, 
which also was an important task of the judicial secretaries who, together with the prefect and 
deputy-prefect, were members of the panel that passed judgement.
40
 
While the judicial secretaries had a paramount role in local legal matters, they were supported in 
their duties by a relatively large number of subordinate staff and low-level functionaries on which 
they could draw on an ad-hoc basis. The officials charged with police duties have already been 
mentioned. Station heads were among those officials who could receive a criminal complaint 
alleging an offence and then at least in some instances had to make an independent decision 
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whether the criminal complaint warranted search and arrest or not.
41
 Other staff was available for 
taking deposits, investigating crime scenes, conducting forensic examinations, supervising 
prisons, recording trials, and preparing legal documents.
42
 While few specifics are known about 
the people filling these posts, it is clear that they required legal knowledge and that these were the 
posts to which young people who had received legal training
43
 usually were first drafted. 
The same structure and division of responsibilities is replicated on the next higher level of 
territorial administration, the commandery (jun 郡). While overall administrative responsibility 
lay with the governor (shou 守) and deputy governor (shoucheng 守丞), the enforcement and 
administration of law was entrusted to a number of locally appointed secretaries-in-chief (zushi 
卒史). The Yinwan strips mention nine secretaries-in-chief overall for Donghai 東海 
commandery in late Western Han. It is very likely that only some of them specialised in legal 
matters. The Zouyanshu mentions for the commandery Nanjun 南郡 three secretaries-in-chief 
responsible for an individual Qin case,
44
 and one secretary-in-chief dealing with two Han cases.
45
 
The sources indicate that at the commandery level, administration was organised into various 
departments (cao 曹) and that among them was a “judicial department” (juecao 決曹), which was 
led by one or more “secretaries of the judicial department” (juecao shi 決曹史).46 As the Yinwan 
strips do not list any such functionaries, it is likely that this was but another name for those 
secretaries-in-chief who were in charge of legal matters. Like their counterparts in the prefectures, 
the secretaries-in-chief in charge of judicial matters (zushi/juecao shi) were responsible for the 
enforcement and administration of law within their jurisdiction. In particular, they investigated 
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 Zouyanshu 36-37. 
42
 See for example the various supporting staff in the Fengzhen shi. 
43
 On legal training see page 170 and passim in the biographical information given for some jurists below. 
44
 Zouyanshu 124. 
45
 Zouyanshu 67, 74. 
46
 See Chen Mengjia 1980, 99ff. According to Chen’s sources, one secretary (shi 史) was assigned to the 
judicial department of a commandery. On this office see also Hanshu 51, 2368 and 76, 3227. 
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those cases that were assigned to the commandery either by the statutes, such as the compulsory 
review of all capital cases and cases involving somebody’s killing,47 or by the central government 
on a case-by-case basis.
48
 If required, they conducted a formal inquest and participated, together 
with the governor and deputy governor, in the actual adjudication.
49
 
Biographical information shows that people actually trained for these judicial posts and made a 
career in them. Such information is scarce for Qin and the early decades of the Han, for which 
Shiji and Hanshu are generally not rich in biographical information. Also, in this early period 
military exploits in the unification of the empire and the civil war were maybe the most important 
qualification for high office, so that few jurists would have risen to those highest posts on which 
Shiji and Hanshu contain information, while the local jurists escaped their attention. However, 
some information can be gleaned from the tombs that have yielded the legal texts. 
In addition to the legal texts – excerpts from statutes and detailed explanations on their 
implementation, instructions for the resolution of doubtful legal problems, model records – and 
the two hemerological texts that Yates mentions, a chronicle was found in the Shuihudi tomb that 
contains information about a certain Xi 喜 who is almost certainly to be identified with the tomb 
owner.
50
 This chronicle shows that the tomb owner is an example of a Qin official who made a 
career in the administration of law on prefecture level. The chronicle notes that in 243, when Xi 
was aged 19 and had already served in the military for about one year in some administrative 
function, he was given the post of secretary (shi 史)51 in Anlu 安陸52 prefecture.53 Two years later, 
                                                     
47
 Ernian lüling 396-397. 
48
 See e. g. Zouyanshu 124-126 for such the assignment of a case involving a prefecture in Cangwu 蒼梧 
commandery to neighbouring Nanjun 南郡 commandery. The assignment was made by the chief prosecutor 
(yushi dafu 御史大夫) at the imperial court. 
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 Zouyanshu 67, 74. 
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 Shuihudi Qin mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 1990, 3. 
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 The character in front of shi 史 is not legible on the bamboo strip, so that it is not clear what exact position 
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he was made a secretary-in-charge (lingshi 令史) in the same prefecture, and after one further 
year transferred to the same position in nearby Yan 鄢54 prefecture. As secretaries-in-charge 
sometimes are noted in connection with legal cases, he might already have been very much 
involved in legal matters at this time.
55
 In 235 BC, Xi, now aged 27, was explicitly assigned to try 
criminal cases in Yan prefecture. In this year, the chronicle notes Xi zhi yu Yan 喜治獄鄢 “Xi tried 
criminal cases in Yan”, a wording that suggests that Xi held a legal position of responsibility, in 
which he was, on his own or with others, in charge of trials. Four years after the unification of the 
empire by Qin Shihuang, in 217 BC, the chronicle ends. This probably also is the date of Xi’s 
death at the age of 45. Between 235 and 217, the chronicle notes that Xi participated in two 
military campaigns (in 234 and 232 BC), but no new administrative assignments. In view of the 
fact that almost only legal texts were found in his tomb, it is very likely that after brief periods of 
military service, Xi returned to his old position in Yan and continued to work as a legal official 
with responsibility for trials until his death. 
The Zhangjiashan tomb contained, besides a collection of statutes and edicts from early Han and 
the Zouyanshu, a text on mathematical problems, two medical manuals, a calendrical chart and a 
military-strategic dialogue between king Gailü of Wu and his advisor Wu Zixu. This indicates an 
interest of the tomb owner not restricted to law; on the other hand, the excavators note that the 
tomb owner was of rather high age and might have been interested in the medical texts for the 
private purpose of maintaining his health.56 The calendrical table found in the Zhangjiashan tomb 
                                                                                                                                                         
Xi took up; it must have been a low-level administrative assignment. The editors suspect that the missing 
character is to be emendated to yu 御 (Shuihudi Qin mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 1990, 10 footnote 48 to strip 
11b. 
52
 Zhongguo lishi dituji 11-12,2*5. Anlu was subordinated to Nanjun 南郡 commandery  
53
 Biannnianji 11b. 
54
 Zhongguo lishi dituji 11-12,2*5. 
55
 The Fengzhen shi alone mentions lingshi fourteen times in such roles. 
56
 Zhangjiashan Han mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 1985, 15. The age is indicated by the presence of a 
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contains only the personal information that Xin, most likely the tomb owner, submitted to the Han 
in 202 BC and was relieved of his office in 194 BC due to illness,
57
 indicating that the tomb owner 
served as an official, probably on the local level of a prefecture, during the reign of the Gaozu 
emperor. As we do not have any information that medical specialists were normally employed by 
the state as officials, it is likely that the medical texts indeed express a personal interest, while the 
legal texts point to a, probably lifelong, occupation in a capacity concerned with legal matters. 
While information on professional jurists is relatively scarce for Qin and the early Han decades, 
this situation changes in the later decades of the Western Han. Military merit not any more being 
paramount for employment in high office, more jurists had a chance to rise to those high offices to 
which the Shiji and Hanshu pay their primary attention. The general higher density of 
biographical information available from the decades immediately preceding the compilation of 
the histories also contributes to this fuller picture, which reveals that some of the people who are 
well known for their thoughtful memorials, attainment of high position and courageous opinions 
expressed at crucial historical junctures have a professional background as career jurists. The 
following analysis systematically looks at all people for whom the Shiji and Hanshu record that 
they served, at least for some time, as local judicial officials on prefecture or commandery level. 
Specifically, the analysis will try to answer the question what qualified these officials for their 
judicial posts, how did they attain these, and which further career options were opened by their 
local judicial appointments. Due to the nature of the sources, which neglect local officials unless 
they later attained very high office, information is only available for a relative small number of 
people. This is certainly not a representative sample. Nonetheless, we gain precious general 
information about the role of judicial officials, and the avenues open to them. 
                                                                                                                                                         
dove-finial staff, which was conferred as a special privilege to those 70-75 years of age, depending on rank 
(see Ernian lüling 355). 
57
 Lipu 2, 10. 
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Yu Gong 于公58 is an example of a jurist who made a career in legal positions at the prefecture 
and commandery level and gained recognition in them. By virtue of being the father of the famous 
Yu Dingguo 于定國, Yu Gong is one of the few local jurists on whom the histories include 
biographical information even though they never rose to offices beyond the local and regional 
level. The Hanshu reports that Yu Gong first served as judicial secretary in a prefecture (xian 
yushi 縣獄史), then as an official in the judicial department of a commandery (jun juecao 郡決
曹)59 and finally as jueyuping 決獄平 “arbiter for deciding trials”, an office that is not well 
documented, but the name of which makes clear that it was concerned with the decision of 
judicial cases, probably on the local or regional level.
60
 Yu Gong is best known for the case of a 
young woman, who, having been widowed at a young age, nevertheless continued to care for her 
aged mother-in-law in a self-sacrificing way, steadfastly refusing to re-marry. When the 
mother-in-law committed suicide in order to relieve her from the burden of caring for her, the 
mother-in-law’s natural daughter reported the daughter-in-law for killing her mother. 
Consequently, the daughter-in-law, after having made a wrong confession under torture, was 
sentenced to death by the prefecture. Yu Gong became involved in the case when it was submitted 
to the commandery for the mandatory review of any death-penalty case and strongly argued for 
the innocence of the woman, but was overruled by the governor. Yu Gong finally was vindicated 
when a three-year long disastrous draught was interpreted as heavenly retribution for the unjust 
execution.
61
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 Yu is the family name, Gong an honorary title, not the first name. 
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 Although not explicitly stated, it must be assumed that Yu served as secretary of the judicial department 
(juecaoshi 決曹史, see above), as he the account makes clear that he was directly answerable to the 
commandery governor. 
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 Hanshu 71, 3041. 
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 Hanshu 71, 3041-3042. On Yu Gong, see also Loewe 2000, 660 (Loewe erroneously interprets gu 姑 in 
Hanshu 71, 3041 as “aunt”; while gu also refers to the father’s sister, it is the common designation of the 
husband’s mother, see Erya 4, 63b, Zuozhuan Zhao 28,724,16f, and Zuozhuan Xiang 2,415,5 with a 
classical passage on the wife’s filial duty to care for her mother-in-law – fu yang gu 婦養姑. In the Hanshu 
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Yu Gong’s son Yu Dingguo is an example of a jurist who demonstrates that legal careers did not 
stop at the prefecture or commandery level, but that legal training and achievements in at the local 
level enabled judicial officials to rise all the way to the highest judicial offices of the empire. Yu 
Dingguo was first taught law by his father and after the latter’s death also became judicial 
secretary in a prefecture (xian yushi 縣獄史), followed by a post in the judicial department of a 
commandery (jun juecao 郡決曹), thereby duplicating, at first, the career of his father. But then 
he was recruited to the central government and filled the post of secretary to the minister of trials 
(tingwei shi 廷尉史), where he was assigned to try attempts at rebellion against the emperor, i. e. 
very high-profile cases. His talents evident, he was promoted to the 1000-bushel office of palace 
prosecutor (yushi zhongcheng 御史中丞).62 When, following the Zhaodi emperor’s death in 74 
BC, Liu He 劉賀 was enthroned as emperor, Yu Dingguo submitted a politically risky memorial 
criticising the latter’s conduct as immoral. Shortly after, Huo Guang 霍光, the empire’s dominant 
official, not only engineered Liu He’s disposal and replacement with the Xuandi emperor, but also 
requested that all officials who had memorialised against Liu He should be promoted out of turn. 
As a result, Yu Dingguo was given the 2000-bushel office of palace advisor (guanglu dafu 光祿
大夫),63 where he held the quasi-judicial responsibility of arbitrating matters concerning the 
Imperial Secreteriat (ping shangshu shi 平尚書事). After some years he was transferred to the 
2000-bushel office of superintendent of the imperial hunting park (shuiheng duwei 水衡都尉),64 
his only non-judicial appointment before becoming chief minister later in his life, and then being 
appointed as minister of trials (tingwei 廷尉), the highest judicial post within the empire which he 
                                                                                                                                                         
passage, the context is that of a woman who exhibits an exemplary degree of filial piety by caring for her 
mother-in-law even after her husband’s early death – xiao fu…yang gu… 孝婦…養姑… Therefore, the 
meaning “mother-in-law” is clearly intended). – Generally, Loewe, in his paraphrases of Shiji and Hanshu 
information, focuses on the later stages of officials’ careers and provides relatively few details about the 
early more specialised appointments of Han officials with a legal background. 
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 Hucker 1985 no. 8174. 
63
 Hucker 1985 no. 3349. 
64
 Hucker no 5497. 
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held for the exceptionally long period of 18 years. To attain this office, he entirely relied on his 
legal training and experience in previous posts, as he only devoted himself to classical studies (in 
his case in the Chunqiu) after he had become minister of trials. He rose even higher, becoming 
chief prosecutor (yushi dafu 御史大夫), which, supervising the legal conduct of officaldom, also 
can be considered a legal appointment, and finally chief minister (chengxiang 丞相).65 
Lu Wenshu 路溫舒 is the example of an official who, unlike Yu Dingguo, did not come from a 
lawyer family, but saw a career in law as his chance to escape from a humble background. He rose 
through various judicial posts at the local, regional and central government levels and his 
achievements as a jurist were finally rewarded with a posting as commandery governor. Lu 
Wenshu spent his youth as a shepherd, but then decided to apply for the position of a judicial 
official, and for this purpose took up the study of the laws and ordinances (qiu wei yu xiao li, yin 
xue lüling 求為獄小吏，因學律令). Having proven himself in junior judicial posts, he was 
promoted to the post of judicial secretary in a prefecture (xian yushi 縣獄史), and soon his 
opinion was sought on all doubtful cases within the prefecture. When the commandery governor 
realised his talent, he had him promoted to secretary of the commandery judicial department 
(juecao shi 決曹史). Lu Wenshu then pursued some studies in the Chunqiu, which seems to have 
helped his promotion to deputy prefect of Shanyi 山邑. Relieved from this office for some 
offence, he was demoted to some commandery office. After this intermezzo, the incumbent 
minister of trials recruited Lu Wenshu for an assignment as head of the department for judicial 
memorials and submissions (zouyancao yuan 奏讞曹掾66), an official responsible for preparing 
the memorials concerning those cases for which the minister of trials intended to seek the 
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 Hanshu 71, 3042-3045. On Yu Dingguo, see also Loewe 2000, 659f. 
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 Hanshu 51, 2368 writes zoucao yuan 奏曹掾 “head of the memorials department”; however, according to 
Hucker 1985 no. 7044 such an office is only known to have existed under the chief of staff (taiwei 太尉) 
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emperor’s decision. Some time later, Lu Wenshu was given the post of a secretary to the minister 
of trials (tingwei shi 廷尉史). In this capacity, he recommended to the emperor some reforms in 
the conduct of trials and treatment of prisoners, which were approved. This proved to be Lu 
Wenshu’s breakthrough: In recognition of his merits, Lu Wenshu was promoted to positions 
where he was fully in charge of an administrative agency, first to the 600-bushel post of director 
of one of the treasuries in the kingdom of Guangyang (廣陽私府長),67 and subsequently to 
deputy governor of the capital west (you fufeng cheng 右扶風丞), probably also ranked 600 
bushel.
68
 Lu Wenshu’s career culminated in his appointment to the powerful 2000-bushel office 
of commandery governor in Linhuai (臨淮太守).69 
Bing Ji 丙吉 is a further example of a jurist whose career in legal posts at the local and central 
level prepared him for the highest offices. Bing Ji first specialised in legal studies (zhi lüling 治
律令) and worked as a judicial secretary (yushi 獄史) in Lu 魯. Having distinguished himself in 
this post, he was promoted directly to the 1000-bushel office of inspector of the right to the 
minister of trials (tingwei you jian 廷尉右監). Dismissed for an unknown charge, he went to serve 
under one of the regional commissioners, but was called back to the capital to handle some of the 
cases that were connected to the witchcraft affair of 91 BC. After he again had himself proven in a 
judicial capacity, he faced no obstacles in a career that took him to highest office. He rose to the 
non-judicial post of chief clerk to Huo Guang 霍光, the then-general-in-chief (da jiangjun 大將
軍), only to be promoted first to the prestigious post of palace advisor (guanglu dafu 光祿大夫), 
then to chief prosecutor (yushi dafu 御史大夫) and finally even to chief minister (chengxiang 丞
相). Bing Ji is described as an official who started out as a “junior legal official” (fa xiao li 法小
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 Hucker 1985 no. 5624. 
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 The you fufeng ranked 2000 bushel and was one of the officials in the metropolitan region who was 
equivalent to a provincial governor, together with the governor for the capital center (jingchaoyin 京兆尹) 
and the governor for the capital east (zuo fufeng 左扶風.). 
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 Hanshu 51, 2367-2372. On Lu Wenshu, see also Loewe 2000, 418f. (yu xiao li 獄小吏 in Hanshu 51, 
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吏) and only later pursued some studies in the Shijing and ritual classics.70 
Wang Zun 王尊 is an example of a man from a humble background for whom a legal career 
proved a stepping stone to higher, non-specialist offices mainly in regional administration. 
Orphaned at an early age, Wang Zun was entrusted to the care of his uncles who sent him to tend 
sheep in the marches. However, he secretly devoted himself to studies and mastered the clerical 
script. At the age of 13, he applied successfully for the position of a junior judicial official (yu 
xiao li 獄小吏) in a prefecture and after some years was transferred to a post in the office of the 
commandery governor. His ability to answer any question regarding the implementation of 
imperial edicts was noted by the governor, who entrusted Wang Zun with responsibility for the 
prisons in the commandery. After resigning for reasons of illness, he took instructions in the 
Shangshu 尚書 and Lunyu 論語, but was soon recalled to take responsibility for the trials held 
under the governor’s jurisdiction and was made secretary of the commandery judicial department 
(jun juecao shi 郡決曹史). After some further years, he was chosen to serve on the staff of the 
Youzhou 幽州 regional inspector (cishi 刺史). His work as a legal specialist prepared Wang Zun 
for appointments where he was fully responsible for an agency: After his term in Youzhou, Wang 
Zun was successively appointed head of the salt commission (yanguan zhang 鹽官長) in Liaoxi 
遼西; made prefect of Guo 虢, at some stage with responsibility for other prefectures in the area; 
governor of Anding 安定; colonel, with responsibility for transport, to the general-protector of the 
Qiang (hu Qiang jiangjun zhuan xiaowei 護羌將軍轉校尉); prefect of Mei 郿; regional inspector 
(cishi 刺史) of Yizhou 益州; administrator (相) of Dongping 東平; colonel for internal security 
(sili xiaowei 司隸校尉); prefect of Gaoling 高陵; advisor (jian dafu 諫大夫); palace advisor 
(guanglu dafu 光祿大夫); acting, and subsequent substantial governor of the capital centre 
(jingchaoyin 京兆尹); regional inspector (cishi 刺史) of Xuzhou 徐州; governor of Dongjun 東
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 Hanshu 74, 3142-3145. On Bing Ji, see also Loewe 2000, 12f. (as described above, Loewe’s rendering of 
yushi 獄史 as “prison official” does not suggest the actual role of a judicial secretary with oversight over all 
legal matters in a prefecture). 
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郡. While none of these posts carried specialised judicial duties, Wang Zun was noted for a style 
of administration which frequently framed issues in legal terms, gave priority to the enforcement 
of law and order and frequently challenged people to live up to their legal duties, pronouncing 
harsh punishment on people who failed to do so. This style led to criticism and caused Wang Zun 
to be dismissed, only to be recalled when other approaches failed.
71
 
The information about the role of judicial officials within the bureaucracy as well as the 
biographical information about specific jurists, taken together, show that law was an attractive 
career path that was actively pursued; this is indicated by the use of words like qiu 求 in some 
biographies. The sources mention that a training in law was a requirement for such a career. While 
the sources in several instances mention the humble background of the jurists, it is unclear 
whether legal training was particularly attractive for people from such families, either because it 
was more easily available than an education in classical learning, or because it offered better 
employment opportunities. In some instances, young men had the opportunity, like Yu Dingguo, 
to obtain a legal education at home, especially if their father or other relatives were jurists. But 
legal training seems to have been also available outside of the family. It is unlikely that jurists 
were completely self-taught, if only for the reason that a study of law required access not only to 
the current laws, but also to legal literature (see below). At least in the later decades of the 
Western Han period, it seems to have been common for jurists who aspired to higher, 
non-specialised office to complement their training with classical education. But such training 
was only taken after a distinguished judicial post, usually at commandery level, already had been 
attained; others took classical education only very late, such as Yu Dingguo who was already 
minister of trials. In the latter’s case, is not clear if his studies in the Chunqiu were a requirement 
for his advancement to chief prosecutor (yushi dafu 御史大夫) and chief minister (chengxiang 丞
相), or more a matter of prestige or personal interest; however, it has to be kept in mind that since 
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around the middle of the second century BC, it had become fashionable to treat legal problems in 
a Chunqiu framework, one of the dominant intellectual trends of the time.
72
 Even if no formal 
requirement for his further advancement, Yu Dingguo might therefore well have been aware that 
his Chunqiu studies were suited to enhance his intellectual standing as a legal specialist. On the 
other hand, it is unlikely that a classical education was a career factor in Qin and the first Han 
decades, when classical learning was either not valued or was surpassed in importance by military 
merits.
73
 
The typical initial employment goal for a young lawyer seems to have been one of the numerous 
low-level judicial posts at the prefecture which usually are not further specified but simply 
summed up in terms like yu xiao li 獄小吏. It is probable that many officials with more or less 
legal training spent a lifetime moving between such posts, but for an ambitious and capable jurist, 
the next career goal was an appointment as judicial secretary (yushi 獄史) in a prefecture. If he 
distinguished himself, the following step was a judicial post in a commandery, mostly as secretary 
of the judicial department (juecao shi 決曹史), an appointment shared by all of the Han officials 
mentioned, with the exception of Bing Ji, who seems to have jumped this step. Zouyanshu case 22 
is instructive on the circumstances in which a judicial official could be promoted to the equivalent 
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post at the next higher administrative level of the commandery: This case record contains the 
request to grant such an advancement to a judicial secretary who has solved an exceptionally 
difficult case.
74
 There were several options after attaining the highest judicial office in a 
prefecture or commandery: For most jurists, such an appointment was certainly the crowning of 
their career. The example of Yu Gong, for whom an altar was erected, demonstrates that it was 
possible to achieve a high reputation or even fame in such a local office. Other jurists, such as Lu 
Wenshu, Bing Ji and in particular Yu Dingguo, went on to specialised judicial posts in the central 
government, typically being appointed to the staff of the minister of trials. From there, Yu 
Dingguo went on to become minister of trials himself and keeping this post for an exceptional 
long time. Bing Ji was promoted to positions that, while not primarily concerned with the 
administration of law, required legal knowledge. Lu Wenshu, on the other hand, was rewarded for 
his merits as a jurist in the central government with non-specialised appointments. A third career 
path is exemplified by Wang Zun, for whom the local office of a commandery judicial secretary 
proved a stepping stone to appointments of importance that did not per se require legal training. 
These are only a few examples of legal experts, chosen because they highlight the different 
options for a career in law. However, these are by far not the only known Han jurists. Cheng 
Shude alone compiled in the Lüjia kao 律家考 chapter of his Hanlü kao 漢律考 information 
about some 75 people from both Western and Eastern Han who either specialised in law or made 
a distinct contribution to the study or practice of law.
75
 
It is evident that in no way all, or not even the majority, of early Chinese officials were jurists by 
trade, but the examples given demonstrate that law was one, and maybe a particularly important 
option for young people aspiring to official appointment, and for some people even a vehicle to 
                                                     
74
 Zouyanshu 227. 
75
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e. Cheng Shude 1963). 
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reach high office at a level that would otherwise have been out of their reach. But the legal 
profession did not only prove important for the career of some, the importance of legal 
professionals, especially in local administration, also can hardly be overestimated. 
In legal matters, the prefect and deputy-prefect on prefecture level and the governor and deputy 
governor on commandery level quite certainly had the last word in cases of disagreement, as the 
episode demonstrates in which Yu Gong’s objections to a death sentence were overruled. 
However, the jurists’ influence in the day-to-day running of legal affairs must have been 
substantial: When Lu Wenshu’s biography states that in his first post as a young man, all doubtful 
matters in the commandery were referred to him (xian zhong yi shi jie wen yan 縣中疑事皆問焉
76
), then this means in practice that the centrally appointed prefect deferred to his junior, and 
presumably much younger, subordinate in all instances were a case was not clear-cut. We know 
little what, if any, regular training prefects and governors were given. While some of them might 
have had a background in law themselves, it is likely that the ordinary prefect or governor did not 
receive much of a legal education. In this case, they would have depended almost entirely on the 
legal specialists in their agencies. It is likely that the responsibility of legal specialists extended to 
other areas than just criminal law, which, as the primary means for controlling the populace and 
asserting the power of the state, was important enough on its own. But as the Zhangjiashan and 
Shuihudi legal sources reveal, criminal and administrative law was not clearly separated. The 
legal experts therefore must have played an important role in all administrative matters. Evidence 
of this is Wang Chong’s observation within the Lun Heng that “when a civil official disposes of a 
matter, he cannot but inquire with the legal experts; therefore, in regard to the affairs of the 
prefectural offices, absolutely nothing surpasses in importance the laws and edicts” (Wenli zhi shi 
bi wen fajia; xianguan shiwu mo da faling. 文吏治事必問法家縣；官事務莫大法令。).77 Fajia 
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法家 in this passage clearly refers to legal experts, not the philosophical school of the legalists; it 
is a shorthand for falü zhi jia 法律之家 or faling zhi jia 法令之家 which is used elsewhere in the 
text. The text deals with the disposal of practical affairs, not philosophical questions. It clearly 
does not suggest that a local administrator should read legalist theory, which does not talk about 
specific “laws and edicts”. This point is driven home by the fact that Wang Chong feels obliged to 
defend the Five [Confucian] Classics against people who would say: Lüling, Han jia zhi jing! 
“The statutes and edicts – those are the true classics of the Han!"78 
The presence of a professional community of legal experts is also confirmed by another passage 
of the Lunheng which singles out the falü zhi jia 法律之家 “legal experts” and compares them 
with the respective communities of the scholars of Confucian learning (rusheng 儒生) and of the 
civil officials (wenli 文吏). This passage is remarkable for the way in which it mocks the shallow 
learning of the legal experts by subjecting them to a mock interrogation presented according to 
the blueprint of a trial record.
79
 
Expert legal knowledge 
A second criterion for distinguishing and defining law as a conceptual and professional field is 
that there is a distinct body of knowledge in which the legal specialists share. 
In any legal system, the body of legal knowledge consists, on the one hand, of the abstract legal 
rules, and on the other hand of the techniques used to apply those abstract rules to the concrete and 
manifold situations of real-life cases. The specific knowledge of a jurist consists in the techniques 
necessary to successfully apply the abstract normative rules to actual situations even though the 
manifold experience of real life defies a neat classification into abstract categories. It is, however, 
not necessary that these techniques and the relationship between norms and the methods for their 
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application are theoretically reflected; a practical familiarity is sufficient. In addition to the norms 
and the methods for their application, a jurist must know the formal procedure which facilitates 
the application of the rules to individual cases, as a formalised procedure is one of the means that 
serves to ensure that rules are applied with uniformity. 
In early China, both a set of rules and techniques for their application are present. A large set of 
sophisticated administrative and penal stipulations, contained in statutes and edicts, was used in 
Qin and Han times. An attempt at the beginning of the Han period to replace the whole Qin legal 
corpus with three rudimentary rules that regulated killing, injuring and stealing only
80
 was very 
short-lived, and the complex legal canon of the Qin was revived and adapted for the requirements 
of the new dynasty.
81
 Qin and Han also had a standardised and sophisticated procedure for the 
adjudication of legal matters; this is evident from sources such as the Fengzhen shi or the 
Zouyanshu, but also from Juyan. 
The Zouyanshu and other palaeographic texts show clearly that the early Chinese jurists had at 
their disposal a large arsenal of sophisticated techniques for the application of the legal norms. 
These techniques of argument and reasoning were quite different from the professional 
techniques used by religious or ritual experts. The aim here is to show only that such techniques 
existed and were commonly used, but not to present a detailed and complete analysis. Four of 
these techniques will be briefly discussed as examples: 
Subsumption: Most of those parts of the Falü dawen that are not concerned with definitions can 
be understood as guidelines to subsumption in difficult cases. This text and others like the 
Zouyanshu show both that subsumption was used as a matter of routine, and an awareness that 
subsumption sometimes was difficult, especially if two conflicting norms seemed applicable to 
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the same case. In these instances, the correct alternative was either prescribed in the legal 
literature – the Falü dawen itself serves this purpose –, or the legal practitioners had to rely on 
other techniques, such as the ones discussed in the paragraphs following, to arrive at the best 
solution. 
Teleological interpretation, that is: establishing the purpose of a given norm in order to decide if it 
is applicable. An example of this is provided in case 3 of the Zouyanshu. The question there is if 
the defendant’s marrying of a woman from Qi 齊, who had been resettled to Guanzhong 關中 for 
political purposes, and his attempt at taking her back to Qi qualifies as the offence of “coming 
from the feudal lords in order to lure somebody to their territory” (cong zhuhou lai you 從諸侯來
誘).82 The accused argues that he came to Guanzhong not with the intention to lure somebody 
away to a feudal domain, but with the aim of accompanying the woman to Guanzhong for 
resettlement; thus, his marrying her is unrelated to his arriving in Guanzhong. This means that the 
accused insists on a literal interpretation of the law. The interrogating officials, in contrast, argue 
with the purpose of the law: They maintain that one of the aims of the law is to forbid exactly such 
marriage alliances; thus they maintain that this telos must guide the interpretation of the rule, even 
though it might go beyond or be contrary to its wording.
83
 
Decision by precedent: In Zouyanshu case 3 mentioned above, the question is whether bringing a 
resettled woman back to Qi after accompanying her to Guanzhong and then marrying her 
qualifies as the offence of “coming from the feudal lords in order to lure somebody to their 
territory”. In this case, the proponents of an affirmative answer bring up the precedent of a slave 
woman who joined her brother in Zhao 趙 after having been employed in the Zhao capital in 
connection with wall-building work there. This slave woman was convicted for “absconding to 
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the feudal lords” (wang zhi zhuhou 亡之諸侯).84 The implied argument is the following: The 
slave woman committed “absconding to the feudal lords” even though she had no intention of 
political interference and switching allegiances, but merely had the purely personal motive of 
joining her relative. Therefore, the accused in the case at hand is guilty of the correlating offence 
of “coming from the feudal lords in order to lure somebody to their territory” even though he 
came to Guanzhong for legitimate reasons and attempted to take the woman back to Qi not with 
an intention of political interference, but purely for the personal motive of wanting to be with his 
wife. In terms of legal technique, the raising of this precedent is interesting in two respects: (a) 
The judicial officials correlate the two offences of cong zhuhou lai you and wang zhi zhuhou. This 
is already hinted at earlier when the officials maintain that the woman’s being guilty of wang zhi 
zhuhou implies that the person taking her to Qi must be guilty of cong zhuhou lai you. However, 
the precedent takes this correlation even further, making a point that requires further abstractive 
work, namely that the legal requirements for both offences are the same. That is, it is claimed that 
both offences are to be treated as analogous in their requirements. (b) The judicial officials reduce 
the precedent to the aspect in which it is relevant to the case at hand. This aspect is the question of 
the motives for the potentially punishable action, namely personal motives – living with a 
relative – vs. an intention to interfere politically. This is the crucial intellectual operation for this 
judicial technique. The precedent is raised to show that the motive is irrelevant, i. e. the accused is 
punishable regardless of the fact that he had an innocent motive. 
Analogy of statute: This involves the application of a statute by way of analogy to a case which 
strictly speaking is not covered by it; nonetheless, the application is considered justified because 
the case is not covered by any other law and because it is analogous to the cases which are 
originally covered by the law. Case 21 of the Zouyanshu offers a sophisticated attempt at a kind of 
“double analogy” of statute. In the case to be decided, a woman has had sex with another man 
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during the mourning rites for her deceased husband, literally besides the latter’s coffin. This 
would qualify as “fornication” (jian 奸), however, for a conviction the procedural requirement of 
bu jianzhe bi an zhi jiao shang 捕奸者必案之校上 “when arresting a person for fornication, one 
has, without exception, to lay hold on him/her on the place of copulation”85 must be fulfilled. 
While the available sources make the specific implications of the rule not entirely clear, it is not 
disputed that the requirement is not fulfilled in this particular case, obviously because the woman 
is only arrested the next morning by the authorities after they have received a criminal complaint 
brought by the woman’s mother-in-law. The judicial officials in the agency of the minister of trials 
to whom the case has been submitted therefore seek for an alternative legal basis that would allow 
to punish the woman’s conduct nonetheless. They propose to convict the woman for “instructing 
somebody to unfilial conduct” (jiao ren bu xiao 教人不孝), an offence punishable by penal 
labour as a tattooed ‘earth pounder’ or ‘grain pounder’ convict.86 Since (a) unfilial conduct (bu 
xiao 不孝) only covers offences that are committed against one’s parents (not one’s husband), and 
since (b) the woman has not instructed anybody, but acted on her own, this requires a double 
analogy. The argument for the analogy, or rather the two analogies, can be summed up as follows: 
(a) A woman owes her husband respect. This is due to the mutual obligations between people 
(renshi 人事) and reflected in the legal obligation for a woman to furnish her husband’s funeral. 
This is similar to the respect that children owe to their parents, which is also reflected in their 
obligation to furnish a parent’s funeral. Since the respect owed to one’s parent and the respect 
owed to one’s husband are, in principal, alike, it is justified to apply in an analogous way the law 
about unfilial conduct, which punishes acts displaying a serious lack of respect to one’s parent, to 
acts displaying a serious lack of respect to one’s husband. (b) However, the respect to be paid by a 
wife to her husband, while principally alike, is of a lesser degree than a child’s respect towards his 
or her parents. Therefore, the woman’s behaviour in the case at hand is to be treated as unfilial 
                                                     
85
 Zouyanshu 182-183. See footnote 93 above. 
86
 Compare Ernian lüling 36-37. 
 211 
conduct of a “lesser degree”. While the statutes do not expressly define such an offence, they 
accord a punishment one degree less severe than for actual unfilial conduct to “instructing another 
person to unfilial behaviour”. It is therefore justified to apply this less severe punishment to 
disrespectful behaviour to one’s husband.87 
This double analogy requires a complicated intellectual operation. It demands the abstraction that 
the dominant issue of the case is about the lack of respect within a family relationship. It further 
demands the identification of a law that regulates such a relationship; as no law regulates lack of 
respect within family relationships in general, a further abstraction is required to find a suitable 
law, in this case the law on unfilial behaviour. Even when the two concrete forms of conduct – 
fornication besides one’s husband’s coffin and unfilial behaviour towards a parent – are reduced 
to the essential point of “lack of respect”, it is further necessary to recognise that both types of 
conduct, while essentially alike, are different in degree. This in turn demands that a second law is 
identified that is related in its content. It is then necessary to deduce the fact that the law regulates 
conduct less serious by one degree from the fact that the punishment is less serious by one 
degree.
88
 
The arguments recounted here are eventually rejected. However, the rejection is based not on a 
claim that the analogy is inappropriate, but that wrong assumptions were made about the legal 
consequences of the law that is used in the analogy. The arguments for the rejection can be 
rephrased as follows: If a child behaves unfilially towards his or her parent after the latter’s death, 
this would not be punishable.
89
 Therefore, if the law is to be applied in an analogous way to the 
case at hand, the woman is not punishable since her husband already has died. I. e., The analogy is 
correct, but the conclusions drawn from it are wrong. 
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These four examples show that in early China, legal specialists had at their disposal a number of 
techniques that they routinely used to apply abstract norms to the concrete situations of real life. 
Expert literature 
A third criterion is that the body of knowledge and techniques in which the legal specialists share 
is transported by a corpus of expert literature. 
Our knowledge about legal literature in early China remains sketchy and is based to some extent 
on the random selection of texts that has been excavated from tombs. Only tiny fragments of Han 
legal literature have survived within the received texts. The Hanshu’s “Yiwen zhi” 藝文志 does 
not list any legal literature, apart from the Dong Zhongshu’s Chunqiu jueyu, which is classified as 
a Chunqiu text;90 it is unclear to what extent Dong Zhongshu’s text was actually used in legal 
study and practice. However, the absence of legal literature in the Hanshu catalogue is not too 
surprising: After all, the “Yiwen zhi” is, according to its title, a treatise of texts related to the six 
classics. Other literature, such as works on military strategy (bingfa 兵法), is included in the 
“Yiwen zhi” only when it can be considered canonical. To be more precise, the criterion for 
inclusion in the treatise seems to be that a piece of literature is associated with a school. However, 
as far as we know, there were no schools devoted to the preservation of different canonical 
traditions related to the statutes. While the statutes were normative texts, their function and 
institutional role required that neither different textual nor different interpretative schools could 
be accepted. While different opinions about the correct interpretation of the law arose when they 
were applied, such differences were, at least in principal, resolved at the highest judicial level, the 
imperial court, which issued a binding decision. 
But even without information from the bibliographic treatises of the dynastic histories, we know 
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that the legal literature was rich and manifold. 
Primary sources of law were, of course, the statutes and edicts which were distributed throughout 
the empire. The only available substantial collection of Han law is the Ernian lüling 186 BC 
found in Zhangjiashan.
91
 Excerpts and quotes of Qin law are contained in the Shuihudi texts, 
while fragments of Han statutes are contained in other palaeographic material such as the Juyan 
strips; further information can be reconstructed from the dynastic histories.
92
 
The Shuihudi texts include at least three different types of technical legal literature: The Qinlü 
shiba zhong, Xiaolü, and Qinlü zachao sections are probably best understood either as imperial 
edicts, as Zhang Jianguo argues,
93
 or as instructions on the implementation of statutes that did not 
originate directly with the emperor, but with high-level judicial officials at the court. Despite their 
modern Chinese titles, it is evident from a comparison with the actual statutes collected in the 
Ernian lüling from Zhangjiashan, a direct successor of Qin law, that these Shuihudi texts are not 
to the most part not actual statutes. For example, the early Han Xiaolü contained general 
instructions on how often the contents of stocks and granaries were to be accounted for; the 
Shuihudi text called “Xiaolü” by the modern editors details the procedure for doing this. 
While these text types, statutes and edicts and, maybe, an additional layer of instructions on the 
execution of the statutes, contain the positive norms, other types of literature deal mainly with the 
techniques of their application and with procedure. A first type of legal literature in this category 
is the interpretative guide. The Falü dawen from Shuihudi, which uses a question and answer 
format, is an example for this: On the one hand, it provides explanations for difficult, or dated 
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terms that were not (any more) easily understandable in late Qin; but its major part are 
instructions about the correct application of the statutes that deal mostly with subsumption 
problems: Typically, the question concerns a situation (a) for which either two competing rules 
equally offer themselves for subsumption; (b) for which it is unclear if the situation can be 
subsumed under a given rule or not; or (c) for which there is no explicit rule available, so that a 
solution must be sought by analogy. The answer to these questions provides the correct alternative, 
sometimes with a short explanation. The Falü dawen presupposes a high degree of legal 
knowledge, and thus is addressed to legal specialists, as in most cases only a short description of 
the situation is given, so that the problem is evident to the reader only when he is aware of the full 
context of legal rules that are possibly applicable. 
The procedural guide is another type of legal literature and complements the interpretative guide. 
An example for this is found in the Fengzhen shi “Models on sealing and investigating” from 
Shuihudi. While some of the individual sections of this text might be based on actual cases, the 
text does not qualify as a collection of model cases, but rather as detailed instructions on how to 
proceed when dealing with criminal cases of different types. The text is clearly addressed to 
practitioners of the law. The individual sections are a mixture of a model record and the 
instructions necessary to proceed with the case. The Fengzhen shi thus tells the judicial officials 
what to do in a certain type of case, what report to write to his superiors, and how to record the 
proceedings. The texts are characterised by the consistent use of blanket names such as jia 甲, yi 
乙, bing 丙 “A, B, C” for personal names and mou 某 for place names. This stresses their function 
as generalised prototypes rather than individual precedents. In contrast, precedents contain at 
least the original place name which allows the identification of the deciding authority, which is 
essential because only this gives the precedent its binding force. The occasional (Zouyanshu) or 
consistent (later collections) use of cyclical characters for personal names in precedent collections 
thus serves to anonymise, but not to generalise the cases. A case only is a valid precedent when it 
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is recognisable as an individual case that has been decided by a legitimate authority. This is not 
the case for the Fengzhen shi. Even more important is the fact that judicial decisions are 
completely absent in the Fengzhen shi, which makes them useless as precedents, which are 
characterised by the particular judgement in a specific case. Even when the Fengzhen shi provides 
procedural guidelines and model records for both the steps to be taken before the passing of a 
judgement and after the passing of a judgement, the judgement itself is not dealt with and left out. 
A text type of primary importance is the case collection. Its main function was to assemble 
precedents that could be used to conduct and decide other legal cases. Like the interpretative 
guides, their focus is on the decision of a difficult legal question, a case which cannot easily be 
subsumed under an existing rule. But unlike the interpretative guides, they refer to actual cases. 
This takes into account that the complexity of real-life cases - which sometimes defies 
straightforward subsumption and requires authoritative decisions, hence the precedents - becomes 
only apparent in the actual administration of law and cannot be fully conceived beforehand. As 
real cases, they at least sometimes also document the correct procedure. This may not be their 
main focus, but it is recognised that a correct decision also depends on correct procedure, and that 
for some legal problems to be become fully apparent, the proceedings must be taken into account, 
e. g. if an accused objects to a legal interpretation during his interrogation. But unlike the 
procedural guides, the protocol of the investigation is dispensable in those cases where the legal 
problem is already summed up in the finding of fact, while the judgement is always indispensable. 
As a special type of case collection, precedent collections are distinguished from both 
interpretative and procedural guides, as well as from more random collections of cases (like the 
cases from the Baoshan tomb, which were found in that particular constellation because they all 
were dealt with by the tomb owner), by the fact that they contained actual law cases that had been 
decided by an authority whose view on the legal issues at stake was binding for the lower judicial 
bodies. The most authoritative precedents were those either decided by the emperor or compiled 
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in his name. An example of this is the Zouyanshu unearthed in Zhangjiashan, which at the same 
time is the earliest known precedent collection. However, we know from other sources that other 
such collections existed and that, in fact, precedent collections played a paramount role in the Han 
administration of law. The Hanshu reports that until the end of the rule of the Wudi emperor, 
13471 precedents for deciding capital cases (sizui jueshi bi 死罪決事比) alone had been 
accumulated. Even more significant is the Hanshu’s criticism that the profusion of legal rules and 
large number of precedents also had negative effects: 
是以郡國承用者駮，或罪同而論異．姦吏．．．所欲活則傅生議，所欲陷則予死
比．94 
“For this reason, the commanderies’ and domains’ application [of the many laws and 
precedents] was contradictory; in some cases, the offence being the same, the judgement 
was different; treacherous officials… in the cases of those whom they wished to live 
attached [a precedent containing] a reasoning for sparing their life, and to the cases of 
those whom they wished to trap [in the death penalty] they consigned a precedent for 
[the application of the] death [penalty]. 
The Zouyanshu and the precedent collections mentioned in the Hanshu probably were compiled 
by the agency of the minister of trials (tingwei 廷尉)95 and distributed in the emperor’s name.96 
Other collections were associated with the names of respected jurists and judicial officials. Bao 
Yu’s 鮑昱 Cisong bi 辭訟比 and Jueshi dumu 決事都目97 as well as Dong Zhongshu’s 董仲舒 
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Chunqiu jueyu 春秋決獄98 are probably only two examples of a common genre of legal literature. 
Legal texts clearly have not been favoured by history and tradition for preservation, and the 
excavated legal texts provide only a small window to the literature that must have been available. 
But it is not so much the quantity of the extant legal texts, but their complexity and diversity that 
indicates the existence of technical legal literature as its own genre. 
Legal terminology 
A fourth criterion for law to qualify as a distinct realm is the availability of a technical 
terminology that is used in the expert literature and by the legal professionals to discuss questions 
in their field. 
A technical term is characterised by its being either not used in everyday language, or in a 
meaning that is more or less different from its meaning in everyday language. The amount of 
difference between the meaning in technical and everyday language determines the degree to 
which a term is technical. 
On a more analytical level, a technical term is distinguished by its position within a web of 
differences that are only meaningful in a technical field, and by its relationship to matters or 
concepts that are inherent to that same technical field. In other words, a technical term derives its 
meaning from its contrast with other technical terms, and from its referring to a technical matter 
or concept. The first criterion is at the level of language, the second on the level of the world 
language refers to. 
The degree of a term’s technicality is therefore defined by the degree to which a semantic contrast 
between different, related terms is only meaningful in the technical language, and by the degree to 
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which the matter or concept the term refers to is specific to the technical field. 
A few examples will illustrate this: Qiu 求 “to search”, zhui 追 “to pursue”, and de 得 “to catch” 
are terms at the lower end of the spectrum of technical specificity. Qiu refers to the search of a 
suspected offender whose whereabouts are not known; typically, the process of qiu will yield the 
information that enables a pursuit.
99
 In contrast, zhui refers to the pursuing of a fugitive for whom 
the whereabouts or other information sufficient to track him down are known; zhui presupposes 
that such information already exists.
100
 De, on the other hand, does not refer to search and pursuit 
as such, but to their successful conclusion, the catching of a suspect,
 
hence the common 
expressions qiu de 求得 “searched for and caught (somebody)”101 and qiu fu de 求弗得 “searched 
for, but did not catch (somebody)”.102 However, the contrast between these terms is a similar one 
in everyday language: Qiu, zhui, and de can, for example, be used for the search, pursuit, and 
catching of animals;
103
 significantly, the combined expression qiu fu de is also found in such 
contexts.
104
 The object is, of course, a different one, but this is not an issue at the level of semantic 
contrasts. The reason why these terms still can be treated as technical terms is that in legal 
contexts they imply legal facts and institutional arrangements: For example, zhui was a legal duty 
for local officials if any case of killing, injuring or robbery occurred within their jurisdiction and 
they could be punished for a failure to do so;
105
 if the owner of an absconded private slave 
searched (qiu) for the latter himself and caught (de) him, he was allowed to spare the slave the 
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otherwise mandatory punishment which also would have decreased the slave’s value for his 
owner.
106
 Thus, these terms are technical because they not only, like an everyday term, refer to an 
isolated action, but also to the institutional arrangements surrounding it. 
Dou 鬥 “in a fight” and zei 賊 “with malice”, on the other hand, do not contrast in the everyday 
language; they derive their technical meaning from a semantic difference that is only meaningful 
in the realm of law. In everyday speech, dou “to fight” would contrast107 with synonyms such as 
zhan 戰 “to conduct a military fight, to battle”,108 or zheng 爭 “to struggle, to compete”.109 Zei, on 
the other hand, in everyday speech meaning “malefactor, villain” would contrast110 with words 
such as jian 姦 “to be villainous, wicked; wicked person, villain”.111 However, in the legal 
language, both terms are in a meaningful relationship, as they both are used to qualify the 
seriousness of certain offences such as sha ren 殺人 “to kill another person” or shang ren 傷人 “to 
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injure another person”. Zei shang ren 賊傷人 refers to the more serious act of afflicting injury in a 
pre-meditated way, while dou shang ren 鬥傷人 refers to the less serious act of causing injury in 
the heat of the moment, i. e. spontaneously in a situation that developed into a fight. Without this 
contrast on the semantic level, dou would not be a meaningful technical term. On the level of legal 
institutions, each of the two terms implies legal arrangements, most importantly a specific 
punishment: Zei shang ren was punished with penal labour as a tattooed ‘earth pounder’ or ‘grain 
pounder’ convict,112 while a lesser punishment applied for dou shang ren, depending on the type 
of weapons used and the severity of the injury caused.
113
 On the other hand, zei and dou also 
provide an example for the fact that the semantic contrast between the two terms does not always 
need to be reflected in the legal arrangements they refer to, as there was, for example, the same 
punishment specified for zei sha ren and dou sha ren.114 
One characteristic of the semantic contrasts between different technical terms is that they do not 
lend themselves to an easy classification into synonyms and antonyms: While in everyday speech, 
gao 告 and he 劾 would be considered synonyms for “to accuse”, the crucial point in the legal 
language is the difference between these two terms, namely that gao “criminal complaint” refers 
to an accusation to the authorities about an offence or an offender made by a person in a private 
capacity or as a low-level official with police duties, while he “ex-officio charge” refers to an 
accusation made by an official regarding matters or persons within his jurisdiction. 
A definite indication that a given term can be identified as a technical legal term is encountered 
when that term is consistently used in alternation with other terms at the same position of a legal 
form. A simple example is the form used by the statutes, namely: 
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 Ernian lüling 25. 
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 Ernian lüling 27-28. 
114
 I. e. qi shi 棄市 “casting away on the marketplace” (probably referring to public beheading) according to 
Ernian lüling 21. 
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Action A necessitates consequence B. 
In such a simple form, all actions that are filled in at position A, and all consequences that are 
filled in at position B, will be considered legal terms, namely specific offences and punishments. 
The reason for this is that they are only meaningful in a legal context in relation to such a form, 
and in relation to the other terms that can be filled in at the same position. For example, it is 
unclear what the punishment of nai 耐 exactly implied. Some commentators claim that nai meant 
shaving off the offender’s beard,115 while others maintain that it remained wholly intact.116 It also 
cannot have meant a complete shaving of the head, as this was called kun 髡.117 However, while 
this difficulty poses a translation problem, it is marginal to the understanding of nai as a technical 
term, which is defined by nai being the punishment for such-and-such offences, and by being 
more severe than a fine fa 罰, but less severe than penal labour as an ‘earth pounder’ or ‘grain 
pounder’ convict (wei chengdan chong 為城旦舂). Again, the severity of the punishment is not 
specified by its actual content (for which it would be necessary to know its correct meaning), but 
by its relation to other punishments, which is observable by its position in other forms that specify 
to which lesser punishment a given punishment could be reduced.
118
 
A more complex example for the definition of a technical term by the form within which it is 
employed is provided by the form used to record judicial procedure. The early Chinese trial 
records can be understood of conforming to a particular form, or model, that is filled in with the 
specific information from the case at hand.119 The full technical meaning of a term is constituted 
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 This seems to have been originally claimed by Tang scholar Kong Yingda in commentary to the Liji (Li 
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only by (a) the contrast with the terms that precede and follow its own position, as well as (b) by 
the contrast with the terms that could be used at the same position in its stead. For example, in 
terms of different positions within the sequence, the ci 辭 “initial statement” of an accused in the 
trial records contrasts with the gao 告 “criminal complaint” that precedes it and the jie 詰 
“confrontation” that follows; similarly, the ju 鞫 “finding of fact” will be preceded by the wen 問 
“[result of] inquiries” and zhen 診 “[result of] physical inspections”, and will be usually followed 
by a lun 論 “judgement”. In terms of alternatives at the same position of the sequence, the gao 告 
“criminal complaint” could be replaced by a he 劾 “ex-officio charge”, while the lun 論 
“judgement” (which pronounces a sentence) could be replaced by a dang 當 “application of the 
law” (which merely proposes a sentence), or the yan 讞-formula with which a decision 
(concerning the applicable sentence) was requested from a higher authority. Each of these 
procedural choices signifies alternatives that contrast with each other, and through this contrast, 
define each other. The gao 告 “criminal complaint”, for example, is as much defined by its place 
at the beginning of the formal procedure, triggering an inquest, and by the fact that it is not a he 劾 
“ex-officio charge” which could trigger the inquest in the same way as a gao. This is also the 
reason why it is appropriate to translate the technical terms with the closest English equivalent 
that suggests their technical function, and not their etymological origin or everyday meaning. Ju 
鞫, for example, is an archaic word, originally meaning “to exhaust, to strain to the limit”; its 
function within judicial procedure, though, is best suggested by the translation “finding of fact”, 
even though the etymology of the Chinese word as such in no way contains a reference to “facts”. 
For the same reasons, a translation of the terms for specific punishments as “punishment of the 
x-th degree” would be conceivable; the more literal translations like “‘earth pounder’ convict” are 
a compromise that takes into account that “punishment of the x-th degree” would sound overly 
artificial in a target language that designates punishment not by degrees, but in more concrete 
ways such as by fines, prison terms etc. 
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Law as the most natural thing even for a child 
In Qin and Han, the expert field of law, complete with legal professionals, a body of expert 
knowledge, a canon of legal literature and a legal terminology was so well established and taken 
as a matter of course that even children could get satisfaction from playing “lawyer” – and could 
surprise their parents with their proficiency in imitating the skills, appearance and manner of an 
actual legal practitioner. The Shiji tells a childhood story about Zhang Tang 張湯, who was to 
become a famous minister of trials under the Wudi emperor:
120
 
張湯者，杜人也．其父為長安丞，出，湯為兒守舍．還而鼠盜肉，其父怒，笞湯．
湯掘窟得盜鼠及餘肉，劾鼠掠治﹝笞﹞121，傳爰書，訊鞫論報，并取鼠與肉，具
獄磔堂下．其父見之，視其文辭如老獄吏，大驚，遂使書獄．122 
Zhang Tang originally was from Du prefecture. Once, Tang still being a child, he had to 
keep care of the house when his father, who was at the time deputy prefect of Changan, 
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 Zhang Tang served in this function from 126 to 124 BC according to Hanshu 19B, 772. In the sources, 
neither the childhood story is dated, nor Zhang Tang’s exact age given. If Zhang Tang in his mock trial 
really scrupulously adhered to the law in force at the time (which after all is the point of the story), the 
episode would need to have taken place before 148 BC when the zhe 磔-punishment was abolished by the 
Jingdi emperor and replaced by the qi shi 棄市-punishment (Hanshu 5, 145). The first report of Zhang 
Tangs involvement in official affairs states that he made every effort to help Tian Sheng 田勝 at the time 
when the latter was detained in Changan 長安 (Shiji 122, 3138; Hanshu 59, 2637). This must have been 
before 141 BC, since after his release and immediately after the Wudi emperor’s accession to the throne in 
141 BC, Tian Sheng, on account of his status as younger half-brother of Jingdi’s Empress Wang 王, was 
ennobled as Lord (hou 侯) of Zhouyang 周陽 (Shiji 19, 1024-1025; Shiji 107, 2842 with commentary; 
commentary to Shiji 122, 3138; Hanshu 6, 155; Hanshu 18, 686). If we tentatively assume that Zhang Tang 
was then in his twenties, he would have been born sometime between 172 BC and 162 BC. Zhang Tang died 
in 115 BC when he was caught up in an intrigue, charged with crimes and as a result committed suicide 
(Shiji 122, 3142-3144; Hanshu 59, 2644-2645; Hanshu 19B, 774-775; commentary to Shiji 30, 1434 puts 
his death to 114 BC; Shiji 61, 3125 with Hanshu 19B, 781 implies 116 BC as the date of his death, Shiji 122, 
3147 with Hanshu 19B, 775 implies 117BC). On Zhang Tang, compare Loewe 2000, 692f. 
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 zhi 治 in the received versions of Shiji and Hanshu is most probably a loan writing for chi 笞 with the 
meaning “to cane” and specifically, especially in combination with lüe 掠, “to subject to judicial torture 
with the cane”. This loan writing is common in the palaeographic sources (Shuihudi FZS 1, 4f.=RCL E 1f.). 
The expression 掠笞 is well attested (Shiji 70, 2279; Shiji 2664=Hanshu 2076; Hanshu 60, 2660). 
122
 Shiji 122, 3137; see also Hanshu 59, 2637. 
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went out. When his father upon his return found out that rats had stolen a piece of meat, 
he became angry and caned Tang for this. Tang thereupon dug out the rats’ hole and 
caught the thievish rat as well as what was left from the meat. Then he brought an 
ex-officio charge against the rats, subjected them to judicial torture with the cane, 
transmitted a protocol [to inform the higher-level authorities], interrogated [the rats], 
made a finding of fact, passed judgement and [requested] a reply [from the higher 
authorities to obtain the mandatory approval of a death sentence], seized both the rats 
and the meat, drew up the trial documentation and below the main hall executed the rats 
by dismemberment. When his father saw all this, he realised that the expressions used by 
his son matched those of an experienced judicial official. He was very surprised, and 
consequently employed him for drawing up the documents of actual trials. 
Little Tang, making a point out of being as true to reality as possible, conducts his mock trial in a 
way that exactly resembles an actual trial; in the process, he displays the expert knowledge of an 
actual jurist. In the text, this is reflected by the use of the appropriate legal terms: He 劾, lüechi 掠
笞, chuan yuanshu 傳爰書, xun 訊, ju 鞫, lun 論, bao 報, jue yu 具獄, zhe 磔. The technical 
specifity and difficulty of these terms is evidenced by the fact that some of them wee hardly 
comprehended by the Tang commentators, even though they are are used as a matter of course by 
a child in the Shiji and Hanshu accounts; only the recent archeological finds have enabled us to 
more fully understand them.
123
 
The terminology used in the account refers to tasks and procedures which, mastered so 
surprisingly well by little Tang, can only be understood by placing them in the context of the 
whole legal system and which are very distinct from anything specialists in other fields had to 
undertake. 
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- he 劾 “to bring an ex-officio charge”: Impersonating a judicial prefecture official, little Tang 
knew that the appropriate action was he and not gao 告 “to lodge a criminal complaint with 
the authorities”, as a gao-complaint was only lodged by private persons or lower-level 
personnel with police duties. Tang also knew that a he was indispensable; without it, he would 
not even have been allowed to interrogate the culprit.
124
 The he was also crucial because its 
exact content determined the whole proceedings: By law, the judicial officials were only 
allowed to investigate the original charge. It was an offence to venture into other matters than 
those set force in the original charge.
125
 
- chuan yuanshu 傳爰書 “to transmit a protocol”: Zhang Tang not only applies correct criminal 
procedure as such, but also displays an awareness of the institutional setting within which this 
took place. The officials within a prefecture had to inform the prefecture head by transmitting 
a protocol about any legal case in which they became involved,
126
 and the prefecture 
authorities in turn had to inform the commandery as the next higher administrative level in the 
same way about any matters of importance and the legal steps taken.
127
 Such yuanshu had to 
be transmitted at different stages of the procedure. In particular, such a protocol had to be 
made if a suspect had been interrogated under torture, noting the reasons why resort to torture 
had been necessary.
128
 The yuanshu kept the higher officials informed and in particular 
enabled them to supervise the proceedings, which included appropriate intervention when 
discrepancies arose.
129
 
- xun 訊 “to interrogate”: Interrogation was an elaborate procedure, in which the accused first 
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was to be given room to present his version of the matter in question. If any inconsistencies 
remained in his account, the accused was “confronted” with matters of fact or matters of law 
which might contradict his story. This is the phase of the interrogation which is called jie 詰 
and to which Lewis alludes. But it is difficult to find a ritualistic or even exorcist nature: The 
jie served to achieve the aim of the confrontation, namely to either elicit a valid defence (jie 
解) of the accused’s actions, or to have him confess his guilt. If he did not so, then further 
investigation and interrogation was necessary if the unresolved matters pertained to matters 
of fact, or the case was referred to a higher authority for decision if a matter of law stood in 
question. The reasons for the confession requirement, which necessitated the jie-procedure, 
have to do with the paramount role of testimony within legal proceedings, the re-assuring 
nature of a confession as ultimate evidence, and the affirmation of the legitimacy of the state 
and its proceedings that a confession implied.
130
 There existed also a well documented 
concern that miscarriages of justice could occur, thus the jie with its aim to extract a 
confession was probably seen as the best method to pre-empt this possibility. 
- lüechi 掠笞: “to subject to judicial torture with the cane”. The confession requirement created 
the quandary that conviction was not possible if the accused stubbornly refused to confess 
even if his statements were inconsistent or if other evidence indicated his guilt. In such a 
situation, the interrogating officials were allowed to break the quandary by resorting to 
judicial torture (lüe 掠), which regularly was carried out by caning (chi 笞). In Qin and Han, 
there was a recognition of the risks associated with torture, in particular the forcing of wrong 
confessions and the causing of irreparable injuries or even death. Judicial officials therefore 
were instructed to avoid torture if possible and, if necessary at all, to use it only as a last resort. 
In 144 BC, some years after Zhang Tang conducted his mock trial, regulations about the size 
of the cane and the manner in which it was to be applied, aimed to reduce the danger of 
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permanent injury and death, came into force;
131
 in 66 BC, imperial oversight over torture was 
further strengthened
132
 after the same Lu Wenshu mentioned above had complained in a 
memorial about the negative consequences of torture.
133
 
- ju 鞫 “to make a finding of fact”: The finding of fact had to contain only the facts, but no legal 
evaluation, and had to refrain from implying any prejudice in regard to the final judgement. 
Questions of fact were almost always decided by the lowest authority; while questions of law 
could be referred to higher authorities. The finding of fact was crucial because it had a large 
bearing on the final judgement. This step therefore required great skill from the judicial 
official, as he had to make a decision which facts were potentially relevant for the legal 
evaluation. This implied that he not only had to know the full context of possibly applicable 
norms, but also their potential effects for the evaluation of the facts at hand. 
- lun 論 “to pass a judgement”: The judgement pronounced the applicable sentence. It had to 
fully take into account questions of fact as well as of law, both pertaining those related to the 
offence at hand and those related to the legal status of the accused. The process of passing a 
judgement implied the application of the relevant laws to the facts of the case, as stated in the 
finding of fact. This required not only a full knowledge of the legal rules, but also mastery of 
the legal techniques discussed above, as not all cases offered themselves for a clear-cut 
subsumption. 
- bao 報 “to issue a reply [to a request by a lower authority for the approval or the making of 
judicial decision]”: Again, little Tang displays keen knowledge of the procedural rules and 
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 Hanshu 23, 1100, with commentary by Ru Chun. Zhang Tang’s mock trial must have taken place before 
148 BC, as he still uses the zhe-punishment, which was abolished at that date; this is also consistent with the 
biographical information (see below). 
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 The Xuandi emperor decreed in 66 BC that the commanderies and nominal feudal domains had to report 
to the emperor all cases where a remand prisoner had died during detention either as a result of torture or of 
deprivation (Hanshu 8, 253). 
 228 
institutional settings. Any judgement in a death penalty case tried on prefecture-level had to 
be approved by the commandery to which the prefecture belonged.
134
 The prefecture 
forwarded the trial documentation; the commandery then reviewed the case and issued a reply 
(bao).  
- ju yu 具獄 “to draw up the trial documentation”: A full documentation had to be drawn up for 
every trial. It served not only archival purposes, but also was the basis for review by the 
higher levels of government. It therefore served as a means to make local governments 
accountable to the central government.
135
 
- zhe 磔 “to execute by dismemberment”: As little Tang made a point of adhering to the actual 
law in force at the time, this punishment implies that he dug up at least five rats
136
 from their 
hole. With this, their offence qualified as “stealing in a group” (qun dao 群盜）, requiring zhe 
as the applicable punishment for this offence.
137
 That is, little Tang was aware of the crucial 
difference between simple “stealing” (dao 盜) and the various offences of stealing qualified 
by certain aggravating circumstances. The simple stealing of a piece of meat, presumably 
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 Ernian lüling 65-66. The zhe-punishment was generally abolished in 148 BC by the Jingdi emperor and 
replaced with the qi shi 棄市-punishment (“casting away on the market place”, probably referring to public 
beheading) (Hanshu 5, 145). This is consistent with biographical information on Zhang Tang which 
indicates that his mock trial must have taken place some time before 148 BC. 
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worth only a few cash, would have merely resulted in a fine of gold
138
 (which the rat might 
have been unable to come up with anyway). In contrast, if one of the aggrevating 
circumstances listed in the statutes was present, e. g. if physical coercion had been used in the 
course of stealing, if death or injury had been caused to accomplish it, or if five or more 
people had organized in a group
139
 to commit the offence, the property offence qualified for 
the death penalty.
140
 The zhe-punishment was to be executed at a public place, presumably at 
the market place
141
 as the central place of the settlement where the local government resided. 
Accordingly, little Tang’s choice of venue “below the main hall” (tang xia 堂下), that is at the 
central place in the courtyard of a residential villa below the elevated main hall, was just 
appropriate. 
Law was such a natural part of early Chinese life that it could lend itself to children’s play. But 
Zhang Tang’s mock trial was at the same time play and the first step to actual legal employment. 
When his father enlisted him for the recording of actual trials, this was the beginning of a splendid 
career in law that took him all the way up to the position of minister of trials, the highest legal 
assignment in the empire. 
Legitimate rule: The role of law 
Law as a means to rule the body politic 
The palaeographic evidence suggests that in Qin and Han, law was not only recognised as an 
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 Such as was the case for the lesser death penalty of qi shi 棄市, where this is implied by its very 
designation, literally “to cast away on the marketplace”, which makes the public aspect of the execution 
explicit. Ying Shao, in commentary to Hanshu 12, 145, claims that zhe-executions were carried out on the 
market place, though it is not clear whether Ying Shao understood the difference between zhe and qi shi. 
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independent professional field, but also proved an efficient means for organising and controlling 
both the populace and official activities. This means that we have to modify a picture in which an 
over-stretched state bureaucracy relies primarily on ritual performance to ensure compliance by a 
largely autonomous society. Quite to the contrary: The state does not attempt to regulate 
everything
142
 – but in the areas which the state wants to regulate, it ensures compliance down to 
the local level. 
In doing so, the state also uses legal procedure as a means to solve one of the primary dilemmas of 
a territorial empire: The centre cannot anymore decide everything, because then it would collapse 
under the large amount of administrative decisions to be taken. But it also cannot leave everything 
to the localities, because then the unity of the empire would be endangered. The palaeographic 
evidence suggests that complex legal procedures played an important role in solving this dilemma. 
One example is the procedure of submitting doubtful cases to the next higher authority for 
decision to which the yan 讞 in “Zouyanshu” refers. The Zouyanshu contains ample illustration 
for this: Cases for which no clearly applicable regulation or precedent existed were to be 
submitted for decision to the higher authorities, thus avoiding that different local administrations 
came to different conclusions. But clear-cut cases were explicitly not allowed to be submitted, 
thus ensuring the efficiency of the central government operations and avoiding that it was 
overburdened with the case load. The Zouyanshu, for example, contains one case in which the 
local government is admonished: Lü bai, bu dang yan. 律白，不當讞。 “The statutes are explicit 
on this, by law the case should not have been submitted for decision”.143 
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 The fact that many offences committed outside of office, and especially within the sphere of the family, 
were only prosecuted by the authorities when a criminal complaint (gao 告) was received implies that there 
was broad latitude for unofficial settlement of conflicts and redress of wrongs particularly within the family 
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Legitimising rule: “Rule of law” practices 
From the palaeographic material unearthed it becomes obvious that the life of the officials as 
much as that of the general populace was at least as much affected by invisible web of legal 
obligations placed on them by the statutes and edicts, as by the visible performances of state ritual. 
But if this is true, then it can also be expected that political power derived its legitimisation as 
much from the legal arrangements as from ritual. There is, of course, a long-standing discourse in 
the West which stresses that a just regime is essentially characterised by its just laws and that 
legitimate rule is a rule of law. For China, though, many scholars would take issue with the notion 
that legitimate rule was equated with anything else than the proper set of rites, which 
distinguishes a good ruler from a bad and, in general, Zhou, Qin or Han rule from barbarian rule. 
But at least from the Warring states period onward, a strong case can be made for the existence of 
an awareness in early China that just laws play a crucial role for a legitimate regime. For the 
philosophical literature, Karen Turner has argued that “rule of law ideals” can be identified in 
early Chinese thought.
144
 At least as significant is the actual political and legal practice. 
One telling example is found in the actions taken by the first Han ruler at the beginning of his 
reign: After Liu Bang 劉邦 entered Guanzhong 關中, his claim to imperial authority was not yet 
consolidated, even though he had received from the last Qin emperor the imperial seal and 
insignia. The first thing he did in this situation was not to hold some ritual performance, but to call 
all the district elders of Guanzhong together to announce that they had long enough suffered under 
the cruel laws of the Qin and that therefore, from now on, the law should consist of only three 
articles which regulate killing, causing bodily injury and stealing.
145
 
There is obviously an element of propaganda in this account, and in fact the Han soon took over 
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basically the whole corpus of the Qin law.
146
 But this is not the point here: Exactly because Liu 
Bang’s action so obviously aims to achieve a publicity effect, it illustrates that he thought it 
crucial for the consolidation of his power to demonstrate the just nature of the laws he was going 
to apply. 
More important than this public performance, however, is the actual legal practice. In Qin and 
early Han legal practice, a number of elements can be found which not only are indispensable to 
modern rule-of-law ideas, but also in early China would have made the claim plausible that the 
law supported an equitable and just regime: 
1) Exercise of power according to the law. 
There is plenty of evidence that this was considered important: The Zouyanshu contains the case 
of a prefect who orders the killing of a subordinate because the latter did not follow his 
instructions in a private matter.
147
 He is not only prosecuted for murder and sentenced to death, 
but also during the proceedings admonished that he is not allowed to kill of his own authority, 
even though as a prefect he has the powers of a judge. As a consequence, he is reproached by his 
interrogators: “You did not conscientiously uphold the law and govern according to it!” (bu jin 
feng fa yi zhi 不謹奉法以治)148 – a phrase that is found in other Zouyanshu passages as well.149 
Even the emperor, although he embodies the highest legislative and judicial authority, is not 
above the law; he just, unlike the prefect, cannot be the object of ordinary legal proceedings: The 
Hanshu recounts a case where a commoner inadvertently endangers the personal safety of the 
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Wendi emperor; for this the commoner is given a pecuniary fine (fa 罰) by Zhang Shizhi 張釋之, 
then minister of trials. Little surprising, the emperor considers this punishment much too lenient. 
But the minister of trials insists on the validity of his decision and replies: 
「法者天子所與天下公共也．今法如是，更重之，是法不信於民也．且方其時，
上使使誅之則已．今已下廷尉，廷尉，天下之平也，壹傾，天下用法皆為之輕重，
民安所錯其手足？唯陛下察之．」
150
 
“The law is something in the impartiality of which the heaven’s son and the realm under 
the heaven partake together. Since the law in this case provides for the said punishment, 
to manipulate it in order to make it harsher would cause the law not to be trusted by the 
people. If, at the time of the incident, Your Majesty had had the person punished on the 
spot,
151
 then that would have been it [implying that nobody could have done anything 
about it, although it would not have been right – M. L.]. But now Your Majesty has 
already entrusted the case to the Minister of trials, and the Minister of trials is the one 
who embodies equity in the realm under the heaven. If he wavers only once, the 
application of the law in the realm under the heaven in all cases would become harsher or 
more lenient because of this – but then where shall the people place their hand and 
feet?
152
 – May your majesty think carefully about it!” 
Though it takes the emperor some time, he in the end agrees with this assessment.
153
 
2) Remedies against unjust action. 
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 Hanshu 102, 2754-2755 
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If the state exercised its judicial power in an unjustified way, there were legal remedies. This is 
illustrated by one case of the Zouyanshu from the first years of King Zheng 政, the later Qin 
Shihuang, in which a person is punished for theft by tattooing and hard labour (qing wei chengdan 
黥為城旦) due to a false allegation. This man, already having been made a convict, exercises his 
statutory right
154
 to demand a new finding of facts in his case. It is found that his supposed 
accomplice had lied, and that his own confession was extracted by torture. As a result, the 
conviction is revoked, compensation is paid for his property that has been confiscated, his wife 
and children, who have already been sold into slavery, are bought back by the state, and, since 
regular employment might have been difficult after the disfiguring and humiliating punishment of 
tattooing, he was given some kind of official employment removed from the public eye (yinguan 
隱官).155 
3) Accountability of officials who do not apply the law. 
There is a strong emphasis on this in the case records. In the case mentioned above, for example, 
the responsible officials were almost certainly punished for the unjust conviction.
156
 This was the 
case in all miscarriages of justice, whether they were committed intentionally or not.
157
 
4) Precedence of proper procedure. 
In early China, there was an awareness that for a legal decision to be considered just, it is not 
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enough that it is valid in its material substance, but it must also have been arrived at by the proper 
procedure, which safeguards against arbitrariness. The important role of proper procedure in early 
Chinese law is highlighted, among other evidence, by the case in the Zouyanshu, already 
mentioned above, in which a young woman, while performing the mourning rites for her deceased 
husband, has sex with another man, in a room just behind her husband’s coffin. The husband’s 
mother, also present at the mourning rites, is not amused by this and lodges a criminal complaint 
with the authorities against her daughter-in-law the next morning, who then – only then – is 
arrested. The authorities have no doubt at all about the accuracy of the accusation – the woman 
probably has even confessed to it, but there still is a problem: She cannot be convicted for the 
relevant statutory offence of “fornication” (jian 奸), because there is a procedural rule that, as far 
as we understand it, specified that fornicators are to be arrested in the spot,
158
 therefore an arrest 
made “the next morning” does not suffice. This leads in the end, to the acquittal of the woman.159 
Even though the judicial officials clearly do not like it and try to find interpretations of the law 
that would allow convicting the woman for other offences which, strictly speaking, have not been 
committed but for which no equivalent constrictive procedural rule existed, they eventually give 
precedence to the integrity of the procedural requirement. 
5) Publicity, which implies two things: The law is no secret, and the proper application of the law 
is not a pure matter of fiat, but open to public discussion. 
Law in China was publicly accessible since Zi Chan 子產 as chancellor of Zheng 鄭 had the laws 
cast in bronze in 536 BC,
160
 and in later periods, there is a clear understanding that new laws were 
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to be promulgated throughout the empire. The Zouyanshu, for example, quotes an edict which 
after the end of the civil war between Liu Bang and Xiang Yu in 202 BC required all people 
without registration to register themselves within thirty days after the edict reached their 
respective localities.
161
 The content makes clear that the edict was to be announced publicly. But 
not only were the contents of the law publicly announced, its application was also open to 
discussion on all levels: The Zouyanshu, for example, contains the transcripts of cases were the 
accused quite stubbornly insist that their action was legally justified, and even if in the end they 
acknowledge to the opposite legal interpretation with which they are confronted by the 
investigating officials, they do so only conditionally, triggering submission of the case as doubtful 
to the higher authorities for decision.
162
 In the case of the woman who has sex behind her 
husband’s coffin, the minister of trials as highest judicial official in the empire has already 
reached a “guilty”-verdict when he is convinced of the opposite by a subordinate official.163 The 
episode in which Zhang Shizhi argues against the emperor Wen shows that it was expected that 
legal officials contradicted even the emperor if they were convinced of their point of view. 
6) Specificity of the law in order to avoid arbitrary interpretation. 
An attempt at specificity and objectifiability can be clearly determined in early Chinese law. An 
indication for this is the strong tendency to qualify culpable behaviour not according to the mental 
state of the offender, which is difficult to determine and liable to subjective interpretation, but 
according to the objective circumstances in which an offence is committed. For example, the 
different forms of homicide (murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide) which in most modern 
systems are distinguished by different degrees of intent, are in early China primarily distinguished 
by the situation in which the killing occurs, thus we find: Killing with malice (zei sha ren 賊殺人) 
(where malice qualifies a behaviour, not a state of mind) – killing in a fight (dou sha ren 鬥殺
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 E. g. Zouyanshu 1-27 and 36-48. 
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 Zouyanshu 184-196. 
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人) – inadvertent killing (guoshi er sha ren 過失而殺人) – killing committed during an amicable 
game or competition (xi er sha ren 戲而殺人).164 The provision which serves Yates to illustrate 
the religious nature of the law is more plausibly interpreted in this context: An objective 
situation – the consumption of luxury goods – justifies the assumption that the wife had gained 
knowledge about the theft committed by her husband, and no further, problematic inquiry into the 
state of her mind was necessary. 
Conclusions 
The discussion above leads to the following conclusions: 
1) To say that legal rules regulated the behaviour of the populace and the officialdom, that matters 
down to the local level are decided in the framework of the law, and that a just administration of 
justice is seen as crucial does not mean to deny the important role of religion and ritual both in the 
daily life of the inhabitants of early China, and in justifying political authority. In fact, there are 
important points of overlap: Law regulated, at least in some respects, ritual and religion. The 
obligations to one’s parents and superiors, which can be stated as ritual obligations, were 
recognised by the law both by providing more severe punishments for causing harm to these and 
by classifying certain actions such as cursing or beating committed against one’s parents as the 
capital offence of “unfilial conduct” (bu xiao 不孝).165 On the other hand, there are important 
aspects in which ritual affected the administration of law: Autumn or winter
166
 was considered an 
appropriate time to carry out executions, based on concepts evident in the Yueling 月令 chapter of 
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the Liji,
167
 while amnesties often were declared at the time of natural disaster and thus clearly 
served to regain the order of the cosmos. But the principles according to which people were found 
liable to punishment in the first place have very little to do with either ritual or religion. It is 
important to stress that law remains a distinct and very important aspect of early Chinese life that 
cannot be collapsed into any other sphere. 
2) This better understanding of early Chinese legal practice has consequences for our 
understanding of the philosophical reflections about law. It has long been understood that, in 
particular, Legalist thought is connected with the laws of Qin. This is clearly true, for example in 
the way how punishments and rewards were balanced against each other. But the relationship is 
often thought of as a one-way-street: Legalism is seen as advocating draconian laws as a means to 
further the ruler’s interest, and from this it is concluded that legal practise served only the brutal 
aims of the state. But if the analysis above proves correct, the opposite approach would be called 
for, and we would have to re-think our understanding of legalism in the light of the new evidence 
about legal practice. This would mean to recognise the awareness that law is only efficient if it is 
equitable as an integral part of the “legalist spirit” of the time. 
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